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Articles 1 - 30 of 104
Full-Text Articles in Law and Philosophy
Does Textualism Constrain Supreme Court Justices?, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum
Does Textualism Constrain Supreme Court Justices?, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum
Northwestern University Law Review
A principal justification for textualism is the constraint hypothesis. Conservative Justices and leading textualist scholars contend that—in stark contrast to reliance on legislative history—focus on the ordinary meaning of enacted text leaves little room for the Justices to be policy-oriented or ideological in their interpretations. This Article represents the first systematic study probing the validity of the constraint hypothesis, one that employs both quantitative and qualitative analysis.
The Article examines the Justices’ reliance on interpretive resources in over 660 statutory decisions in the field of labor and employment, decided by the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court, and the Roberts Court—during …
Legal Realism, Legal Positivism, And Determinacy, Dan Priel
Legal Realism, Legal Positivism, And Determinacy, Dan Priel
All Papers
It is a commonplace that the legal realists argued that law is deeply indeterminate. According to this familiar account, the legal realists insisted that legal materials don’t constrain judges, who are therefore free to decide cases in almost any way they want. An influential argument has argued that the only way to explain this view is by showing that the legal realists presupposed a legal positivist theory of law. This Essay offers a different understanding of the relationship between realism, positivism, and determinacy, challenging this interpretation of the realists as both historically false and as philosophically unwarranted. I provide many …
Constitutional Futurisms, Jeremiah Chin
Constitutional Futurisms, Jeremiah Chin
Northwestern University Law Review
How do we reckon with the past? The Supreme Court’s recent embrace of originalism as a mode of constitutional analysis relies almost exclusively on a view of history and tradition that would bind us to an understanding of principles and ideals that legitimized the exclusion of minority voices. Cases such as New York State Pistol and Rifle Ass'n v. Bruen use flavors of originalism as a framework to define rights and governmental powers through their historical antecedents, but this broad standard of interpretation is notably absent in the Court’s recent discussions of histories and traditions of racism in the United …
Toward A Perpetual Practice Of Affirmative Action, Sheldon Bernard Lyke
Toward A Perpetual Practice Of Affirmative Action, Sheldon Bernard Lyke
Northwestern University Law Review
Despite perceptions that affirmative action is “dead” following the Supreme Court ruling in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (SFFA), this Essay argues that affirmative action remains crucial for addressing racial bias in admissions processes. This Essay examines the strict scrutiny standard, which requires that any use of race must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Courts have interpreted the narrowly tailored prong of this standard to include a logical end point requirement, which mandates that race-conscious measures must have a clear and limited …
Law In Society: Defending Hart, Alma Diamond
Law In Society: Defending Hart, Alma Diamond
Fellow, Adjunct, Lecturer, and Research Scholar Works
I revisit the debate between Joseph Raz and H. L. A. Hart concerning the nature of legal content and reasoning. Raz contended that legal reasoning should be analyzed as a form of moral reasoning. In contrast, Hart emphasized the distinction between legal and moral content, proposing that legal reasoning is a form of what I will call social-institutional reasoning. I characterize social-institutional reasoning in terms of the agent-relative, domain-specific, universal, and content-insensitive justifications it draws upon. I evaluate Raz’s moralized analysis and argue that it obscures the distinctive contribution that law’s social and institutional grounds play in our understanding of …
Interactional Ordering: Reconstructing Lon Fuller's Theory Of Private Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh
Interactional Ordering: Reconstructing Lon Fuller's Theory Of Private Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh
Faculty Scholarship
While Lon Fuller is best remembered for his contributions to the fields of general jurisprudence and contract law, his work in each has long been seen as unrelated to the other. This Article shows that in a significantly underappreciated body of work, Fuller did connect the two and, in the process, developed the outlines of a robust theory of private law, best characterized as “interactional ordering.” Driven by Fuller’s efforts to develop a jurisprudence of form that was derived from conventionalism and natural law thinking, interactional ordering sees all normativity as originating in horizontal interactions between individuals in society, seeking …
Language, Legitimacy, And The Law: The Social Roots Of Legal Obligation, Joshua Keton
Language, Legitimacy, And The Law: The Social Roots Of Legal Obligation, Joshua Keton
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
