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Articles 1 - 30 of 42
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
Reconsidering The Evolutionary Erosion Account Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
Reconsidering The Evolutionary Erosion Account Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
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This Article reconsiders the dominant account of corporate law’s duty of loyalty, which asserts that the courts have steadily relaxed standards of fiduciary scrutiny applied to self-dealing by corporate managers across more than a century of history—to the great detriment of the shareholder interest. The account originated in Harold Marsh, Jr.’s foundational article, Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, published in The Business Lawyer in 1966. Marsh’s showing of historical lassitude has been successfully challenged in a recent book by Professor David Kershaw. This Article takes Professor Kershaw’s critique a step further, asking whether the evolutionary …
The History And Revival Of The Corporate Purpose Clause, Elizabeth Pollman
The History And Revival Of The Corporate Purpose Clause, Elizabeth Pollman
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The corporate purpose debate is experiencing a renaissance. The contours of the modern debate are relatively well developed and typically focus on whether corporations should pursue shareholder value maximization or broader social aims. A related subject that has received much less scholarly attention, however, is the formal legal mechanism by which a corporation expresses its purpose—the purpose clause of the corporate charter. This Article examines corporate purpose through the evolution of corporate charters. Starting with historic examples ranging from the Dutch East India Company to early American corporations and their modern 21st century parallels, the discussion illuminates how corporate purpose …
Should Corporations Have A Purpose?, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon
Should Corporations Have A Purpose?, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon
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Corporate purpose is the hot topic in corporate governance. Critics are calling for corporations to shift their purpose away from shareholder value as a means of addressing climate change, equity and inclusion, and other social values. We argue that this debate has overlooked the critical predicate questions of whether a corporation should have a purpose at all and, if so, what role it serves.
We start by exploring and rejecting historical, doctrinal, and theoretical bases for corporate purpose. We challenge the premise that purpose can serve a useful function either as a legal constraint on managerial discretion or as a …
Corporate Personhood And Limited Sovereignty, Elizabeth Pollman
Corporate Personhood And Limited Sovereignty, Elizabeth Pollman
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This Article, written for a symposium celebrating the work of Professor Margaret Blair, examines how corporate rights jurisprudence helped to shape the corporate form in the United States during the nineteenth century. It argues that as the corporate form became popular because of the way it facilitated capital lock-in, perpetual succession, and provided other favorable characteristics related to legal personality that separated the corporation from its participants, the Supreme Court provided crucial reinforcement of these entity features by recognizing corporations as rights-bearing legal persons separate from the government. Although the legal personality of corporations is a distinct concept from their …
A Babe In The Woods: An Essay On Kirby Lumber And The Evolution Of Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh
A Babe In The Woods: An Essay On Kirby Lumber And The Evolution Of Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh
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This essay examines the development of corporate law during the time span of the author's career, focusing on the interrelated subjects of valuation, corporate purpose, and shareholder litigation.
Foreword: Bankruptcy’S New And Old Frontiers, William W. Bratton, David A. Skeel Jr.
Foreword: Bankruptcy’S New And Old Frontiers, William W. Bratton, David A. Skeel Jr.
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This Symposium marks the fortieth anniversary of the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (the “1978 Code” or the “Code”) with an extended look at seismic changes that currently are reshaping Chapter 11 reorganization. Today’s typical Chapter 11 case looks radically different than did the typical case in the Code’s early years. In those days, Chapter 11 afforded debtors a cozy haven. Most everything that mattered occurred within the context of the formal proceeding, where the debtor enjoyed agenda control, a leisurely timetable, and judicial solicitude. The safe haven steadily disappeared over time, displaced by a range of countervailing forces …
The Separation Of Corporate Law And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton
The Separation Of Corporate Law And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton
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A half century ago, corporate legal theory pursued an institutional vision in which corporations and the law that creates them protect people from the ravages of volatile free markets. That vision was challenged on the ground during the 1980s, when corporate legal institutions and market forces came to blows over questions concerning hostile takeovers. By 1990, it seemed like the institutions had won. But a different picture has emerged as the years have gone by. It is now clear that the market side really won the battle of the 1980s, succeeding in entering a wedge between corporate law and social …
Corporate Law Doctrine And The Legacy Of American Legal Realism, Edward B. Rock
Corporate Law Doctrine And The Legacy Of American Legal Realism, Edward B. Rock
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In this contribution to a symposium on "Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine," I examine the role that jurisprudence plays in corporate law doctrine. Through an examination of paired cases from the United States and United Kingdom, I offer a case study of the contrasting influence on corporate law judging of American Legal Realism versus traditional U.K. Doctrinalism.
