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Full-Text Articles in Legal Remedies

Fmc Corp. V. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Seth T. Bonilla Apr 2020

Fmc Corp. V. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Seth T. Bonilla

Public Land & Resources Law Review

In 1998, FMC Corporation agreed to submit to the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ permitting processes, including the payment of fees, for clean-up work required as part of consent decree negotiations with the Environmental Protection Agency. Then, in 2002, FMC refused to pay the Tribes under a permitting agreement entered into by both parties, even though the company continued to store hazardous waste on land within the Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. FMC challenged the Tribes’ authority to enforce the $1.5 million permitting fees first in tribal court and later challenged the Tribes’ authority to exercise civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over …


Class Actions, Indivisibility, And Rule 23(B)(2), Maureen Carroll Jan 2019

Class Actions, Indivisibility, And Rule 23(B)(2), Maureen Carroll

Articles

The federal class-action rule contains a provision, Rule 23(b)(2), that authorizes class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief for class-wide wrongs. The procedural needs of civil rights litigation motivated the adoption of the provision in 1966, and in the intervening years, it has played an important role in managing efforts to bring about systemic change. At the same time, courts have sometimes struggled to articulate what plaintiffs must show in order to invoke Rule 23(b)(2). A few years ago, the Supreme Court weighed in, stating that the key to this type of class action is the “indivisible” nature of the remedy the …


The Future Of Classwide Punitive Damages, Catherine M. Sharkey Jun 2013

The Future Of Classwide Punitive Damages, Catherine M. Sharkey

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Conventional wisdom holds that the punitive damages class action is susceptiblenot only to doctrinal restraints imposed on class actions but also to constitutionaldue process limitations placed on punitive damages. Thus, it would seem that theprospects for punitive damages classes are even grimmer than for class actionsgenerally.This conventional picture misunderstands the role of punitive damages and, inparticular, the relationship between class actions and punitive damages. It eitherignores or underestimates the distinctly societal element of punitive damages, whichmakes them especially conducive to aggregate treatment. Furthermore, punitivedamages classes offer a solution to the constitutional due process problem of juriesawarding "classwide" damages in a …


Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. V. Curran: Establishing An Implied Private Right Of Action Under The Commodity Exchange Act, Howard E. Hamann Feb 2013

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. V. Curran: Establishing An Implied Private Right Of Action Under The Commodity Exchange Act, Howard E. Hamann

Pepperdine Law Review

In the case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, the United States Supreme Court held that there is an implied private right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended. As a result of this holding, a private party may maintain an action for damages caused by a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act. In this article, the author examines the Supreme Court's analysis and explores the future impact of the decision in light of the role the judiciary has in legislative matters.


The Supreme Court Continues Its Journey Down The Ever Narrowing Paths Of Section 1983 And The Due Process Clause: An Analysis Of Parratt V. Taylor, Robert E. Palmer Feb 2013

The Supreme Court Continues Its Journey Down The Ever Narrowing Paths Of Section 1983 And The Due Process Clause: An Analysis Of Parratt V. Taylor, Robert E. Palmer

Pepperdine Law Review

After nearly a century of quiet slumber, the Supreme Court awoke the sleeping giant. In the past two decades, 42 U.S.C. §1983 has evolved into a judicial Frankenstein monster. Unable to control the beast, the Court has attempted to restrict the creature's movements by unnecessarily limiting its constitutional source. If followed to its logical conclusion, the Court's narrow reading of the Constitution may ultimately demote all due process violations to state tort remedies. This note traces the legislative and judicial evolution of section 1983 as well as the statute's present interaction with the due process clause. The vehicle for this …


Ruckleshaus V. Sierra Club: Muddying The Waters Of Fee-Shifting In Federal Environmental Litigation , Jeanne A. Taylor Jan 2013

Ruckleshaus V. Sierra Club: Muddying The Waters Of Fee-Shifting In Federal Environmental Litigation , Jeanne A. Taylor

Pepperdine Law Review

In numerous federal environmental statutes, Congress gave plaintiffs the right to recover attorneys' fees when the court finds them "appropriate." In Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, the United States Supreme Court held that it was only "appropriate" to grant attorneys' fees when the plaintiff had at least partially prevailed on the merits. The decision ignored both the important role environmental groups play in the interpretation and development of regulatory programs through litigation and the ability of the lower courts to determine when attorneys' fees were "appropriate." The Court, instead, focused on the adversarial nature of such groups and the traditional American …


Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles In The Quest For Justice, Suzette M. Malveaux Jan 2011

Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles In The Quest For Justice, Suzette M. Malveaux

Publications

No abstract provided.


Is A Judgment Open To Collateral Attack If Rendered Without Written Pleadings As Required By Statute, Or If The Writings Do Not Comply With The Statutory Requirements?, John R. Rood Jan 1912

Is A Judgment Open To Collateral Attack If Rendered Without Written Pleadings As Required By Statute, Or If The Writings Do Not Comply With The Statutory Requirements?, John R. Rood

Articles

It is believed that no good reason can be assigned for answering the above question in the affirmative. Certainly none has yet been discovered in a careful search of the cases involving the point. And yet the assurance and unanimity with which lawyers and judges give the affirmative answer to it on first thought is indeed remarkable. For instance, Mr. Justice FIELD in speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, on the question as to whether a judgment is subject to collateral attack if one served with process is not permitted to make any defense when he appears …