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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
La Cesión De Derechos En El Código Civil Peruano, Edward Ivan Cueva
La Cesión De Derechos En El Código Civil Peruano, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
La Cesión de Derechos en el Código Civil Peruano
Why De Minimis?, Matthew D. Adler
Why De Minimis?, Matthew D. Adler
All Faculty Scholarship
De minimis cutoffs are a familiar feature of risk regulation. This includes the quantitative “individual risk” thresholds for fatality risks employed in many contexts by EPA, FDA, and other agencies, such as the 1-in-1 million lifetime cancer risk cutoff; extreme event cutoffs for addressing natural hazards, such as the 100-year-flood or 475-year-earthquake; de minimis failure probabilities for built structures; the exclusion of low-probability causal models; and other policymaking criteria. All these tests have a common structure, as I show in the Article. A de minimis test, broadly defined, tells the decisionmaker to determine whether the probability of some outcome is …
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, Vikramaditya Khanna, Timothy L. Dickinson
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, Vikramaditya Khanna, Timothy L. Dickinson
Michigan Law Review
Following the recent spate of corporate scandals, government enforcement authorities have increasingly relied upon corporate monitors to help ensure law compliance and reduce the number of future violations. These monitors also permit enforcement authorities, such as the Securities & Exchange Commission and others, to leverage their enforcement resources in overseeing corporate behavior. However there are few descriptive or normative analyses of the role and scope of corporate monitors. This paper provides such an analysis. After sketching out the historical development of corporate monitors, the paper examines the most common features of the current set of monitor appointments supplemented by interviews …
Segundo Congreso Nacional De Organismos Públicos Autónomos, Bruno L. Costantini García
Segundo Congreso Nacional De Organismos Públicos Autónomos, Bruno L. Costantini García
Bruno L. Costantini García
Memorias del Segundo Congreso Nacional de Organismos Públicos Autónomos. "Autonomía, Profesionalización, Control y Transparencia"
Algunos Apuntes En Torno A La Prescripción Extintiva Y La Caducidad, Edward Ivan Cueva
Algunos Apuntes En Torno A La Prescripción Extintiva Y La Caducidad, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Process And Vertical Deference: Judicial Review Of State Regulatory Inaction, Jim Rossi
Antitrust Process And Vertical Deference: Judicial Review Of State Regulatory Inaction, Jim Rossi
ExpressO
Courts struggle with the tension between national competition laws, on the one hand, and state and local regulation, on the other – especially as traditional governmental functions are privatized and as economic regulation advances beyond its traditional role to address market monitoring. This Article defends a process-based account of the state action antitrust exception against alternative interpretations, such as the substantive efficiency preemption approach recently advanced by Richard Squire, and elaborates on what such a process-based account would entail for courts addressing the role of state economic regulation as a defense in antitrust cases. It recasts the debate as focused …
When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry
When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry
ExpressO
As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—have become increasingly important. Unfortunately, the patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute technologies and discouraging the development of complementary technologies. This paper explains how an optional patent purchase system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the implications of such a system.
Seguridad Jurídica En El Estado Regulador, Carlos Mena-Labarthe
Seguridad Jurídica En El Estado Regulador, Carlos Mena-Labarthe
Carlos Mena-Labarthe
El artículo pretende analizar las implicaciones en seguridad jurídica derivadas del cambio en el modelo de organización de las actividades del Estado en su transformación en un Estado Regulador. Se analizan las implicaciones de los nuevos elementos del modelo y algunas sugerencias para brindar seguridad jurídica en un este nuevo modelo.
Who Writes The Rules For Hostile Takeovers, And Why? The Peculiar Divergence Of Us And Uk Takeover Regulation, John Armour, David A. Skeel Jr.
Who Writes The Rules For Hostile Takeovers, And Why? The Peculiar Divergence Of Us And Uk Takeover Regulation, John Armour, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic Regulatory Structures And The Wto, Elizabeth Trujillo
Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic Regulatory Structures And The Wto, Elizabeth Trujillo
Faculty Scholarship
One of the goals of Article III of GATT is to invalidate domestic regulatory measures, including taxes and non-fiscal policies that amount to non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB) and therefore violate the principles of national treatment. While internal policies that directly discriminate between products based on nationality or origin are clearly in violation of national treatment principles, it is the facially neutral regulatory measures with protectionist and discriminatory effects that are more difficult to assess, even within transparent regulatory processes. However, with their emphasis on the likeness of the products in question, WTO panels run the risk of alienating member …
La Cláusula General Como Elemento Esencial En La Configuración De Los Actos De Competencia Desleal Enunciados Y No Enunciados, Pierino Stucchi
La Cláusula General Como Elemento Esencial En La Configuración De Los Actos De Competencia Desleal Enunciados Y No Enunciados, Pierino Stucchi
Pierino Stucchi
No abstract provided.