Specialist judges in both systems, aided by specialist lawyers, clearly identify and understand the core policy issues involved in a dispute and arrive at sensible results. Adjusting for differences in background law and institutions, it seems likely that the disputes would ultimately be …
The Derivative Nature Of Corporate Constitutional Rights, Margaret M. Blair, Elizabeth Pollman
The Derivative Nature Of Corporate Constitutional Rights, Margaret M. Blair, Elizabeth Pollman
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This Article engages the two hundred year history of corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence to show that the Supreme Court has long accorded rights to corporations based on the rationale that corporations represent associations of people from whom such rights are derived. The Article draws on the history of business corporations in America to argue that the Court’s characterization of corporations as associations made sense throughout most of the nineteenth century. By the late nineteenth century, however, when the Court was deciding several key cases involving corporate rights, this associational view was already becoming a poor fit for some corporations. The …
Progressive Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Progressive Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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A widely accepted model of American legal history is that "classical" legal thought, which dominated much of the nineteenth century, was displaced by "progressive" legal thought, which survived through the New Deal and in some form to this day. Within its domain, this was a revolution nearly on a par with Copernicus or Newton. This paradigm has been adopted by both progressive liberals who defend this revolution and by classical liberals who lament it.
Classical legal thought is generally identified with efforts to systematize legal rules along lines that had become familiar in the natural sciences. This methodology involved not …
A Corporate Right To Privacy, Elizabeth Pollman
A Corporate Right To Privacy, Elizabeth Pollman
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The debate over the scope of constitutional protections for corporations has exploded with commentary on recent or pending Supreme Court cases, but scholars have left unexplored some of the hardest questions for the future, and the ones that offer the greatest potential for better understanding the nature of corporate rights. This Article analyzes one of those questions — whether corporations have, or should have, a constitutional right to privacy. First, the Article examines the contours of the question in Supreme Court jurisprudence and provides the first scholarly treatment of the growing body of conflicting law in the lower courts on …
The Marginalist Revolution In Corporate Finance: 1880-1965, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Marginalist Revolution In Corporate Finance: 1880-1965, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fundamental changes in economic thought revolutionized the theory of corporate finance, leading to changes in its legal regulation. The changes were massive, and this branch of financial analysis and law became virtually unrecognizable to those who had practiced it earlier. The source of this revision was the marginalist, or neoclassical, revolution in economic thought. The classical theory had seen corporate finance as an historical, relatively self-executing inquiry based on the classical theory of value and administered by common law courts. By contrast, neoclassical value theory was forward looking and as a result …
A Preface To Neoclassical Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
A Preface To Neoclassical Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Most legal historians speak of the period following classical legal thought as “progressive legal thought.” That term creates an unwarranted bias in characterization, however, creating the impression that conservatives clung to an obsolete “classical” ideology, when in fact they were in many ways just as revisionist as the progressives legal thinkers whom they critiqued. The Progressives and New Deal thinkers whom we identify with progressive legal thought were nearly all neoclassical, or marginalist, in their economics, but it is hardly true that all marginalists were progressives. For example, the lawyers and policy makers in the corporate finance battles of the …
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, Elizabeth Pollman
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, Elizabeth Pollman
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Why is a corporation a “person” for purposes of the Constitution? This old question has become new again with public outrage over Citizens United, the recent campaign finance case which expanded corporate constitutional speech rights. This Article traces the historical and jurisprudential developments of corporate personhood and concludes that the doctrine’s origins had the limited purview of protecting individuals’ property and contract interests. Over time, the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine without a coherent explanation or consistent approach. The Court has relied on the older cases that were decided in different contexts and on various flawed conceptions of the corporation. …
The Law Of Vertical Integration And The Business Firm: 1880-1960, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Law Of Vertical Integration And The Business Firm: 1880-1960, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Vertical integration occurs when a firm does something for itself that it could otherwise procure on the market. For example, a manufacturer that opens its own stores is said to be vertically integrated into distribution. One irony of history is that both classical political economy and neoclassicism saw vertical integration and vertical contractual arrangements as much less threatening to competition than cartels or other horizontal arrangements. Nevertheless, vertical integration has produced by far the greater amount of legislation at both federal and state levels and has motivated many more political action groups. Two things explain this phenomenon. First, while economists …
Tracking Berle's Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation's Law Chapter, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Tracking Berle's Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation's Law Chapter, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Competing Narratives In Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor In Control Vs. No Time To Spare, David A. Skeel Jr.
Competing Narratives In Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor In Control Vs. No Time To Spare, David A. Skeel Jr.
