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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Economics, Public Choice, And The Perennial Conflict Of Laws, Erin O'Hara O'Connor
Economics, Public Choice, And The Perennial Conflict Of Laws, Erin O'Hara O'Connor
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory Of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, Manuel A. Utset
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory Of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
A Game-Theoretic Approach To Regulatory Negotiation And A Framework For Empirical Analysis, Shi-Ling Hsu
A Game-Theoretic Approach To Regulatory Negotiation And A Framework For Empirical Analysis, Shi-Ling Hsu
Scholarly Publications
For at least two decades, federal agencies have departed from their traditional role as top-down regulators, and have engaged regulated parties in negotiations regarding matters that were previously either handed down as edict or resolved in quasi-judicial agency proceedings. It is no accident that the increase in agency use of more conciliatory negotiation-oriented strategies coincides with a steady increase in skepticism regarding the effectiveness of regulation at the federal level and demands for less federal control and more state and local control. In this setting, federal agencies have become more inclusive and less adversarial towards regulated parties and other stakeholders, …