Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Constitutional Law (36)
- Supreme Court of the United States (23)
- Law and Race (12)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (10)
- Arts and Humanities (8)
-
- Comparative and Foreign Law (7)
- Law Librarianship (7)
- Legal Education (7)
- Library and Information Science (7)
- Common Law (6)
- History (6)
- Law and Gender (6)
- Legal Biography (6)
- Courts (5)
- Immigration Law (5)
- United States History (5)
- Civil Law (4)
- First Amendment (4)
- Judges (4)
- Jurisprudence (4)
- Law and Philosophy (4)
- Law and Politics (4)
- Law and Society (4)
- President/Executive Department (4)
- Criminal Law (3)
- Fourteenth Amendment (3)
- American Politics (2)
- Civil Rights and Discrimination (2)
- Keyword
-
- Legal History (45)
- Constitutional History (18)
- Legal history (16)
- United States Supreme Court (16)
- McSweeney works (14)
-
- John Marshall (13)
- Magna Carta (13)
- Constitutional law (9)
- Judicial Process (9)
- M. Green works (9)
- Judges (7)
- Law & history (7)
- 1789-1817 (6)
- 1817-1861 (6)
- Constitutional Law (6)
- Slavery (6)
- United States History (6)
- Wythe Lecture (6)
- B. Tucker Dean Collection (5)
- British Constitution (5)
- Constitutional history (5)
- History of Common Law (5)
- Jurisprudence (5)
- Legal Education (5)
- Legal Philosophy (5)
- W&M Faculty (5)
- Book review (4)
- Citizenship policy (4)
- Courts (4)
- Naturalization policy (4)
- Publication Year
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 30 of 170
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
Precedent-Based Antitrust Law, Anca Daniela Chirita
Precedent-Based Antitrust Law, Anca Daniela Chirita
William & Mary Business Law Review
This contribution revisits the authentic origins of antitrust law and the U.K.’s legacy of EU precedent rulings, spanning an eclectic and holistic analysis of the wider contemporary objectives of antitrust law, the versatile doctrine of vertical restraints of trade applied in the context of the online resale price maintenance, and the abuse theory of monopoly power applied in the context of excessive pricing and, more recently, of data-driven digital market competition. This contribution offers an original legal interpretation of precedent-based antitrust law: First, sustaining as principal narrative streams of evolutionary development, the rise of authentic precedent, which has had a …
The Localist Roots Of Climate Litigation, Jonathan H. Adler
The Localist Roots Of Climate Litigation, Jonathan H. Adler
Popular Media
No abstract provided.
But For A Free Press: A Response To Press Freedom Skeptics, Patrick J. Charles, Kevin Francis O'Neill
But For A Free Press: A Response To Press Freedom Skeptics, Patrick J. Charles, Kevin Francis O'Neill
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I will outline the history-in-law case for why the historical record sufficiently supports recognizing distinct constitutional press freedoms. Part II then provides a history-in-law response to some of the most common arguments made by press freedom skeptics as to why distinct constitutional press freedoms should not be recognized by the courts. Lastly, Part III makes the case for why the recognition of distinct constitutional press freedoms should become a jurisprudential reality and provides a roadmap to accomplish this.
This abstract has been taken from the authors' introduction.
