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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Indiana Law Journal
Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. In many of these cases the threat is that in concentrated markets—those with only a few sellers—the merger increases the likelihood of collusion or collusion-like behavior. The result will be that the post-merger firm will reduce the volume of sales in the affected market and prices will rise.
Mergers can also injure competition in markets in which the firms purchase, however. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases …
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. Mergers can also injure competition in markets where the firms purchase. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases have applied merger law to buyers. This article concerns an even more rarefied subset, and one that has barely been mentioned. Nevertheless, its implications are staggering. Some mergers may be unlawful because they injure competition in the labor market by enabling the post-merger firm anticompetitively to suppress wages or salaries. …