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Juries, Hindsight, And Punitive Damages Awards: Reply To Richard Lempert, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2002

Juries, Hindsight, And Punitive Damages Awards: Reply To Richard Lempert, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Richard Lempert, a Professor of Law and Sociology at the University of Michigan criticized our recent article on judge and jury performance of a punitive damage judgment task, calling it a "failure of a social science case for change." Professor Lempert's depiction of our research is confusing and incorrect. However, because we believe a reading of only the Lempert critique can lead to a substantial misunderstanding of our research and its implications, we have written a reply.


The Impact Of State Prohibitions Of Punitive Damages On Libel Litigation: An Empirical Analysis, Dennis Hale Jan 2002

The Impact Of State Prohibitions Of Punitive Damages On Libel Litigation: An Empirical Analysis, Dennis Hale

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

This Article explores the role of punitive damages in media libel cases by measuring the quantity and quality of libel appeals for a ten-year period in states with and without punitive damages. Specifically, the Article identifies appellate court decisions for media libel cases over a ten year period from 1986 to 1995, comparing five states with punitive damages (Alabama, New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota and Tennessee) to five states without punitive damages (Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oregon and Washington). Each appeal of a federal or state media libel case was coded for the following characteristics: year, whether the media won …


Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail To Promote Efficiency, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2002

Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail To Promote Efficiency, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Evidence of corporate risk-cost balancing often leads to inefficient punitive damages awards, suggesting that jurors fail to base their decision making on principles of economic efficiency. In this Article, Professor Viscusi presents the results of two experiments regarding jury behavior and punitive damages. In the first experiment, Professor Viscusi found that mock jurors punish companies for balancing risk against cost, although award levels vary depending on how the economic analysis is presented at trial. The results of the second experiment suggested that mock jurors are unwilling or unable to follow a set of model jury instructions designed to generate efficient …