Second Amendment Principles, Jamie G. Mcwilliam
Second Amendment Principles, Jamie G. Mcwilliam
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
In United States v. Rahimi, the Supreme Court explained that firearm regulations “must comport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment.” This Article examines what those principles are, how to derive them, and how to apply them in concrete cases. It begins with the Second Amendment’s core principle of defense of self and community, which traces its lineage back to classical thinkers like Aquinas and Grotius. The tradition of firearm regulation that surrounded the adoption of the Second Amendment depended on this fundamental principle. But it also developed subsidiary principles that implement the defense principle in specific ways. This …
Understanding Dobbs V. Jackson Women's Health Organization: How The Modern Supreme Court Broke From Tradition And Changed The Original Meaning Of Due Process, Matthew W. Lunder
Understanding Dobbs V. Jackson Women's Health Organization: How The Modern Supreme Court Broke From Tradition And Changed The Original Meaning Of Due Process, Matthew W. Lunder
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
What follows here describes and criticizes the modern liberal and conservative approaches to substantive due process. Part I shows how substantive due process came about in the mid-twentieth century as the union of two extant doctrines: incorporation and fundamental rights. Part II then describes how modern conservatism used the doctrine to arrive at the deeply rooted-in-history-and-tradition test and shows the deliberate reconfiguration of the jurisprudence during the latter twentieth century into the novel patchwork of the modern-conservative method applied in Dobbs. Part III offers a contrast, describing and explaining the traditional due-process analysis of medieval origin and the concept of …
The Law Of Heredity -- Whistelo, Whiteness And Whales, Walter J. Walsh
The Law Of Heredity -- Whistelo, Whiteness And Whales, Walter J. Walsh
William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice
This Article reveals the impact of an early New York case upon science and law, raising questions about heredity that spurred evidentiary progress from maternal imagination to visual resemblance, and later from blood groups to DNA paternity testing. In the Jeffersonian republic, a dark-skinned man was charged with reputedly fathering the infant daughter of a mixed-race woman. However, to most witnesses this light-skinned child appeared to be the offspring of a White man. The trial of Commissioners of the Alms-House, vs Alexander Whistelo, a Black man, being a Remarkable Case of Bastardy (1808) became a cause célèbre in both law …
The Enlightenment In Early America, Annette Gordon-Reed
The Enlightenment In Early America, Annette Gordon-Reed
William & Mary Law Review
The founding of the United States of America is often said to have been the product of Enlightenment ideals that emphasized reason, individual liberty, and notions of progress. During this same era, however, racially based slavery, which confounded reason, denied individual liberty to millions, and challenged ideas about progress, existed in all of the colonies of North America.
The third president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, embodied this seeming contradiction at the heart of the American founding. The principal author of the American Declaration of Independence enslaved hundreds of people over the course of his long life.
This Article …
Patenting The Taboo: Sex, Drugs, And Abortion, Andrew Gilden, Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec
Patenting The Taboo: Sex, Drugs, And Abortion, Andrew Gilden, Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec
Faculty Publications
The patent system provides a surprisingly rich archive of the interplay between social norms and technological change. Patent law requires applicants to publicly disclose the novelty and usefulness of their inventions, thereby bringing to light areas of innovation that may have previously lived in the shadows. In other words, patent law encourages public disclosure of technologies that are taboo—developed and practiced in secret, for reasons such as social approbation, illegality, or religious sanctity. To obtain a patent for a taboo technology, patentees must establish their legitimacy as innovators while navigating cultural norms that are hostile to their fields of innovation. …
The Griffin's Case Phenomenon And The Problem Of Historical Knowledge In Legal Arguments, Rachel A. Shelden
The Griffin's Case Phenomenon And The Problem Of Historical Knowledge In Legal Arguments, Rachel A. Shelden
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
The sudden relevance of a formerly little-known historic case is surely not new; much of legal history is necessarily about discovery and rediscovery of the past. Still, I think the clarity with which we can outline the development of the Griffin’s Case phenomenon offers an opportunity to think carefully about the role of history in constitutional conversation. What follows, then, is a short exploration of the case’s recent (re)entry into our historical consciousness. Tracing this phenomenon highlights (at least for me) some potential difficulties embedded in the interaction between legal advocacy and what we know about the past.
This abstract …
In Praise Of Ignoring Facts, Stephen E. Sachs
In Praise Of Ignoring Facts, Stephen E. Sachs
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Treating every use of legal rhetoric as equally probative of American law is fatal to the theoretical project—including to [Jack] Balkin’s own “thin” theory of constitutional law, which stretches itself past the breaking point in the hopes of accommodating the changing winds of social movements. Rather than take advocates’ rhetorical moves for granted, we scholars have the indulgence and time to look for the implicit theories underlying these moves, to air those theories explicitly, to identify what might make them true or false, and to assess how plausible they are on those grounds. Constitutional theories need microfoundations: a theory of …
Learning To Read Like An Eighteenth-Century Lawyer: The Historical Critique Of Originalism Revisited, Saul Cornell
Learning To Read Like An Eighteenth-Century Lawyer: The Historical Critique Of Originalism Revisited, Saul Cornell
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Historians have been among the fiercest critics of originalism. Among the many virtues of Jack Balkin’s book, Memory and Authority, is the deft way he analyzes and dismantles these efforts to insulate originalism from historical critique. In a short essay, it would be impossible to fully acknowledge the sophistication of Balkin’s analysis. Instead, I would like to build on his impressive achievement by pointing out additional problems with the originalist response to historical critique.
