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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Legal Remedies
Turning Restitution Upside-Down: The Mortgage Fraud Restitution Formula Amidst Volatile Housing Prices, Nicole Scott
Turning Restitution Upside-Down: The Mortgage Fraud Restitution Formula Amidst Volatile Housing Prices, Nicole Scott
Nevada Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Third Party Funding Of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep The Baby And Change The Bathwater, Terrence Cain
Third Party Funding Of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep The Baby And Change The Bathwater, Terrence Cain
Chicago-Kent Law Review
In the early 1990s, a period of high-risk lending at high interest rates, a new entrant emerged in civil litigation: the Litigation Finance Company (“LFC”). LFCs advance money to plaintiffs involved in contingency fee litigation. The money is provided on a non-recourse basis, meaning the plaintiff repays the LFC only if she obtains money from the lawsuit through a settlement, judgment, or verdict. If the plaintiff recovers nothing, she will not owe the LFC anything. When she does repay the LFC, however, she could end up paying as much as 280% of the amount advanced by the LFC. As one …
Three Proposals For Regulating The Distribution Of Home Equity, Ian Ayres, Joshua Mitts
Three Proposals For Regulating The Distribution Of Home Equity, Ian Ayres, Joshua Mitts
Faculty Scholarship
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s recently-released “qualified mortgage” rules effectively discourage predatory lending but miss an equally important source of systemic risk: low-equity clustering. Specific “volatility-inducing” mortgage terms, when present in a substantial cluster of mortgage contracts, exacerbate macroeconomic risk by increasing the chance that the housing and lending markets will have to absorb a wave of simultaneous defaults after a downturn in housing prices. This Article shows that these terms became prevalent in a substantial proportion of residential mortgages in the years leading up to the home mortgage crisis. In contrast, during the earlier “amortization era” (when mortgagors were …