In a recent turn, both legal scholarship and judicial practice in the United States have converged on the idea that the content of the law is grounded on moral facts—especially facts about democracy. Leveraging insights from the philosophy of language, especially the underdetermination of meaning by syntax and semantics, I argue that textualism can only be reconstructed as a small part of a complete theory of legal interpretation. I then consider a more serious claim to the necessity of moral facts in metaphysically grounding the content of the law. As Mark Greenberg’s anti-positivist theory would have it, the content of …
Slaughtering Slaughter-House: An Assessment Of 14th Amendment Privileges Or Immunities Jurisprudence, Caleb Webb
Slaughtering Slaughter-House: An Assessment Of 14th Amendment Privileges Or Immunities Jurisprudence, Caleb Webb
Senior Honors Theses
In 1872, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases, which applied a narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment that effectually eroded the clause from the Constitution. Following Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court compensated by utilizing elastic interpretations of the Due Process Clause in its substantive due process jurisprudence to cover the rights that would have otherwise been protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In more recent years, the Court has heard arguments favoring alternative interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause but has yet to evaluate them thoroughly. By applying the …
Applying Bentham's Theory Of Fallacies To Chief Justice Roberts' Reasoning In West Virginia V. Epa, Dana Neacsu
Applying Bentham's Theory Of Fallacies To Chief Justice Roberts' Reasoning In West Virginia V. Epa, Dana Neacsu
Law Faculty Publications
This essay summarizes the Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA. It also analyzes Chief Justice Robert’s reasoning and addresses the case’s flaws from two perspectives. It references the Court’s decision connecting it to the so-called New Deal Cases, because in both Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, and West Virginia v. EPA, the Court accepted to review a lower court’s decision about a non-existent regulation. In 1935, the governmental kerfuffle was due to a lack of regulatory transparency; the Federal Register had yet to be established. This essay’s analysis incorporates Jeremy Bentham’s 1809 work on two classes of fallacies, authority …
Jazz Improvisation And The Law: Constrained Choice, Sequence, And Strategic Movement Within Rules, William W. Buzbee
Jazz Improvisation And The Law: Constrained Choice, Sequence, And Strategic Movement Within Rules, William W. Buzbee
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Article argues that a richer understanding of the nature of law is possible through comparative, analogical examination of legal work and the art of jazz improvisation. This exploration illuminates a middle ground between rule of law aspirations emphasizing stability and determinate meanings and contrasting claims that the untenable alternative is pervasive discretionary or politicized law. In both the law and jazz improvisation settings, the work involves constraining rules, others’ unpredictable actions, and strategic choosing with attention to where a collective creation is going. One expects change and creativity in improvisation, but the many analogous characteristics of law illuminate why …
The Moral Authority Of Original Meaning, J. Joel Alicea
The Moral Authority Of Original Meaning, J. Joel Alicea
Notre Dame Law Review
One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of …
Friendship As The Primary Purpose Of Law, Michael P. Moreland
Friendship As The Primary Purpose Of Law, Michael P. Moreland
Faculty Publications
A significant aspect of the legacy of John Finnis is the restoration of friendship to a central place in moral, political, and legal theory building on the classical tradition in Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. This essay surveys the implications of friendship for law by way of exploring Finnis’s treatment of friendship in several of his works, including friendship as a condition for discourse, friendship as an especially important illustration of the central case, the relationship between friendship and the common good, and the place of civic friendship in a political community. The essay concludes with a discussion of friendship with …
The Temptation Of Cosmic Private Law Theory, Nathan B. Oman
The Temptation Of Cosmic Private Law Theory, Nathan B. Oman
Faculty Publications
It’s a heady time to be a theorist of private law. After decades of vague post-Realist functionalism or reductive economic theories, the latest generation of private law theorists have provided a proliferation of new philosophies of tort, contract, and property. The result has been a tremendous burst of intellectual creativity. While Kant and Hegel have been dragooned into debates over torts and contracts and even such supposedly wooly headed thinkers as Coke and Blackstone have been rehabilitated, there have been fewer efforts to generate natural law accounts of private law than one might expect, particularly in light of the revival …
Confrontation In The Age Of Plea Bargaining [Comments], William Ortman
Confrontation In The Age Of Plea Bargaining [Comments], William Ortman
Law Faculty Research Publications
No abstract provided.
