Legal History Commons^™

Shanghai In The 1930s, The German Civil Code And The Tragic Story Of A Brilliant Legal Mind, Lutz-Christian Wolff

Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Intertemporal Law Doctrine's Application To The Acquisition Of Colonies In The Americas, Kent Mcneil

Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

An Elegy For The Hereditary Peers, Declan M. Hurley

Notre Dame JLEPP: In Limine

Declan Hurley reflects on the role of the hereditary peers, and what is lost with their demise.

Decline And Fall Of The House Of Lords, Thomas H. Schacht

Notre Dame JLEPP: In Limine

Thomas Schacht recounts the inevitable momentum of the last one hundred years, which has rendered the House of Lords impotent

A Comparative Analysis Of The Rule Of Lenity And National Power Structures, Albert Kwon

Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Whose Truth Commission, Lehlohonolo January

Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law

It is often said that the victor always dictates the narrative and thus dictates how history is represented. The end of Apartheid in South Africa wasn’t a result of an outright victorious defeat of the Apartheid State together with its institutions of coercion but rather came about as a result of a culmination of a series of events. If this adage holds true, then why is it that the narrative seems to paint a picture of a victor’s perspective? This assertion is not made lightly but is no less reflective of how the facts seem to portray themselves in that …

Creating U.S. Catholicism, Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

Reviewing, The World and Work of Father John J. Burke: A Mystic in Action by Douglas J. Slawson, St. Augustine's, 600 p, $36.

The Lost History Of Judicial Restraint, Derek A. Webb

Notre Dame Law Review

For over 125 years, jurists and scholars who have championed judicial restraint have looked back to James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 Harvard Law Review article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, as the seminal authority for the rule that courts should presume the constitutionality of a challenged law and only invalidate it if its unconstitutionality is “clear” and “beyond a reasonable doubt.” But Thayer presented those three rules (presumption of constitutionality, clear error rule, and reasonable doubt standard) as rooted in historical legal practice in America. And yet none of his twentieth or twenty-first century …

Bruen’S Enforcement Puzzle: Unearthing And Adjudicating The Historical Enforcement Record In Second Amendment Cases, Andrew Willinger

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen brings historical complexity to the fore by instituting a history-focused test for the Second Amendment that demands analogues from the Founding or Reconstruction eras to support modern gun regulations. The majority opinion in Bruen considers, in multiple places, how certain historical gun regulations may have been enforced. In each instance, the Court suggests that evidence of racially disparate enforcement of a historical law is relevant to whether that law is part of the American historical tradition and an appropriate analogue. Historical enforcement data appear to …

Diverse Originalism, History & Tradition, Christina Mulligan

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen decision appears to be an originalist opinion, ostensibly looking for the meaning of the Constitution’s text by looking to the public’s understanding of the language used. But Bruen's test actually fails to follow a public meaning originalist methodology. The Court focuses present-day constitutional interpreters on evidence of constitutional meaning that only reflects a portion of the public—the politically empowered men who were in a position to pass legislation. Two unfortunate outcomes follow. First, by limiting potential evidence of public meaning so severely, the Court raises the risk …

The General-Law Right To Bear Arms, William Baude, Robert Leider

Notre Dame Law Review

In this Article, we argue that Bruen's intended methodological shift has been widely misunderstood by the bench and bar. This has led to confusion and misapplication in the lower courts, as well as much scholarly criticism of the test that is, we think, misdirected. As we will explain, Bruen calls for a form of legal originalism, applying a classical view of fundamental rights as a form of unwritten customary law. This is consistent with the text and history of the Constitution and leads to results that are less mechanical and more sensible than many lower courts have thought. Understanding …

Historical Fact, Ryan C. Williams

Notre Dame Law Review

The growing emphasis on history as a criterion of constitutional decision-making in Supreme Court jurisprudence has raised the importance of a distinctive type of judicial fact-finding—namely, the investigation and resolution of contested questions of historical fact. Although history has always played an important role in constitutional adjudication, its primary role has traditionally been as an input to constitutional interpretation. But in cases like New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the Court has increasingly demanded that factual determinations regarding the content, meaning, purposes, and effects of decisions taken in the distant past should also guide the lower …

What Originalism Can Teach Historians: History As Analogy, Means-Ends Tests, And The Problem Of History In Bruen, Kunal M. Parker

Notre Dame Law Review

There is a long tradition of professional historians’ critiques of lawyers’ truncated understandings and clumsy deployments of the past. The intellectual historian J.G.A. Pocock’s The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, with its depiction of a “common-law mind” obdurately committed to the continuity of law and unable to grasp the significance of situating law in historical context, might be taken as the origin point of a post–World War II tradition. Historians’ critiques have enjoyed a fresh lease of life since constitutional originalism began to assume prominence in the closing decades of the twentieth century. As legal scholars and judges …

The History Of Bans On Types Of Arms Before 1900, David B. Kopel, Joseph G.S. Greenlee

Journal of Legislation

This Article describes the history of bans on particular types of arms in America, through 1899. It also describes arms bans in England until the time of American independence. Arms encompassed in this article include firearms, knives, swords, blunt weapons, and many others. While arms advanced considerably from medieval England through the nineteenth-century United States, bans on particular types of arms were rare.

