Law and Economics Commons^™

Almost Everybody Disagrees Almost All The Time: The Genericity Of Weakly Merging Nowhere, Ronald I. Miller, Chris William Sanchirico

All Faculty Scholarship

Suppose we randomly pull two agents from a population and ask them to observe an unfolding, infinite sequence of zeros and ones. If each agent starts with a prior belief about the true sequence and updates this belief on revelation of successive observations, what is the chance that the two agents will come to agree on the likelihood that the next draw is a one? In this paper we show that there is no chance. More formally, we show that under a very unrestrictive definition of what it means to draw priors “randomly,” the probability that two priors have any …

Restating Capitalization Standards And Rules: The Case For "Rough Justice" Regulations (Part Two), John W. Lee, Eldridge Blanton, Veena Luthra, Glenn Walberg, Darryl Whitesell

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Products Liability And Legal Leverage: The Perverse Effect Of Stiff Penalties, Michael S. Knoll

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, And The Role Of The Plaintiff, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Assessing Consensus: The Promise And Performance Of Negotiated Rulemaking, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

Over its thirteen year history, the negotiated rulemaking process has yielded only thirty-five final administrative rules. By comparison, the federal government publishes over 3,000 final rules each year through the ordinary notice-and- comment process. Why have federal agencies relied so little on negotiated rulemaking? I examine this question by assessing the impact of negotiating rulemaking on its two major purposes: (1) reducing rulemaking time; and (2) decreasing the amount of litigation over agency rules. My analysis suggests that the asserted problems used to justify negotiated rulemaking have been overstated and that the limitations of negotiated rulemaking have been understated. Negotiated …

Price Theory And Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has exerted a strong influence over the law of vertical restraints in the past two decades, leading the Supreme Court to abandon much of its traditional hostility toward such agreements. Chicago's success has provoked a vigorous response from Populists, who support the traditional approach. Chicago, Populists claim, has improperly relied upon neoclassical price theory to inform the normative and descriptive assumptions that drive its analysis of trade restraints generally and of vertical restraints in particular. This reliance is misplaced, Populists assert, because the real world departs from that portrayed by price-theoretic models and, at …

Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, And Justice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

THIS PAPER IS THE CO-WINNER OF THE FRED BERGER PRIZE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE 1999 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE BEST PUBLISHED PAPER IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS.

The conflict between liberal legal theory and critical legal studies (CLS) is often framed as a matter of whether there is a theory of justice that the law should embody which all rational people could or must accept. In a divided society, the CLS critique of this view is overwhelming: there is no such justice that can command universal assent. But the liberal critique of CLS, that it degenerates into …

Reinventing Government: The Promise Of Comparative Institutional Choice And Government Created Corporations, Nancy J. Knauer

Nancy J. Knauer

This Article focuses on a subset of private/public partnerships - those that involve relationships between the public sector and charitable organizations, specifically "government created charitable organizations" (GCCOs). For example, the first President Bush, known as the "Education President," championed the creation of the New American Schools Development Corporation (NASDC) as the cornerstone of his education policy. Designed as an independent charitable organization, the NASDC's proposed budget relied on private corporate contributions. In this way, the federal government could assert that it would fund its new educational program without increasing the federal bureaucracy, raising taxes, or cutting other budget items. To …

The Role Of The World Bank In Controlling Corruption, Susan Rose-Ackerman

Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture

In 1997, Professor of Law and Political Science, Susan Rose-Ackerman of Yale University, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s seventeenth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: "The World Bank’s Role in Controlling Corruption."

Susan Rose-Ackerman is Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University, and Co-director of the Law School’s Center for Law, Economics, and Public Policy. She holds a Ph.D. in economics from Yale University and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the Fullbright Commission. She was a visiting Research Fellow at the World Bank in 1995-96 where she did research on corruption and economic …

Restating Capitalization Standards And Rules: The Case For "Rough Justice" Regulations (Part One), John W. Lee, Eldridge Blanton, Veena Luthra, Glenn Walberg, Darryl Whitesell

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

On Game Theory And The Law, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Jeffrey E. Stake, Robert H. Heidt, Eric Rasmusen, Michael Alexeev

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Liberalized Immigration As Free Trade: Economic Welfare And The Optimal Immigration Policy, Howard F. Chang

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Direct Effect Of International Economic Law In The United States And The European Union, Ronald A. Brand

Articles

One of the most important and challenging issues in international law is the manner in which we address the relationship between the individual and the international legal system. The traditional framework, in which we set a "sovereign" government between the individual and the development and application of the rules, is no longer sufficient in all circumstances. The fact that governments feel insecure or threatened by the application of international legal rules in actions brought by individuals is not sufficient reason to preclude that development. The purpose of government is not to perpetuate traditional power structures, it is to provide security …

Class Action Reform: Lessons From Securities Litigation, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The New Economics Of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Measuring The Social Costs And Benefits And Identifying The Victims Of Subordinating Security Interests In Bankruptcy, Steven L. Harris, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Conflicts And Defense Lawyers: From Triangles To Tetrahedrons, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Public Choice And The Future Of Public-Choice-Influenced Scholarship, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Dividends, Noncontractibility, And Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.