Deep Cuts: Four Critiques Of Legal Ideology, Justin Deystone, Akbar Rasulov
Deep Cuts: Four Critiques Of Legal Ideology, Justin Deystone, Akbar Rasulov
Publications
This Article begins an effort to rekindle the intellectual tradition of critical legal theory. The context for the project is significant. On the one hand is the grip of a social crisis, the contours of which continue to confound the commentariat. Racism, xenophobia, gendered violence, migration and nation, climate change, health pandemics, political corruption. The parade is as intimidating as it is spectacular. On the other hand, the very tools of criticism we depend upon in identifying these characters in the parade, much less the spectacle of the parade itself, are themselves in crisis. There is, in a word, a …
Reevaluating Legal Theory, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Reevaluating Legal Theory, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Journal Articles
Must a good general theory of law incorporate what is good for persons in general? This question has been at the center of methodological debates in general jurisprudence for decades. Answering “no,” Julie Dickson’s book Evaluation and Legal Theory offered both a clear and concise conspectus of positivist methodology, as well as a response to the longstanding objection that such an approach has to evaluate the data it studies rather than simply describe facts about legal systems. She agreed that legal positivism must evaluate. At the same time, she argued, it is possible to offer an evaluative theory of the …
Making Sense Of Nonsense Jurisprudence, Dan Priel
Making Sense Of Nonsense Jurisprudence, Dan Priel
All Papers
Did Ronald Dworkin think morality is timeless? He did not. But he did think it was universal, right? No to that as well. Turning to jurisprudence, did he think that morality is a criterion of legal validity? No. But he thought morality is part of the law, didn’t he? Not quite. How can you say this? Is it not obvious that Dworkin was not a legal positivist? In that case, he must have been a natural lawyer. Actually, he was neither. So you’re saying that Dworkin invented a new theory of law? No, his views are a version of a …
The Philosophy Of Law For A Naturalist: An Introduction To Artificial Law Theory, Dan Priel
The Philosophy Of Law For A Naturalist: An Introduction To Artificial Law Theory, Dan Priel
All Papers
The aim of this essay is to provide an outline for a naturalistic approach to jurisprudence. It begins by arguing for certain reorientations away from certain questions currently preoccupy legal philosophers but should not. The question of the nature of law is, as currently understood, a misguided question. The questions of the metaphysics and the normativity of law, by contrast, are problematic in a different sense: It is not clear that law raises any special questions with respect to them. Following on that I offer a more positive agenda for naturalistic jurisprudence. Starting with methodology, I argue that there is …
The Conceptions Of Self-Evidence In The Finnis Reconstruction Of Natural Law, Kevin P. Lee
The Conceptions Of Self-Evidence In The Finnis Reconstruction Of Natural Law, Kevin P. Lee
St. Mary's Law Journal
Finnis claims that his theory proceeds from seven basic principles of practical reason that are self-evidently true. While much has been written about the claim of self-evidence, this article considers it in relation to the rigorous claims of logic and mathematics. It argues that when considered in this light, Finnis equivocates in his use of the concept of self-evidence between the realist Thomistic conception and a purely formal, modern symbolic conception. Given his respect for the modern positivist separation of fact and value, the realism of the Thomistic conception cannot be the foundation for the natural law as Finnis would …
The 'Authority' Of Law: Joseph Raz Reconsidered, Andrew Stumpff Morrison
The 'Authority' Of Law: Joseph Raz Reconsidered, Andrew Stumpff Morrison
Law & Economics Working Papers
The article presents a critical reassessment of the legal philosophical writings of Joseph Raz. The critique develops from the author’s previous argument that law is – contra recent near-consensus – best understood as “the command of the sovereign, backed by force.” Given that this is the distinctly defining feature of law, Raz’s extended preoccupation with “reasons for obeying law” is misplaced and even nonsensical.
