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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Technology & Torts: A Theory Of Memory Costs, Nondurable Precautions And Interference Effects, Ben Depoorter
Technology & Torts: A Theory Of Memory Costs, Nondurable Precautions And Interference Effects, Ben Depoorter
Ben Depoorter
This Article examines the influence of nondurable precaution technologies on the expansion of tort awards. We provide four contributions to the literature. First, we present a general, formal model on durable and non-durable precaution technology that focuses on memory costs. Second, because liability exposure creates interference, we argue that tort law perpetuates the expansion of awards. Third, because plaintiffs do not consider the social costs of interference effects, private litigation induces socially excessive suits. Fourth, while new harm-reducing technologies likely increase accident rates, such technologies also raise the ratio of trial costs to harm, leaving undetermined the overall effect of …
Tort Law And Probabilistic Litigation: How To Apply Multipliers To Address The Problem Of Negative Value Suits, Ben Depoorter
Tort Law And Probabilistic Litigation: How To Apply Multipliers To Address The Problem Of Negative Value Suits, Ben Depoorter
Ben Depoorter
This Article advances a proposal that brings to life valuable lawsuits that litigation costs currently discourage. Our proposal converts claims with negative expected values into positive expected value claims by implementing a novel system involving flexible conditional multipliers. Our proposal has two components. First, under the proposed system a plaintiff is allowed to select a damage multiplier that determines the amount of damages the plaintiff will receive if the litigation is successful. Second, courts select cases for litigation randomly with a probability inverse to the multiplier the plaintiff selected.
Law In The Shadow Of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect Of Civil Settlements, Ben Depoorter
Law In The Shadow Of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect Of Civil Settlements, Ben Depoorter
Ben Depoorter
Lawmakers, courts, and legal scholars often express concern that settlement agreements withhold important information from the public. This Essay identifies, to the contrary, problematic issues involving the availability of information on non-representative settlements. The theoretical and empirical evidence presented in this Essay demonstrates that, despite the widespread use of nondisclosure agreements, information on settlements is distributed both inside and outside legal communities, reaching actors through various channels including the oral culture in legal communities, specialized reporters, professional interest organizations, and media coverage. Moreover, information on private settlement agreements circulates more widely if the agreed compensation in a given settlement exceeds …