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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

A Risk/Cost Framework For Logistics Policy Evaluation: Hazardous Waste Management, Kimberly Hollister Apr 2002

A Risk/Cost Framework For Logistics Policy Evaluation: Hazardous Waste Management, Kimberly Hollister

Department of Information Management and Business Analytics Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

The management of hazardous waste disposal operations is extremely complex involving a multitude of environmental, engineering, economic, social and political concerns. This article proposes a framework to assist policy makers in the evaluation of logistic policies. A spatial general equilibrium based policy evaluation model is developed to calculate risk, cost, and risk equity tradeoff curves. This framework provides policy makers a tool with which they can relate resulting logistics patterns and their associated risk, cost, and equity attributes to original policy goals.


Teoría General De La Prueba Judicial, Edward Ivan Cueva Jan 2002

Teoría General De La Prueba Judicial, Edward Ivan Cueva

Edward Ivan Cueva

No abstract provided.


A Game-Theoretic Approach To Regulatory Negotiation And A Framework For Empirical Analysis, Shi-Ling Hsu Jan 2002

A Game-Theoretic Approach To Regulatory Negotiation And A Framework For Empirical Analysis, Shi-Ling Hsu

Scholarly Publications

For at least two decades, federal agencies have departed from their traditional role as top-down regulators, and have engaged regulated parties in negotiations regarding matters that were previously either handed down as edict or resolved in quasi-judicial agency proceedings. It is no accident that the increase in agency use of more conciliatory negotiation-oriented strategies coincides with a steady increase in skepticism regarding the effectiveness of regulation at the federal level and demands for less federal control and more state and local control. In this setting, federal agencies have become more inclusive and less adversarial towards regulated parties and other stakeholders, …


International Environmental Law And Emotional Rational Choice, Peter H. Huang Jan 2002

International Environmental Law And Emotional Rational Choice, Peter H. Huang

Publications

This paper considers how emotions can foster compliance by rational actors with international environmental law. Many environmental issues are highly emotionally charged. Both supporters of and opponents to international environmental law often feel very strongly about their positions and views. A psychological game-theoretic model focuses on the disciplinary role that losing face may play in compliance with international environmental law. This model implies that non-compliance, especially by high-profile international actors, should be highly and swiftly publicized upon detection and verification. The model also explains why actors care so much about soft, that is, non-binding international environmental law, such as international …