Motives And Fiduciary Loyalty, Stephen R. Galoob, Ethan J. Leib
Motives And Fiduciary Loyalty, Stephen R. Galoob, Ethan J. Leib
Faculty Scholarship
How, if at all, do motives matter to loyalty? We have argued that loyalty (and the duty of loyalty in fiduciary law) has a cognitive dimension. This kind of “cognitivist” account invites the counterargument that, because most commercial fiduciary relationships involve financial considerations, purity of motive cannot be central to loyalty in the fiduciary context. We contend that this counterargument depends on a flawed understanding of the significance of motive to loyalty. We defend a view of the importance of motivation to loyalty that we call the compatibility account. On this view, A acts loyally toward B only if …
Legal Realism And Legal Doctrine, Dan Priel
Legal Realism And Legal Doctrine, Dan Priel
All Papers
Legal realism is widely perceived to be hostile to legal doctrine. In the familiar narrative, the realists showed that legal doctrine does not, and cannot, constrain judges from using existing legal materials to reach virtually any outcome they want. As such, doctrine only serves to hides and obfuscate what is better discussed openly. The purpose of this essay is to complicate this familiar story. I focus on one contemporary take on legal realism that argues that an open discussion of values will give the law greater determinacy. I counter this view, first, by showing that it does not, in fact, …
Artificial Intelligence And Role-Reversible Judgment, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Stephen E. Henderson
Artificial Intelligence And Role-Reversible Judgment, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Stephen E. Henderson
Faculty Articles
As intelligent machines begin more generally outperforming human experts, why should humans remain ‘in the loop’ of decision-making? One common answer focuses on outcomes: relying on intuition and experience, humans are capable of identifying interpretive errors—sometimes disastrous errors—that elude machines. Though plausible today, this argument will wear thin as technology evolves. Here, we seek out sturdier ground: a defense of human judgment that focuses on the normative integrity of decision-making. Specifically, we propose an account of democratic equality as ‘role-reversibility.’ In a democracy, those tasked with making decisions should be susceptible, reciprocally, to the impact of decisions; there ought to …
Choice Theory: A Restatement, Michael A. Heller, Hanoch Dagan
Choice Theory: A Restatement, Michael A. Heller, Hanoch Dagan
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter restates choice theory, which advances a liberal approach to contract law. First, we refine the concept of autonomy for contract. Then we address range, limit, and floor, three principles that together justify contract law in a liberal society. The first concerns the state’s obligation to be proactive in facilitating the availability of a multiplicity of contract types. The second refers to the respect contract law owes to the autonomy of a party’s future self, that is, to the ability to re-write the story of one’s life. The final principle concerns relational justice, the baseline for any legitimate use …
Grounding Originalism, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs
Grounding Originalism, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs
Faculty Scholarship
How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since.
Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our problems, when there are so many theories of law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official …
Originalism And The Law Of The Past, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs
Originalism And The Law Of The Past, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs
Faculty Scholarship
Originalism has long been criticized for its “law office history” and other historical sins. But a recent “positive turn” in originalist thought may help make peace between history and law. On this theory, originalism is best understood as a claim about our modern law — which borrows many of its rules, constitutional or otherwise, from the law of the past. Our law happens to be the Founders’ law, unless lawfully changed.
This theory has three important implications for the role of history in law. First, whether and how past law matters today is a question of current law, not of …
Language's Empire: A Counter-Telling Of Administrative Law In Canada, Nicholas Hooper
Language's Empire: A Counter-Telling Of Administrative Law In Canada, Nicholas Hooper
LLM Theses
This thesis renders the unstated assumptions that animate statutory interpretation in the administrative state. It argues that the current approach is a disingenuous rhetorical overlay that masks the politics of definitional meaning. After rejecting the possibility of structuring principles in our (post)modern oversaturation of signs, the thesis concludes with an aspirational account of interpretive pragmatism in the face of uncertainty.
A Philosophical Defense Of Judicial Minimalism, Cory A. Evans
A Philosophical Defense Of Judicial Minimalism, Cory A. Evans
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
This dissertation analyzes, criticizes and ultimately defends judicial minimalism, a contemporary theory of judging that has come to the forefront of American jurisprudence in the early part of the 21st Century. In this dissertation I offer the first formal definition of judicial minimalism, apply that definition to case law and the literature, refute many objections to judicial minimalism including objections based on tough case counterexamples, offer a new version of the argument of epistemic humility and offer a new argument in support of judicial minimalism from the perspective of law and economics.
Fiction In The Code: Reading Legislation As Literature, Thomas J. Mcsweeney
Fiction In The Code: Reading Legislation As Literature, Thomas J. Mcsweeney
Faculty Publications
One of the major branches of the field of law and literature is often described as "law as literature." Scholars of law as literature examine the law using the tools of literary analysis. The scholarship in this subfield is dominated by the discussion of narrative texts: confessions, victim-impact statements, and, above all, the judicial opinion. This article will argue that we can use some of the same tools to help us understand non-narrative texts, such as law codes and statutes. Genres create expectations. We do not expect a law code to be literary. Indeed, we tend to dissociate the law …
The Free Exercise Clause, Minority Faiths, And The Possibility Of Religious Independence After Rawlsian Liberalism, David Charles Scott
The Free Exercise Clause, Minority Faiths, And The Possibility Of Religious Independence After Rawlsian Liberalism, David Charles Scott
Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy
The conversation to which my dissertation belongs is that which preoccupied John Rawls in Political Liberalism, namely: (1) how it is possible that a religiously and morally pluralistic culture like ours lives cooperatively from one generation to the next, and (2) The extent to which religious or moral convictions are appropriate bases for political action. My three-essay dissertation is about aspects of this investigation that affect minority or non-mainstream religious and cultural groups, since legal institutions, and theoretical models of them (such as Rawls’s and Ronald Dworkin’s) are in many ways ill-suited to accommodate their ways of life. In the …