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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Digital Surveillance And Preventive Policing, Manuel A. Utset
Digital Surveillance And Preventive Policing, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
A Behavioral Justification For Escalating Punishment Schemes, Murat C. Mungan
A Behavioral Justification For Escalating Punishment Schemes, Murat C. Mungan
Scholarly Publications
The standard two-period law enforcement model is considered in a setting where individuals usually, but not exclusively, commit crimes only after comparing expected costs and benefits. Where escalating punishment schemes are present, there is an inherent value in keeping a clean criminal record; a person with a record may unintentionally become a repeat offender if he fails to exert self-control, and be punished more severely. If the punishment for repeat offenders is sufficiently high, one may rationally forgo the opportunity of committing a profitable crime today to avoid being sanctioned as a repeat offender in the future. Therefore, partial deterrence …
Rational Criminal Addictions, Manuel A. Utset
Rational Criminal Addictions, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Inchoate Crimes Revisited: A Behavioral Economics Perspective, Manuel A. Utset
Inchoate Crimes Revisited: A Behavioral Economics Perspective, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Response To Comments By Professors Baer, Candeub, Medwed, Painter, And Prentice, Manuel A. Utset
Response To Comments By Professors Baer, Candeub, Medwed, Painter, And Prentice, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes And Time-Inconsistent Preference, Manuel A. Utset
Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes And Time-Inconsistent Preference, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Don't Say You're Sorry Unless You Mean It: Pricing Apologies To Achieve Credibility, Murat C. Mungan
Don't Say You're Sorry Unless You Mean It: Pricing Apologies To Achieve Credibility, Murat C. Mungan
Scholarly Publications
Remorse and apologies by offenders have not been rigorously analyzed in the law and economics literature. This is perhaps because apologies are regarded as ’cheap talk’ and are deemed to be non-informative of an individual’s conscious state. In this paper, I develop a formal framework in which one can analyze remorse and apologies. I argue that legal procedures can be designed to price apologies, such that only truly remorseful individuals apologize. Hence, apologies would not be mere ’cheap talk’ and could send correct signals regarding an offender’s true conscious state, making them credible. This will lead victims, upon receiving apologies, …
The Law And Economics Of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies And Incapacitation, Murat C. Mungan
The Law And Economics Of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies And Incapacitation, Murat C. Mungan
Scholarly Publications
Economic analyses of criminal law are frequently and heavily criticized for being unable to explain many criminal law rules and doctrines people find intuitively just. Existing economic models cannot properly explain, for instance, why criminal law distinguishes between (1) repeat offenders and first-time offenders, (2) murder and voluntary manslaughter, and (3) remorseful and non-remorseful offenders.
This Article proposes a richer economic theory of crime that captures the rationales behind these practices and potentially behind many other important criminal law principles and doctrines. Unlike an overwhelming majority of previous economic analyses, my theory accounts not only for the deterrent effect of …
Repeat Offenders: If They Learn, We Punish Them More Severely, Murat C. Mungan
Repeat Offenders: If They Learn, We Punish Them More Severely, Murat C. Mungan
Scholarly Publications
Many legal systems are designed to punish repeat offenders more severely than first time offenders. However, existing economic literature generally offers either mixed or qualified results regarding optimal punishment of repeat offenders. This paper analyzes optimal punishment schemes in a two period model, where the social planner announces possibly-different sanctions for offenders based on their detection history. When offenders learn how to evade the detection mechanism employed by the government, escalating punishments can be optimal. The contributions of this paper can be listed as follows: First, it identifies and formalizes a source which may produce a marginal effect in the …
Telling Differences: Observational Equivalence, Externalities, And Wrongful Convictions, Manuel A. Utset
Telling Differences: Observational Equivalence, Externalities, And Wrongful Convictions, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
We must begin with the mistake and transform it into what is true. That is, we must uncover the sources of error; otherwise hearing what is true won’t help us. It cannot penetrate when something is taking its place. To convince someone of what is true, it is not enough to state it; we must find the road from error to truth.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazier's Golden Bough 1e (Rush Rhees ed., A.C. Miles trans., 1979 (emphasis in original).
Hyperbolic Criminals And Repeated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, Manuel A. Utset
Hyperbolic Criminals And Repeated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Model Of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case Of Lawyer Misconduct, Manuel A. Utset
Model Of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case Of Lawyer Misconduct, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Time-Inconsistent Management & The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Manuel A. Utset
Time-Inconsistent Management & The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.