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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Aversion To Risk Aversion In The New Institutional Economics, Victor P. Goldberg
Aversion To Risk Aversion In The New Institutional Economics, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
One significant division that emerged during the conference involved the role of risk aversion in analyzing institutional arrangements. I, along with Oliver Williamson, took the position that the risk aversion assumption deflects attention from the more significant determinants and that more progress would be made if we could bind our hands and agree to invoke attitudes toward risk only as a last resort. Professor Richter has graciously given me this opportunity to elaborate upon this theme.
The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery W. Katz
The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
The purpose of this article is to promote a particular research program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract formation. Although I will often simply speak of offer and acceptance in my discussion, I mean to refer to a broader set of issues than are commonly denoted by this doctrinal label. My program transcends the narrow issue of whether particular communications technically should be classified as offers and acceptances, and includes questions often analyzed under the rubrics of implication and interpretation. At its broadest, my argument addresses all legal rules that answer two types of …