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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Faculty Scholarship
This article modifies the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment incentives with external benefits. In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no longer valid. We focus on antitrust applications. In light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than suggested in the standard static model. It may be optimal not to punish the monopolizing firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it. We examine the precise balance between penalty and reward in the optimal punishment scheme.
Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics And Legal Scholarship, Greg Klass, Kathryn Zeiler
Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics And Legal Scholarship, Greg Klass, Kathryn Zeiler
Faculty Scholarship
Endowment theory holds the mere ownership of a thing causes people to assign greater value to it than they otherwise would. The theory entered legal scholarship in the early 1990s and quickly eclipsed other accounts of how ownership affects valuation. Today, appeals to a generic “endowment effect” can be found throughout the legal literature. More recent experimental results, however, suggest that the empirical evidence for endowment theory is weak at best. When the procedures used in laboratory experiments are altered to rule out alternative explanations, the “endowment effect” disappears. This and other recent evidence suggest that mere ownership does not …
Trial Selection Theory And Evidence, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Trial Selection Theory And Evidence, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter presents a review of trial selection theory. We use the term “trial selection theory” to refer to models that attempt to explain or predict the characteristics that distinguish cases that are litigated to judgment from those that settle, and the implications of those characteristics for the development of legal doctrine and for important trial outcome parameters, such as the plaintiff win rate. Using this definition, trial selection theory can be said to have started with Priest and Klein (1984).
An Economic Perspective On Preemption, Keith N. Hylton
An Economic Perspective On Preemption, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This Essay has two goals. The first is to present an economic theory of preemption as a choice among regulatory regimes. The optimal regime choice model is used to generate specific implications for the court decisions on preemption of products liability claims. The second objective is to extrapolate from the regime choice model to consider its implications for broader controversies about preemption.