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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …
Uncertainty Regarding Interpretation Of The `Negligence Rule' And Its Implications For The Efficiency Of Outcomes, Satish K. Jain
Uncertainty Regarding Interpretation Of The `Negligence Rule' And Its Implications For The Efficiency Of Outcomes, Satish K. Jain
Satish K. Jain
There are two ways that the negligence rule is interpreted. Under one interpretation a negligent injurer is liable for the entire harm to the victim; and under the other interpretation a negligent injurer is liable only for that part of the harm which can be ascribed to his negligence. Both these versions are efficient. However, if there is uncertainty regarding whether the court will be employing the full liability version or the incremental liability version for determining the liability of a negligent injurer, notwithstanding the fact that both the versions are efficient, inefficiency is possible. In the paper necessary and …
The Structure Of Efficient Liability Rules, Satish K. Jain
The Structure Of Efficient Liability Rules, Satish K. Jain
Satish K. Jain
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. One, to obtain a complete characterization of efficient liability rules within the framework of a model which is essentially the standard tort model with only some minor differences; but with a liability rule notion more general than the standard one. It is shown in the paper that the subclass of efficient liability rules is characterized by the conjunction of two conditions, namely, the condition of negligence liability and the requirement of non-reward for over-nonnegligence. Negligence liability requires that if one party is exactly nonnegligent and the other party is negligent then the negligent …