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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
The Duty To Disclose And The Prisoner's Dilemma: Laidlaw V. Organ, Robert Birmingham
The Duty To Disclose And The Prisoner's Dilemma: Laidlaw V. Organ, Robert Birmingham
Faculty Articles and Papers
No abstract provided.
La Naturaleza Jurídica Del Cheque En La Ley 23.549, Martin Paolantonio, Eduardo Moccero
La Naturaleza Jurídica Del Cheque En La Ley 23.549, Martin Paolantonio, Eduardo Moccero
Martin Paolantonio
Ante la prohibición de endoso del cheque impuesta por la ley 23.549 se analiza la calificación jurídica que cabe al cheque desde la perspectiva de la teoría general de los títulos valores
Actualización Monetaria Y Propuesta De Acuerdo, Martin Paolantonio
Actualización Monetaria Y Propuesta De Acuerdo, Martin Paolantonio
Martin Paolantonio
Análisis sobre la necesidad de incluir cláusulas de indexación en las propuestas de acuerdo preventivo
Clarifying The Record: A Comment, Victor P. Goldberg
Clarifying The Record: A Comment, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
In their recent article in this journal, Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987] ha presented a distorted characterization of some of my work on the economics o regulation. The editor of this journal has graciously offered me the opportunity to respond to their criticisms and to redress some ambiguities, real or imagine in my earlier work.
Reflections On Fuller And Perdue's The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, Avery W. Katz
Reflections On Fuller And Perdue's The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
Fuller and Perdue's classic article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, is regarded by many contemporary contracts scholars as the single most influential law review article in the field. For those of us who teach and think about contracts from the perspective of law and economics, the consensus would probably be close to unanimous. The article displays an approach highly congenial to an economic perspective. The connection goes beyond Fuller and Perdue's explicitly functional approach to law (which law and economics shares with other schools of thought descended from the legal realists) and beyond Fuller and Perdue's focus on …