An Originalist Approach To Puerto Rico: Arguments Against The Status Quo, Micah Allred

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Few originalists have grappled with a fundamental question about Puerto Rico: whether the Constitution permits the United States to hold the island indefinitely as nonstate territory. There are reasons to doubt that it does. The main purpose of the Constitution’s territorial provisions was to allow Congress to transition the then West-ern Territory into states. And, as a structural matter, Congress’s direct authority over Puerto Ricans conflicts with important constitutional principles such as federalism. But for originalists, arguments from purpose and structure are helpful only insofar as they elucidate the original meaning of the Constitution’s text. This Article lays out two …

Admiralty, Abstention, And The Allure Of Old Cases, Maggie Gardner

Notre Dame Law Review

The current Supreme Court has made clear that history matters. But doing history well is hard. There is thus an allure to old cases because they provide a link to the past that is more accessible for nonhistorian lawyers. This Article warns against that allure by showing how the use of old cases also poses methodological challenges. The Article uses as a case study the emerging doctrine of foreign relations abstention. Before the Supreme Court, advocates argued that this new doctrine is in fact rooted in early admiralty cases. Those advocates did not, however, canvass the early admiralty practice, relying …

Pretrial Commitment And The Fourth Amendment, Laurent Sacharoff

Notre Dame Law Review

Today, the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause governs arrest warrants and search warrants only. But in the founding era, the Warrant Clause governed a third type of warrant: the “warrant of commitment.” Judges issued these warrants to jail defendants pending trial. This Article argues that the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause, with its oath and probable cause standard, should be understood today to apply to this third type of warrant. That means the Warrant Clause would govern any initial appearance where a judge first commits a defendant—a process that currently falls far short of fulfilling its constitutional and historical function. History supports …

Proportionalities, Youngjae Lee

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

“Proportionality” is ubiquitous. The idea that punishment should be proportional to crime is familiar in criminal law and has a lengthy history. But that is not the only place where one encounters the concept of proportionality in law and ethics. The idea of proportionality is important also in the self-defense context, where the right to defend oneself with force is limited by the principle of proportionality. Proportionality plays a role in the context of war, especially in the idea that the military advantage one side may draw from an attack must not be excessive in relation to the loss of …

Rethinking Legislative Facts, Haley N. Proctor

Notre Dame Law Review

As the factual nature of legal inquiry has become increasingly apparent over the past century, courts and commentators have fallen into the habit of labeling the facts behind the law “legislative facts.” Loosely, legislative facts are general facts courts rely upon to formulate law or policy, but that definition is as contested as it is vague. Most agree that legislative facts exist in some form or another, but few agree on what that form is, on who should find them, and how. This Article seeks to account for and resolve that confusion. Theories of legislative fact focus on the role …

Congressional Power To Institute A Wealth Tax, Will Clark

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Over the last few years, several high-profile politicians have pushed to impose a federal “wealth tax.” For example, a recent bill introduced in the Senate would create a two percent tax on the value of assets between fifty million and one billion dollars, plus a higher percentage on wealth valued over one billion dollars. The proponents of the tax argue that it would reduce the growing wealth inequality in the United States, while opponents say that it would disincentivize investment in the American economy.

Policy arguments, however, are only relevant if the federal government has the authority to institute such …

Living Recipes . . . And Constitutions, John Vlahoplus

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Professor Gary Lawson and Zachary Pohlman assert that we can only follow recipes and by analogy the Constitution by complying with the original public or authorial meaning of the instructions in their texts. Absent an instruction in the recipe’s text authorizing changes, any departure from historical meaning amends the recipe rather than follows it.

