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Full-Text Articles in Law and Race
Equal Protection And Disparate Impact: Round Three, Richard A. Primus
Equal Protection And Disparate Impact: Round Three, Richard A. Primus
Articles
Prior inquiries into the relationship between equal protection and disparate impact have focused on whether equal protection entails a disparate impact standard and whether laws prohibiting disparate impacts can qualify as legislation enforcing equal rotection. In this Article, Professor Primus focuses on a third question: whether equal protection affirmatively forbids the use of statutory disparate impact standards. Like affirmative action, a statute restricting racially disparate impacts is a race-conscious mechanism designed to reallocate opportunities from some racial groups to others. Accordingly, the same individualist view of equal protection that has constrained the operation of affirmative action might also raise questions …
Integration Without Classification: Moving Toward Race-Neutrality In The Pursuit Of Public Elementary And Secondary School Diversity, Paul Diller
Michigan Law Review
Ever since the Supreme Court's invalidation of racially segregated public schools in Brown v. Board of Education, America has wrestled with the challenge of successfully dismantling educational apartheid. In recent years, the federal judiciary has largely retreated from enforcing desegregation in school districts that were once under court supervision for engaging in intentional racial discrimination, finding that the vestiges of past discrimination have been satisfactorily ameliorated. In some such unitary school districts, as well as in districts in which no intentional segregation was ever identified by the courts, boards of education, have voluntarily implemented student assignment plans designed to increase …
Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action And The Elusive Meaning Of Constitutional Equality, Michel Rosenfeld
Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action And The Elusive Meaning Of Constitutional Equality, Michel Rosenfeld
Michigan Law Review
This Article first briefly considers the conceptual and constitutional framework out of which the controversy in Croson emerges. Next, the Article turns to Croson itself, and focuses on the Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny test, on the disagreement among the Justices concerning the test's meaning and implications, and on the Court's use of decontextualization to manipulate the key conceptual and factual issues at stake. Finally, drawing upon the principle of equality of opportunity, the Article endeavors to demonstrate how the adoption of particular principles of substantive equality can lead to a comprehensive and coherent constitutional resolution of the affirmative …
Scholars' Reply To Professor Fried, Yale Kamisar, Lee C. Bollinger, Judith C. Areen, Barbara A. Black
Scholars' Reply To Professor Fried, Yale Kamisar, Lee C. Bollinger, Judith C. Areen, Barbara A. Black
Articles
As Solicitor General of the United States, Charles Fried, like any good advocate, was often in the position of attempting to generate broad holdings from relatively narrow and particularistic Supreme Court decisions. This was especially true in affirmative action cases. There, the Department of Justice argued that cautious precedents actually stood for the broad proposition that measures designed to put members of disadvantaged groups on a plane of equality should, for constitutional purposes, be treated the same as measures intended to stigmatize or subordinate them. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently rejected this reading of its precedents and the broad …