This abstract has been taken from the author's opening paragraph.
Memory, Resistance, And Doubt, Richard Primus
Memory, Resistance, And Doubt, Richard Primus
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
The Burroughs Court did not identify any enumerated power that warranted the Corrupt Practices Act, I suggest, because the Burroughs Court did not subscribe to the enumeration principle. The Justices did not believe—or at least, did not consistently believe— that every federal law must be grounded in some enumerated power. As I have explained at length elsewhere, the text of the Constitution does not actually prescribe the enumeration principle: it can be read to support that idea, but it need not be. And at various moments in American constitutional history, judges and other people have taken the view that Congress …
Shared Memories And Constitutional Foundations, Sanford Levinson
Shared Memories And Constitutional Foundations, Sanford Levinson
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
It is significant that the first word in the title of Jack Balkin’s new book [Memory and Authority] is “memory.” A repeated theme of the book is that what binds a nation—or a constitutional order—together is shared memories around which diverse individuals can gather together and therefore establish themselves as a community. Balkin refers to an impressive array of sources with regard to the topic of “public memory,” but I want to concentrate on one of them, which is cited but not extensively discussed. That is Ernest Renan’s famous speech, delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris on March …
Invocations Of Memory In State Constitutional Law, Fred O. Smith Jr.
Invocations Of Memory In State Constitutional Law, Fred O. Smith Jr.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
This Symposium Essay discusses the roles of history and memory within the realm of state constitutional law. Building on Professor Balkin’s observations, I offer two claims. The initial argument, delineated in Part I, is descriptive. While the practice of state constitutional law often mirrors that of federal constitutional interpretation, the use of history in state constitutional interpretation has unique characteristics, both with respect to text and ethos. Regarding textual analysis, understanding the language of a state constitution often involves engaging with a concept referred to by some scholars as “interconstitutionalism.” This phenomenon occurs when a single governmental body has operated …
Reproductive Injustice, Feminist Resistance, And The Uses Of History In Constitutional Interpretation, Serena Mayeri
Reproductive Injustice, Feminist Resistance, And The Uses Of History In Constitutional Interpretation, Serena Mayeri
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Part I examines the erasure of constitutional memory about reproductive injustice and feminist mobilizations and the benefits of recovering these histories. Part II explores how cases involving women’s subordination provide particularly effective illustrations of the anti-democratic, even absurd, results the current supermajority’s approach to history-and-tradition is designed to produce. Part III concludes with a brief discussion of some sites for the expansion of constitutional memory about reproductive control and freedom.
This abstract has been taken from the author's introduction.
Freedom And Families: Reconstruction Republicans And The Question Of Women's Reproductive Autonomy, Kate Masur
Freedom And Families: Reconstruction Republicans And The Question Of Women's Reproductive Autonomy, Kate Masur
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. In the first, I illuminate how congressional Republicans discussed women, gender, and families in the context of policymaking associated with abolishing slavery. Many Republicans worried that enslaved people’s family relationships had been damaged by the imposition of slavery and sought to impose on freedpeople what they saw as normative family values, including by encouraging heterosexual marriage and by insisting on patriarchal gender roles within families. Second, I show that Republicans were at pains to demonstrate that when they talked about equality, they meant race but not gender. Finally, I reflect on the limits of …
Strolling Down Memory Lane, Touring An Historical Restoration, And The Constitution Of December 11, 1865, Mark A. Graber
Strolling Down Memory Lane, Touring An Historical Restoration, And The Constitution Of December 11, 1865, Mark A. Graber
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
The following pages [compare] a stroll down the Reconstruction section of memory lane with a tour of a historical restoration dedicated to reproducing the Constitution of December 11, 1865. Part I strolls down the Reconstruction section of memory lane by elaborating the conventional legal account of what Republicans were thinking when they sought to improve the Thirteenth Amendment’s Constitution immediately after the ratification of the constitutional ban on slavery was assured. Their most vital and often sole concern, legal opinions from the Slaughter-House Cases to Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard agree, was to alleviate doubts among anti-slavery advocates about …
