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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Law, Share Price Accuracy, And Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, Artyom Durnev
Law, Share Price Accuracy, And Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, Artyom Durnev
Michigan Law Review
Mandatory disclosure has been at the core of U.S. securities regulation since its adoption in the early 1930s. For many decades, this fixture of our financial system was accepted with little examination. Over the last twenty years, however, mandatory disclosure has been subject to intensifying intellectual crosscurrents. Some commentators hold out the U.S. system as the standard for the world. They argue that adoption by other countries of a U.S.-styled system, with its greater corporate transparency, would enhance their economic performance. Other commentators, in contrast, insist that the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime represents a mistake, not a model. These crosscurrents …
Manual De Derecho Procesal Civil, Edward Ivan Cueva
Manual De Derecho Procesal Civil, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
No abstract provided.
Responsabilidad Civil Ante Las Pérdidas Por Gestión En Los Fondos Comunes De Inversión, Martin Paolantonio
Responsabilidad Civil Ante Las Pérdidas Por Gestión En Los Fondos Comunes De Inversión, Martin Paolantonio
Martin Paolantonio
Nota crítica al primer fallo que resolvió asignar responsabilidad a los órganos del fondo común de inversión ante resultados negativos de la gestión
Making Markets: Network Effects And The Role Of Law In The Creation Of Strong Securities Markets, Robert B. Ahdieh
Making Markets: Network Effects And The Role Of Law In The Creation Of Strong Securities Markets, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
As Russia and other formerly socialist states construct market economies, the appearance of strong securities markets remains an unfulfilled expectation. Notwithstanding broad privatization of state-owned enterprises and the elimination of industrial subsidies - essential precursors to demand for capital-raising securities markets - stock markets in Central and Eastern Europe remain illiquid, inefficient, and unreliable.
Strong securities markets do not, it seems, neatly follow from the welfare-maximizing behavior of individuals and institutions. Nor can the appearance of securities markets be effectively dictated by government decree. Post-communist securities market transition therefore presents a puzzle: Do markets emerge, or must they be created? …
Law, Share Price Accuracy And Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, Artyom Durnev
Law, Share Price Accuracy And Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, Artyom Durnev
Faculty Scholarship
Mandatory disclosure has been at the core of U.S. securities regulation since its adoption in the early 1930s. For many decades, this fixture of our financial system was accepted with little examination. Over the last twenty years, however, mandatory disclosure has been subject to intensifying intellectual crosscurrents. Some commentators hold out the U.S. system as the standard for the world. They argue that adoption by other countries of a U.S.-styled system, with its greater corporate transparency, would enhance their economic performance. Other commentators, in contrast, insist that the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime represents a mistake, not a model. These crosscurrents …
Behavioral Economics And The Sec, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard
Behavioral Economics And The Sec, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Not all investors are rational. Quite apart from the obvious examples of credulity in the face of the latest Ponzi scheme, there is no shortage of evidence that many investors' decisions are influenced by systematic biases that impair their abilities to maximize their investment returns. For example, investors will often hold onto poorly performing stocks longer than warranted, hoping to recoup their losses. Other investors will engage in speculative trading, dissipating their returns by paying larger commissions than more passive investors. And we are not just talking about widows and orphans here. There is evidence that supposedly sophisticated institutional investors-mutual …
Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton
Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article questions the practice of framing problems concerning auditors’ professional responsibility inside a principal-agent paradigm. If professional independence is to be achieved, auditors cannot be enmeshed in agency relationships with the shareholders of their audit clients. As agents, the auditors by definition become subject to the principal’s control and cannot act independently. For the same reason, auditors’ duties should be neither articulated in the framework of corporate law fiduciary duty, nor conceived relationally at all. These assertions follow from an inquiry into the operative notion of the shareholder-beneficiary. The Article unpacks the notion of the shareholder and tells a …
The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking The Regulation Of Analysts, Jill E. Fisch, Hillary A. Sale
The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking The Regulation Of Analysts, Jill E. Fisch, Hillary A. Sale
All Faculty Scholarship
Recent press has highlighted shocking examples of bias, self-dealing, and inaccuracy in the behavior of the securities analyst. Critics have attributed the bubble and subsequent crash in the technology sector to analyst hype and posited that undue analyst optimism contributed to scandals such as Enron. After many years of minimal regulator oversight analysts are now the subject of extensive regulatory reform proposals, including a mandate in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requiring that the Securities and Exchange Commission adopt a variety of restrictions on analyst behavior.
Despite the media attention, there have been few attempts to conceptualize carefully the analyst's …
Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen
Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen
All Faculty Scholarship
Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.
This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the actors …
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
All Faculty Scholarship
The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.
How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal For Securities Intermediaries, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch
How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal For Securities Intermediaries, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley And Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, William W. Bratton
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley And Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, Michael L. Wachter
Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper evaluates the impact of developments in the understanding of asset value pricing for alternative legal standards for takeover defenses: the management discretion and the shareholder rights positions. Both sides place considerable, albeit implicit, reliance on alternative views of the efficiency of financial markets. Developments in finance theory show that when financial markets are only "relatively efficient," stock prices can incorrectly value the corporation at any point in time, at the same time as investors cannot outperform the market on an ongoing basis. I focus on financial market anomalies arising from the failure of the capital asset pricing model …
Trust, Guilt, And Securities Regulation, Peter H. Huang
Trust, Guilt, And Securities Regulation, Peter H. Huang
Publications
This Article analyzes the importance of trust in securities investing and how guilt about breaching such trust has implications for securities regulation. Both U.S. federal securities laws and the regulations of the National Association of Securities Dealers impose high standards of professional conduct upon securities professionals. But exactly what are and should be the legal responsibilities of securities professionals remain the subject of much debate. In particular, courts disagree over when broker-dealers are fiduciaries of their clients. A legal consequence of a fiduciary relationship is a duty of fair dealing. This Article is the first to analyze the emotional, moral, …
The Mechanisms Of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
The Mechanisms Of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Faculty Scholarship
Twenty years ago we published a paper, "The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency," that sought to describe the institutional underpinnings of price formation in the securities market. Since that time, financial economics has moved forward on many fronts. The sub-discipline of behavioral finance has struggled to bring yet more descriptive realism to the study of financial markets. Two important questions are (1) how much has this new discipline changed our understanding of the efficiency and nature of the institutional mechanisms that set price in financial markets; and (2) how far does this discipline carry novel implications for the regulation of financial …