Law and Economics Commons^™

Reframing Antitrust In Light Of Scientific Revolution: Accounting For Transaction Costs In Rule Of Reason Analysis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

This Article contends that modern rule of reason analysis, informed by workable competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, is suitable for evaluating only a subset of agreements that may reduce transaction costs. The Article distinguishes between “technological” and “non-technological” transaction costs. Technological transaction costs entail the bargaining and information costs first emphasized by Ronald Coase, while non-technological transaction costs result from more fundamental departures from perfect competition, departures creating a risk of opportunism that accompanies relationship-specific investments. Modern law does accurately assess restraints that may reduce technological transaction costs—costs that are analogous to the sort of production costs recognized by the …

Morality And Markets: A Comment On Predicting Crime, Miriam A. Cherry

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In their article, Predicting Crime, Professors Henderson, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz propose an intriguing and futuristic series of market-based models surrounding the broad topic of crime prevention. Harnessing widely dispersed knowledge among groups of people, including cops on the beat, criminologists, residents of neighborhoods, elected officials, snitches, and possibly even the criminals themselves, the authors posit that prediction markets will help to estimate crime statistics more accurately and therefore result in more efficient deployment of policing resources. Further, they hypothesize that posing particular policy alternatives—for example, the option of eliminating the death penalty—to a widely dispersed market will result …