Law And Equity On Appeal, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Law And Equity On Appeal, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Faculty Publications
Most lawyers know that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged the divergent trial procedures of the common law and of equity, but fewer are familiar with the development of federal appellate procedure. Here too there is a story of the merger of two distinct systems. At common law, a reviewing court examined the record for errors of law after the final trial judgment. In the equity tradition, an appeal was a rehearing of the law and the facts that aimed at achieving justice and did not need to await a final judgment. Unlike the story of federal trial procedure, …
Follow The Bloody Brick Road: Bleeding Kansas And The Emancipation Proclamation, Margaret Hu
Follow The Bloody Brick Road: Bleeding Kansas And The Emancipation Proclamation, Margaret Hu
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
To help illuminate Balkin’s project of Memory and Authority, this brief Essay considers a slice of American memory from Kansas’ historical archives and other primary sources, and examines its unique role in the Civil War. Specifically, it excavates the influence of Kansas’ leaders as advisors to President Abraham Lincoln. Prior to and during the Civil War, Lincoln relied upon the guidance of senior leaders from Kansas on matters ranging from guarding the White House, war strategies, the recruitment of former enslaved persons to the war effort, and the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation as a part of an effective …
Constitutional Federalism And The Nature Of The Union, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark
Constitutional Federalism And The Nature Of The Union, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark
William & Mary Law Review
Federalism is an essential feature of the Constitution’s design and structure, but the Constitution does not spell out every respective authority of the federal government and the States in precise detail. This omission has led some observers to embrace broad—if not unlimited—federal power and reject certain longstanding federalism doctrines—such as state sovereign immunity, the anti-commandeering doctrine, and the equal sovereignty of the States. The objection to such doctrines is that the Constitution does not affirmatively grant States these sovereign rights and powers. This charge overlooks long-forgotten background context essential to faithful interpretation of the Constitution. The former British Colonies in …
Is The Constitution Of 1787 A White Supremacist Document? Against Essentialism In Constitutional Interpretation, David S. Schwartz
Is The Constitution Of 1787 A White Supremacist Document? Against Essentialism In Constitutional Interpretation, David S. Schwartz
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
A curious convergence is emerging in legal academia around the conclusion that the 1787 Constitution is a white supremacist document. Although most originalists would deny that contention, their methodology strongly favors, if it does not compel, an agreement with progressive, “neo-Garrisonian” scholars that the Constitution of 1787 is indeed a white supremacist document. Both the neo-Garrisonian and originalist elements of this implicit convergence stem from their “essentialism” in Constitutional interpretation: the idea that the Constitution or its terms or provisions carry a uniquely and objectively correct meaning, invariant over time, and independent of our evolving normative commitments.
This Article argues …
Section Three Of The Fourteenth Amendment: Insurrection, Mark A. Graber
Section Three Of The Fourteenth Amendment: Insurrection, Mark A. Graber
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
The public, scholarly, and legal debate over whether former president Donald Trump is eligible to hold office under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment has focused far more on technical legal questions than on whether Trump engaged in an insurrection. Scholarly and public commentary rarely examines the constitutional/ common law of insurrection, preferring instead to examine whether Trump is exempt from Section Three because Section Three either exempts presidents or the presidency from disqualification or because Section Three is not self-executing. Trump v. Anderson (2024) focused on state incapacity to disqualify “oathbreaking insurrectionists” rather than on whether Trump was an …
Murder On The Hearsay Trail, Jeffrey Bellin
Murder On The Hearsay Trail, Jeffrey Bellin
Faculty Publications
Judges, lawyers, and law students struggle to apply American evidence law’s most distinctive feature—the hearsay prohibition. The problem is that hearsay is difficult to master and somewhat dull. At the same time, hearsay evidence is ubiquitous and important. Every litigator has a story about a judge’s eccentric hearsay rulings; mine is the trial judge who waved his hand dismissively at hearsay objections, letting witnesses answer on the grounds that “I want to hear it.” And the case law is littered with appellate opinions scolding trial judges for erroneous hearsay rulings while introducing errors of their own.
