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Regulatory Institutions Of The Global South: Why Are They Different And What Can Be Done About It?, Yugank Goyal
Regulatory Institutions Of The Global South: Why Are They Different And What Can Be Done About It?, Yugank Goyal
Yugank Goyal
Developing countries suffer from underperforming regulatory agencies compared to those in the developed world. The paper attempts to theorize general reasons behind such divergence. It argues that the differences lie in developing countries’ (a) higher priorities for redistribution, (b) structurally different institutional endowments, especially at informal level, and (c) limited informational channels. The paper proposes that a multi-stakeholder (with increased emphasis on judiciary and civil society) approach has potential to address the shortcomings. It tests these claims through studying cases of telecom and electricity regulation in India.
A Negative Externality By Any Other Name: Using Emissions Caps As Models For Constraining Dead-Weight Costs Of Regulation, Scott A. Shepard
A Negative Externality By Any Other Name: Using Emissions Caps As Models For Constraining Dead-Weight Costs Of Regulation, Scott A. Shepard
Scott A. Shepard
Emissions caps work on a simple and compelling premise. Regulated entities, in the process of creating something desirable, like energy, create and expel some problematic by-product, such as carbon. They do this because they particularly reap a significant set of benefits (e.g., profits, market share, job security) from their efforts, while only diffusely and incidentally, along with the rest of society, suffering the harms caused by their emissions. These emissions, paid for primarily by the rest of society, are called negative externalities. Emissions-cap regimes are designed to make regulated entities more directly accountable for the costs of their emissions and …