This response uses the works of renowned chefs to sketch a competing theory. Following a recipe requires a cook to consider many of the same factors as pluralist and living constitution theories of law including text, history, purpose, current circumstances, personal experience, and individual judgment. Even …

Democracy's Forgotten Possessions: U.S. Territories' Right To Statehood Through Constitutional Liquidation, Joshua Stephen Ebiner

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that the Territories must be granted statehood consistent with the equal footing doctrine. This thesis does not challenge Congress’s power to acquire or govern territory, or its constitutional authority to admit (and place reasonable conditions on the admission of) territory into the Union as states. These matters have long been settled through constitutional practice. Neither does this thesis suggest that acquired territory must be immediately annexed into the Union, since there are valid reasons to delay such a decision. Instead, the claim is that permanently inhabited territories that have longstanding, constitutionally significant relationships with the United States …

Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Kexel Chabot

Notre Dame Law Review

The President’s power to remove and control subordinate executive officers has sparked a constitutional debate that began in 1789 and rages on today. Leading originalists claim that the Constitution created a “unitary executive” President whose plenary removal power affords her “exclusive control” over subordinates’ exercise of executive power. Text assigning the President a removal power and exclusive control appears nowhere in the Constitution, however, and unitary scholars have instead relied on select historical understandings and negative inferences drawn from a supposed lack of independent regulatory structures at the Founding. The comprehensive historical record introduced by this Article lays this debate …

A New Report Of Entick V. Carrington (1765), Christian R. Burset, T. T. Arvind

Journal Articles

The Supreme Court has described Entick v. Carrington (1765) as “the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law” for the Founding generation. For more than 250 years, judges and commentators have read that case for guidance about the rule of law, executive authority, and the original meaning of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. But we have been reading a flawed version. This Article publishes, for the first time, a previously unknown manuscript report of Entick v. Carrington. We explain why this version is more reliable than other reports of the case, and how this new discovery challenges prevailing assumptions about …

Advisory Opinions And The Problem Of Legal Authority, Christian R. Burset

Journal Articles

The prohibition against advisory opinions is fundamental to our understanding of federal judicial power, but we’ve misunderstood its origins. Discussions of the doctrine begin not with a constitutional text or even a court case, but a letter in which the Jay Court rejected President Washington’s request for legal advice. Courts and scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the Jay Court’s behavior. But they all depict the earliest Justices as responding to uniquely American concerns about advisory opinions.

This Article offers a different explanation. Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, it shows that judges throughout the anglophone world—not only …

The Traditions Of American Constitutional Law, Marc O. Degirolami

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article identifies a new method of constitutional interpretation: the use of tradition as constitutive of constitutional meaning. It studies what the Supreme Court means by invoking tradition and whether what it means remains constant across the document and over time. Traditionalist interpretation is pervasive, consistent, and recurrent across the Court’s constitutional doctrine. So, too, are criticisms of traditionalist interpretation. There are also more immediate reasons to study the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation. The Court’s two newest members, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, have indicated that tradition informs their understanding of constitutional meaning. The study of traditionalist …

Glorious Revolution To American Revolution: The English Origin Of The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain

Notre Dame Law Review

It is definitively not my intention to wade into such debates about the wisdom of the Second Amendment or to deal with pending or recent court interpretations. Rather, I want to explore how it came to be and what role British history had in its genesis. For Americans like myself, such history helps us to understand the meaning of our own Constitution. For the Britons, it is a powerful example of how your own constitutional principles shaped the legal landscape of far-flung countries once within the British Empire. And for those simply interested in law as a discipline, irrespective of …

Why Didn't The Common Law Follow The Flag?, Christian R. Burset

Journal Articles

This Article considers a puzzle about how different kinds of law came to be distributed around the world. The legal systems of some European colonies largely reflected the laws of the colonizer. Other colonies exhibited a greater degree of legal pluralism, in which the state administered a mix of different legal systems. Conventional explanations for this variation look to the extent of European settlement: where colonizers settled in large numbers, they chose to bring their own laws; otherwise, they preferred to retain preexisting ones. This Article challenges that assumption by offering a new account of how and why the British …

The Depravity Of The 1930s And The Modern Administrative State, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary Lawson

Notre Dame Law Review

Gillian Metzger’s 2017 Harvard Law Review foreword, entitled 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, is a paean to the modern administrative state, with its massive subdelegations of legislative and judicial power to so-called “expert” bureaucrats, who are layered well out of reach of electoral accountability yet do not have the constitutional status of Article III judges. We disagree with this celebration of technocratic government on just about every level, but this Article focuses on two relatively narrow points.

First, responding more to implicit assumptions that pervade modern discourse than specifically to Professor Metzger’s analysis, we challenge the normally …

The Role Of Circuit Courts In The Formation Of United States Law In The Early Republic, David P. Waddilove

Journal Articles

The Role of Circuit Courts in the Formation of United States Law in the Early Republic: Following Supreme Court Justices Washington, Livingston, Story, and Thompson. ByDAVID LYNCH. [Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2018. xxi +233 pp. Hardback £70.00. ISBN 978-15-09910-85-4.]

The chosen justices were: Bushrod Washington, who served 1801–1829; H. Brockholst Livingston, 1807–1823; Joseph Story, 1811–1845; and Smith Thompson, 1823–1843.