That is just the …
Rage Rhetoric And The Revival Of American Sedition, Jonathan Turley
Rage Rhetoric And The Revival Of American Sedition, Jonathan Turley
William & Mary Law Review
We are living in what Professor Jonathan Turley calls an age of rage. However, it is not the first such period. Professor Turley explores how the United States was formed (and the Constitution was written) in precisely such a period. Throughout that history, sedition has been used as the vehicle for criminalizing political speech. This Article explores how seditious libel has evolved as a crime and how it is experiencing a type of American revival. The crime of sedition can be traced back to the infamous trials of the Star Chamber and the flawed view of free speech articulated by …
Afterward: A Reply To Commentators, Gabriel J. Chin, Paul Finkelman
Afterward: A Reply To Commentators, Gabriel J. Chin, Paul Finkelman
William & Mary Law Review
Authors Gabriel J. Chin and Paul Finkelman respond to the comments on their article, The "Free White Person" Clause of the Naturalization Act of 1790 as Super-Statute.
The "Free White Person" Clause Of The Naturalization Act Of 1790 As Super-Statute, Gabriel J. Chin, Paul Finkelman
The "Free White Person" Clause Of The Naturalization Act Of 1790 As Super-Statute, Gabriel J. Chin, Paul Finkelman
William & Mary Law Review
A body of legal scholarship persuasively contends that some judicial decisions are so important that they should be considered part of the canon of constitutional law including, unquestionably, Marbury v. Madison and Brown v. Board of Education. Some decisions, while blunders, were nevertheless profoundly influential in undermining justice and the public good. Scholars call cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson the anticanon. Recognizing the contemporary centrality of statutes, Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn propose that certain federal laws should be recognized as part of legal canon because of their extraordinary influence and duration. These …
Separate, Sovereign, And Subjugated: Native Citizenship And The 1790 Trade And Intercourse Act, Bethany Berger
Separate, Sovereign, And Subjugated: Native Citizenship And The 1790 Trade And Intercourse Act, Bethany Berger
William & Mary Law Review
In 1790, the same year Congress limited naturalization to “free white persons,” it also enacted the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. The Trade and Intercourse Act may have even stronger claims to “super statute” status than the Naturalization Act. Key provisions of the Trade and Intercourse Act remain in effect today, and the Act enshrined a tribal, federal, and state relationship that profoundly shapes modern law. Unlike the Naturalization Act, the Trade and Intercourse Act reflected the input of people of color: it responded to the demands of tribal nations and—to a degree—reflected tribal sovereignty. While Indigenous people could …
Creating A Racialized Liminal Status: The 1790 Act And Interstitial Citizenship, Rose Cuison-Villazor
Creating A Racialized Liminal Status: The 1790 Act And Interstitial Citizenship, Rose Cuison-Villazor
William & Mary Law Review
This Comment began with De La Ysla’s case to highlight the political status that Filipinos held when the Philippines was a U.S. territory. This Comment argues that this status, which a court would later describe as a “hybrid status ... the so-called ‘non-citizen national,’” was a racialized liminal political status with roots in the 1790 Naturalization Act (1790 Act). Professors Jack Chin and Paul Finkelman claim that the 1790 Act played a critical role in shaping “the very composition of the people of the United States” by including the “free white person” clause in the country’s first naturalization law. One …
The Road Not Taken: A Critical Juncture In Racial Preferences For Naturalized Citizenship, Ming Hsu Chen
The Road Not Taken: A Critical Juncture In Racial Preferences For Naturalized Citizenship, Ming Hsu Chen
William & Mary Law Review
In The “Free White Person” Clause of the Naturalization Act of 1790 as Super-Statute, Gabriel Jack Chin and Paul Finkelman argue that racist results in naturalization have arisen despite, or maybe because of, the race neutral interpretation. This happened in a manner that could have been predicted by the federal government’s attitudes toward non-White persons in the Naturalization Act of 1790 and the nearly unbroken chain of legal developments. This leads them to think of the law as a “super-statute.” While I agree that this is the path actually taken in history, I view the mid-1960s civil rights era …
Paradoxical Citizenship, Amanda Frost
Paradoxical Citizenship, Amanda Frost
William & Mary Law Review
In their article, The “Free White Person” Clause of the Naturalization Act of 1790 as Super-Statute, Gabriel J. Chin and Paul Finkelman make a powerful case that the Naturalization Act of 1790 is a “super-statute” that has shaped not only U.S. immigration law and policy, but also America’s conception of itself as a “White nation.”
[...]
This Comment explores the conflict between the Naturalization Act’s racial restrictions on citizenship (and its proponents’ vision of the United States as a White nation) and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause (and its proponents’ vision of the United States as a multiracial …