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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
The Limits Of Formal Economics In Tort Law: The Puzzle Of Negligence, Shawn J. Bayern
The Limits Of Formal Economics In Tort Law: The Puzzle Of Negligence, Shawn J. Bayern
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Repeat Offenders: If They Learn, We Punish Them More Severely, Murat C. Mungan
Repeat Offenders: If They Learn, We Punish Them More Severely, Murat C. Mungan
Scholarly Publications
Many legal systems are designed to punish repeat offenders more severely than first time offenders. However, existing economic literature generally offers either mixed or qualified results regarding optimal punishment of repeat offenders. This paper analyzes optimal punishment schemes in a two period model, where the social planner announces possibly-different sanctions for offenders based on their detection history. When offenders learn how to evade the detection mechanism employed by the government, escalating punishments can be optimal. The contributions of this paper can be listed as follows: First, it identifies and formalizes a source which may produce a marginal effect in the …
The Politics And Psychology Of Gasoline Taxes: An Empirical Study, Shi-Ling Hsu
The Politics And Psychology Of Gasoline Taxes: An Empirical Study, Shi-Ling Hsu
Scholarly Publications
Economists are beginning to form a consensus that a carbon tax is the most effective and cost-effective way to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. The insight of economists and other policy analysts is that, in the greenhouse gas context, the design of cap-and-trade programs creates so many opportunities for rent-seeking that they may not be very cost-effective, and may not reduce greenhouse gas emissions at all. Carbon tax proposals are appealing because they are so simple and sensible that rent-seeking would have to be very audacious to succeed.
Carbon tax proposals, however, have divided economists from almost everybody else. In …
Is Cap-And-Trade Fair To The Poor? Short-Sighted Households And The Timing Of Consumption Taxes, Manuel A. Utset, Brian Galle
Is Cap-And-Trade Fair To The Poor? Short-Sighted Households And The Timing Of Consumption Taxes, Manuel A. Utset, Brian Galle
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Managerial Entrenchment And Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory And Evidence From A Recessionary Market, Jay B. Kesten
Managerial Entrenchment And Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory And Evidence From A Recessionary Market, Jay B. Kesten
Scholarly Publications
Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and valuation of takeover premiums. The mainstream view, both of academics and market participants, is that entrenchment reduces accountability to shareholders and amplifies agency costs, thus decreasing shareholder wealth. Two influential studies (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) and Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003)) present empirical evidence consistent with this conclusion, finding statistically significant negative correlations between entrenchment and …