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When a company like Chrysler or United Airlines files for bankruptcy, it offers narrative explaining the way out of its predicament. In support of its claim that the business is worth saving, the company may argue that it simply needs time to renegotiate its obligations with its creditors. Alternatively, it may say that asset values are deteriorating rapidly and it is imperative that the bankruptcy court immediately approve a sale of the company, or some other rapid disposition. These two possibilities correspond to the principal resolution narratives in current Chapter 11 bankruptcy practice, which I refer to as Debtor in …
Citizens Not United: The Lack Of Stockholder Voluntariness In Corporatepolitical Speech, Elizabeth Pollman
Citizens Not United: The Lack Of Stockholder Voluntariness In Corporatepolitical Speech, Elizabeth Pollman
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As the Supreme Court reconsiders prior decisions upholding limits on corporate electioneering from general funds, this Essay suggests that the longstanding concern about the lack of stockholder assent to corporate political speech is more compelling than ever. Patterns of U.S. stockholding have significantly changed in the past several decades so as to heighten the concern and caution against a broad overruling of precedents. Stockholders' ability to sell their securities or pursue a derivative action, and other means of "corporate democracy," do not alleviate the concern. A broad decision in favor of Citizens United could leave even stockholders who carefully screen …
Neoclassicism And The Separation Of Ownership And Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Neoclassicism And The Separation Of Ownership And Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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"Separation of ownership and control" is a phrase whose history will forever be associated with Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means' The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), as well as with Institutionalist economics, Legal Realism, and the New Deal. Within that milieu the large publicly held business corporation became identified with excessive managerial power at the expense of stockholders, social irresponsibility, and internal inefficiency. Neoclassical economists both then and ever since have generally been critical, both of the historical facts that Berle and Means purported to describe and of the conclusions that they drew. In fact, however, within …
Shareholder Litigation: The Accidental Elegance Of Aronson V. Lewis, David A. Skeel Jr.
Shareholder Litigation: The Accidental Elegance Of Aronson V. Lewis, David A. Skeel Jr.
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Unlike many key corporate law decisions, the 1984 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Aronson v. Lewis was not heralded by stories in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times, nor in any other newspaper of note. Even now, few people other than corporate law experts are likely to recognize the name. Yet Aronson plays a pivotal role in many corporate law decisions that do get a lot more attention. Aronson established the parameters for filing derivative litigation against the directors of a corporation (or a third party, but derivative suits against third parties are now rare). A shareholder …
Christianity And The Large Scale Corporation, David A. Skeel Jr.
Christianity And The Large Scale Corporation, David A. Skeel Jr.
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Ask most people what they associate with “Christianity and the corporation” and, at least in the US, they may mention activist nuns calling for shareholder votes on sweatshop labor, nuclear weapons or divestment from South Africa, or perhaps a newspaper story about mutual funds that invest only in “faith friendly” corporations. Each is a contemporary manifestation of relations that run far deeper, and date back well over a thousand years. The early church spawned many of the largest corporate enterprises of the middle ages, and tenaciously promoted the concept of a collective entity distinct from the state. When the modern …
Who Writes The Rules For Hostile Takeovers, And Why? The Peculiar Divergence Of Us And Uk Takeover Regulation, John Armour, David A. Skeel Jr.
Who Writes The Rules For Hostile Takeovers, And Why? The Peculiar Divergence Of Us And Uk Takeover Regulation, John Armour, David A. Skeel Jr.
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No abstract provided.
Symbiotic Federalism And The Structure Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Symbiotic Federalism And The Structure Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
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No abstract provided.
Corporate Anatomy Lessons, David A. Skeel Jr.
Corporate Anatomy Lessons, David A. Skeel Jr.
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The book that will lay the groundwork for the corporate law debates of the coming decade is The Anatomy of Corporate Law. Written by seven of the world's leading corporate law scholars - Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Ed Rock of the U.S.; Paul Davies of England; Gerard Hertig of Switzerland; Klaus Hopt of Germany; and Hideki Kanda of Japan - The Anatomy of Corporate Law attempts to identify the underlying structure of corporate law, and to provide a framework for understanding the wide range of approaches that different countries take to corporate law regulation. It is hard to overstate …
Defeating Class Certification In Securities Fraud Actions, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
Defeating Class Certification In Securities Fraud Actions, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
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No abstract provided.
Corporate Ownership Structure And The Evolution Of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons From The United Kingdom, John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins, David A. Skeel Jr.
Corporate Ownership Structure And The Evolution Of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons From The United Kingdom, John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins, David A. Skeel Jr.
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No abstract provided.
Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, And Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, And Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Corporate Law As A Facilitator Of Self Governance, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Corporate Law As A Facilitator Of Self Governance, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Interview With E. Norman Veasey, Andrew Edelstein, E. Norman Veasey, Legal Oral History Project, University Of Pennsylvania Carey Law School
Interview With E. Norman Veasey, Andrew Edelstein, E. Norman Veasey, Legal Oral History Project, University Of Pennsylvania Carey Law School
Legal Oral History Project
For transcript, click the Download button above. For video index, click the link below.
E. Norman Veasey (L '57) practiced at the firm of Richards, Layton & Finger from 1958 to 1992. In 1992 he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware, where he served until 2004.