Law and Economics Commons^™

Placebo Marks, Jake Linford

Scholarly Publications

Scholars often complain that sellers use trademarks to manipulate consumer perception. This manipulation ostensibly harms consumers by limiting their ability to make informed choices. For example, holding other things constant, consumers spend more money on goods with a high-performance reputation. Critics characterize that result as wasteful, if not anticompetitive. But recent marketing research shows that trademarks with a high-performance reputation may sometimes influence perception to the benefit of the consumer.

A trademark with a high-performance reputation can deliver a performance-enhancing placebo effect. Research subjects perform better at physical and mental tasks when they prepare or play with a product bearing …

Through The Lens Of Innovation, Mirit Eyal-Cohen

Florida State University Law Review

The legal system constantly follows the footsteps of innovation and attempts to discourage its migration overseas. Yet, present legal rules that inform and explain entrepreneurial circumstances lack a core understanding of the concept of entrepreneurship. By its nature, law imposes order. It provides rules, remedies, and classifications that direct behavior in a consistent manner. Entrepreneurship turns on the contrary. It entails making creative judgments about the unknown. It involves adapting to disarray. It thrives on deviation as opposed to traditional causation. This Article argues that these differences matter. It demonstrates that current laws lock entrepreneurs into inefficient legal routes. Through …

Private Ordering Under Threat Of Regulation, Jake Linford

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives, Murat C. Mungan

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Economics Of The Independent Invention Defense Under Incomplete Information, Murat C. Mungan

Scholarly Publications

Patents lead to ex post deadweight loss arising from a noncompetitive market structure for the invention. Many have argued that introducing independent invention as a defense (IID) to patent infringement can increase social welfare by decreasing such deadweight loss at the price of a modest decrease in the number of inventions. This paper considers the effects of IID in a setting where R&D firms have incomplete information about their rivals. Four main results follow under incomplete information: (i) fewer things are invented under an IID regime; (ii) IID’s effects on welfare are ambiguous; (iii) IID is more likely to increase …

Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Nurturing A Transnational System Of Innovation, Jerome H. Reichman

Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy

No abstract provided.