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The Electrical Deregulation Fiasco: Looking To Regulatory Federalism To Promote A Balance Between Markets And The Provision Of Public Goods, Jim Rossi Jan 2002

The Electrical Deregulation Fiasco: Looking To Regulatory Federalism To Promote A Balance Between Markets And The Provision Of Public Goods, Jim Rossi

Michigan Law Review

Over the last thirty years, regulators have deregulated just about every regulated industry. In no industry has deregulation raised as much fear and concern as in electric power markets. Even before the Enron debacle, a crisis that is more about the failures of corporate than regulatory law, it was clear that something had gone seriously wrong in the turn towards deregulation of electric power. Recent events in California are illustrative. In early 2000, consumers in California, the first state to deregulate retail power markets on a mass scale, saw repeated months of power interruptions. Many utility customers experienced a risk …


The Price Of Law: How The Market For Lawyers Distorts The Justice System, Gillian K. Hadfield Feb 2000

The Price Of Law: How The Market For Lawyers Distorts The Justice System, Gillian K. Hadfield

Michigan Law Review

Bill Clinton's legal bills in connection with the Lewinsky scandal topped $10 million; the bill for Ken Starr's investigation of the President exceeded $50 million. The cost to the eight families portrayed in the bestseller A Civil Action for their tort suit against a manufacturing company accused of dumping hazardous chemicals into the water supply was $4.8 million (paid from a settlement of about $8 million); the cost for the defense exceeded $7 million. Lawyers who represented the three states in the nationwide suit by state attorneys general against tobacco companies to recoup smoking-related health care costs were awarded $8.2 …


Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer Jan 1999

Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer

Michigan Law Review

Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may have unforeseen virtues. The combination of these oft-criticized characteristics might induce a limited amount of infringement that enhances social welfare without reducing (or without substantially reducing) the profitability of the patentee. Patent infringement is generally viewed as socially inefficient because infringement reduces the patentee's ex ante incentive to innovate. Limited amounts of infringement combined with increased patent duration, however, can substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supracompetitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incentives to innovate. Indeed, this Article derives a legal regime that preserves the incentive to innovate by …


Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp Oct 1989

Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforcement. That premise is controversial. Nonetheless, several economic and legal theorists, primarily among the Chicago School of economics and antitrust scholarship, have developed an Optimal Deterrence Model based on this assumption. The Model is designed to achieve the optimum, or ideal, amount of antitrust enforcement. The Model's originators generally believe that there is too much antitrust enforcement, particularly enforcement initiated by private plaintiffs. I intend to show that, even if efficiency is the only antitrust policy goal, a broader array of lawsuits should …


Hawley: The New Deal And The Monopoly Problem, Arthur D. Austin Apr 1967

Hawley: The New Deal And The Monopoly Problem, Arthur D. Austin

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The New Deal and the Monopoly Problem By E. W. Hawley


Government And The Consumer, Richard J. Barber May 1966

Government And The Consumer, Richard J. Barber

Michigan Law Review

This article takes up four major topics. First, the principal characteristics of governmental action with respect to consumer protection are reviewed, with emphasis on developments during the past thirty years. Second, the traditional pleas for consumer protection are examined with a view toward determining the inadequacies in governmental action. Third, the problems of the consumer are studied in the context of oligopolistic industrial markets in which nonprice competition accentuates the place of advertising and severely restricts the dissemination of factual information that is essential to enlightened purchase decisions. Fourth, the ingredients of a meaningful consumer protection program are outlined and …


Boycotts And Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, Richard M. Buxbaum Feb 1966

Boycotts And Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, Richard M. Buxbaum

Michigan Law Review

It is currently a common if still relatively unheralded practice for a "fired" dealer to bring an antitrust action against his former manufacturer-supplier (and perhaps other dealers), alleging that his termination was the result of a boycott. Boycotts-collective efforts to obtain the exclusion of a party from a market-are illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Thus, questions concerning the justification for the boycott or the significance of the offender's market position do not arise.


Oppenheim: Unfair Trade Practices, Cases And Comments, Glen E. Weston Nov 1965

Oppenheim: Unfair Trade Practices, Cases And Comments, Glen E. Weston

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Unfair Trade Practices, Cases and Comments by S. Chesterfield Oppenheim


British Antitrust In Action, Michael Conant Apr 1961

British Antitrust In Action, Michael Conant

Michigan Law Review

The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 was the first positive anti-monopoly statute in the United Kingdom since the Statute of Monopolies in 1623. Now that the statute has been in effect four years there are sufficient decisions and consent orders to make possible a report on its operation. Since most American readers are unfamiliar with the legal and economic background of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, the prior common law in this area and the 1948 monopolies investigation statute will be summarized first. This summary is followed by an analysis of the structure of the 1956 Act, of the …


Regulation Of Business - Sherman Act - Effect Of Trade-Mark On Scope Of Relevant Market, Robert H. Kapp S. Ed. Dec 1957

Regulation Of Business - Sherman Act - Effect Of Trade-Mark On Scope Of Relevant Market, Robert H. Kapp S. Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Defendants are American corporations marketing trade-marked toilet goods obtained from their French affiliates. In each case the French company transferred to the American company trademark rights covering imported products. Pursuant to section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 defendants filed with the Bureau of Customs certificates of registration of these trade-marks for the purpose of preventing the competitive importation of products bearing the same trade-marks. In an action by the government charging that utilization of section 526 by each defendant constitutes an attempt to monopolize and a monopolization of the importation and sale of these trade-marked commodities in violation …


Edwards: Big Business And The Policy Of Competition, Carl H. Fulda Mar 1957

Edwards: Big Business And The Policy Of Competition, Carl H. Fulda

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Big Business and the Policy of Competition By Corwin D. Edwards.


Product Competition In The Relevant Market Under The Sherman Act, David Macdonald Nov 1954

Product Competition In The Relevant Market Under The Sherman Act, David Macdonald

Michigan Law Review

The correct delimitation of the relevant market is the problem to be examined here. First the legal development of market concepts will be traced. Then, with the objective of coalescing the legal and economic concepts of .the market, a test will be proposed with which to measure the correct market in any given case.