Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law and Economics Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

Deterrence And Damages: The Multiplier Principle And Its Alternatives, Richard Craswell Jun 1999

Deterrence And Damages: The Multiplier Principle And Its Alternatives, Richard Craswell

Michigan Law Review

One purpose of fines and damage awards is to deter harmful behavior. When enforcement is imperfect, however, so the probability that any given violation will be punished is less than 100%, the law's deterrent effect is usually thought to be reduced. Thus, it is often said that the ideal penalty (insofar as deterrence is concerned) equals the harm caused by the violation multiplied by one over the probability of punishment. For example, if a violation faces only a 25% (or one-in-four) chance of being punished, on this view the optimal penalty would be four times the harm caused by the …


Subversive Thoughts On Freedom And The Common Good, Larry Alexander, Maimon Schwarzschild May 1999

Subversive Thoughts On Freedom And The Common Good, Larry Alexander, Maimon Schwarzschild

Michigan Law Review

Richard Epstein is a rare and forceful voice against the conventional academic wisdom of our time. Legal scholarship of the past few decades overwhelmingly supports more government regulation and more power for the courts, partly in order to control businesses for environmental and other reasons, but more broadly in hopes of achieving egalitarian outcomes along the famous lines of race, gender, and class. Epstein is deeply skeptical that any of this is the shining path to a better world. Epstein's moral criterion for evaluating social policy is to look at how fully it allows individual human beings to satisfy their …


The Assault That Failed: The Progressive Critique Of Laissez Faire, Richard A. Epstein May 1999

The Assault That Failed: The Progressive Critique Of Laissez Faire, Richard A. Epstein

Michigan Law Review

Robert Lee Hale has long been an intellectual thorn in the side of the defenders of laissez faire, among whom I am quite happy to count myself. As Barbara Fried notes in her meticulous study of Hale's work, his name is hardly a household word. But both directly and indirectly, his influence continues to be great. His best known work is perhaps Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, published in 1923 as a review of Thomas Nixon Carver's Principles of National Economy, itself a defense of the classical principles of laissez faire, remembered today only for the drubbing …


A New Economic Theory Of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather Than Rent Creation, Douglas Ginsburg May 1999

A New Economic Theory Of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather Than Rent Creation, Douglas Ginsburg

Michigan Law Review

Once upon a time, people believed that the government regulated various indus tries in "the public interest." The idea was that certain conditions, such as "natural monopoly" or the ability to externalize significant costs, caus ed markets to fail and governments to step in to correct that failure. Econmnic regulation predicated upon market failure can be dated conveniently to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, in which the Congress established the Inters tate Commerce Commission to regulate railroads in the interests of shippers, principally farmers and small businesses. The legal notion of "affectation with the public interest" dates back much …


The Tentative Case Against Flexibility In Commercial Law, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 1999

The Tentative Case Against Flexibility In Commercial Law, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

Well-rooted in modern commercial law is the idea that the law and the obligations that it enforces should reflect the empirical reality of the relationship between the contracting parties. The Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") champions this tradition by viewing the performance practices formed among the parties throughout their interaction as a primary source for interpreting and supplementing their explicit contracts. The generous recognition of waiver and modifications, as well as the binding force the Code accords to course of performance, course of dealings, and customary trade usages, effectively permits unwritten commercial practices to vary and to erode explicit contractual provisions.


The Efficient Norm For Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation Of Fiduciary Duty, Thomas A. Smith Jan 1999

The Efficient Norm For Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation Of Fiduciary Duty, Thomas A. Smith

Michigan Law Review

To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing between directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the corporation1 itself smacks of reification - treating the fictional corporate entity as if it were a real thing. Now the orthodox view among corporate law scholars is that the corporate fiduciary duty is a norm that requires firm managers to "maximize shareholder value." Giving the corporation itself any serious role in the analysis of fiduciary duty, the thinking goes, obscures scientific insight with bad legal metaphysics. Some recent scholarship and legislation, such as constituency statutes, have challenged this "shareholder primacy" view. Contestants …


Private Ordering At The World's First Futures Exchange, Mark D. West Jan 1999

Private Ordering At The World's First Futures Exchange, Mark D. West

Michigan Law Review

Modern derivative securities - financial instruments whose value is linked to or "derived" from some other asset - are often sophisticated, complex, and subject to a variety of rules and regulations. The same is true of the derivative instruments traded at the world's first organized futures exchange, the Dojima Rice Exchange in Osaka, Japan, where trade flourished for nearly 300 years, from the late seventeenth century until shortly before World War II. This Article analyzes Dojima's organization, efficiency, and amalgam of legal and extralegal rules. In doing so, it contributes to a growing body of literature on commercial self-regulation while …


Lawyers, Law, And Contract Formation: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Robert K. Rasumssen Jan 1999

Lawyers, Law, And Contract Formation: Comments On Daniel Keating's 'Exploring The Battle Of The Forms In Action', Robert K. Rasumssen

Michigan Law Review

Attempting to infuse the austerity of theory with a dose of reality, an intrepid group of legal scholars has left the security of the office and ventured into the work-a-day world of commercial practices. The information that they have gathered and are sharing with the rest of us is furthering our understanding of the interaction between commercial law and commercial practice. Embedded in much of the research they have generated is the not-so-flattering conclusion that law professors suffer from a self-serving bias. Those of us in the academy engage in the assumption, often unstated or even unacknowledged, that the law …


Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer Jan 1999

Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer

Michigan Law Review

Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may have unforeseen virtues. The combination of these oft-criticized characteristics might induce a limited amount of infringement that enhances social welfare without reducing (or without substantially reducing) the profitability of the patentee. Patent infringement is generally viewed as socially inefficient because infringement reduces the patentee's ex ante incentive to innovate. Limited amounts of infringement combined with increased patent duration, however, can substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supracompetitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incentives to innovate. Indeed, this Article derives a legal regime that preserves the incentive to innovate by …


Exit And Voice In The Age Of Globalization, Eyal Benvenisti Jan 1999

Exit And Voice In The Age Of Globalization, Eyal Benvenisti

Michigan Law Review

The "globalization" of commerce provides ever-growing opportunities for producers, employers, and service providers to shop the globe for more amenable jurisdictions. While they enjoy a "race to the top," an international "race to the bottom," spawned by decreasing relocation costs, threatens to compromise the achievements of the welfare state and lower standards of consumer protection. National governments, weakened by competition that entails leaner budgets, find it increasingly difficult to cooperate in the appropriation of crucial shared natural resources, seriously endangering these assets while damaging the environment. Not only does the growing global competition create both efficiency losses and social-welfare problems, …