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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price Discrimination? The Law And Ethics Of Using Personal Information For Pricing, Akiva A. Miller Nov 2013

What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price Discrimination? The Law And Ethics Of Using Personal Information For Pricing, Akiva A. Miller

Akiva A Miller

New information technologies have dramatically increased sellers’ ability to engage in retail price discrimination. Debates over using personal information for price discrimination frequently treat it as a single problem, and are not sufficiently sensitive to the variety of price discrimination practices, the different kinds of information they require in order to succeed, and the different ethical concerns they raise. This paper explores the ethical and legal debate over regulating price discrimination facilitated by consumers’ personal information. Various kinds of “privacy remedies”—self-regulation, technological fixes, state regulation, and legislating private causes of legal action—each have their place. By drawing distinctions between various …


Standard Contract Clauses As Public Goods: A New Way Of Understanding Inefficient Clauses, Enrico Baffi Mar 2013

Standard Contract Clauses As Public Goods: A New Way Of Understanding Inefficient Clauses, Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

The aim of this work is to show how it is possible to identify market failures other than those traditionally identified by lawyers and law and economics scholars to justify the mandatory provisions of contracts between professionals and consumers and the equally mandatory provisions governing the abuse of economic dependency. This is a new approach that can be extended to other provisions and appears to rest on fairly solid microeconomic foundations. There is no doubt, however, that many criticisms can be leveled against it. Very briefly, I shall argue that the production of clauses characterized by being rather vague, indeterminate …


Standard Contract Clauses As Public Goods: A New Approach, Enrico Baffi Jan 2012

Standard Contract Clauses As Public Goods: A New Approach, Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

The aim of this work is to show how it is possible to identify market failures other than those traditionally identified by lawyers and law and economics scholars to justify the mandatory provisions of contracts between professionals and consumers and the equally mandatory provisions governing the abuse of economic dependency. This is a new approach that can be extended to other provisions and appears to rest on fairly solid microeconomic foundations. There is no doubt, however, that many criticisms can be leveled against it. Very briefly, I shall argue that the production of clauses characterized by being rather vague, indeterminate …


Standard Contract Clauses. A Different Way To Consider This Problem, Enrico Baffi Jan 2012

Standard Contract Clauses. A Different Way To Consider This Problem, Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

The aim of this work is to show how it is possible to identify market failures other than those traditionally identified by lawyers and law and economics scholars to justify the mandatory provisions of contracts between professionals and consumers and the equally mandatory provisions governing the abuse of economic dependency. This is a new approach that can be extended to other provisions and appears to rest on fairly solid microeconomic foundations. There is no doubt, however, that many criticisms can be leveled against it. Very briefly, I shall argue that the production of clauses characterized by being rather vague, indeterminate …


Contracting I The -Modern Woerld, Enrico Baffi Jan 2012

Contracting I The -Modern Woerld, Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

In this paper I want to show that the change that we observe in the way of contracting do not depend by the market powers that firms would have obtained, but it is a phenomenon due to the change in relative costs of activities. There are activities that are labor intensive that must be abandoned in favor of activities that capital intensive, and there are activities that are time consuming that the people do not want to bea, as reading all the contract clauses of a standard form contract, that determine the necessity, probably, if there is not a state …


Contracting In Modern World, Enrico Baffi Jan 2012

Contracting In Modern World, Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

In this paper I try explore some of the basic features of modern mass contracting. In my opinion, there are basically four characteristics of modern mass contracting: a)he reduced negotiations; b) the dissemination of standard form contracts; c) the presence of abusive clauses; d) and the recapitulation of the contract and its execution in a single act of stipulation. All the changes are the consequences in the changes of relative costs of activities: a) The reduction in negotiations is the result first of all of the costs that this activity requires and of the costs required to manage personalized contracts; …


Regulation Insurance Sales Or Selling Insurance Regulation: Against Regulatory Competition In Insurance, Daniel Benjamin Schwarcz Jan 2010

Regulation Insurance Sales Or Selling Insurance Regulation: Against Regulatory Competition In Insurance, Daniel Benjamin Schwarcz

Daniel Benjamin Schwarcz

In certain regulatory regimes, including those governing banking and corporate law, firms are permitted to choose among multiple competing regulators. This Article examines the desirability of such regulatory competition in the context of property, casualty and life insurance markets. It analyzes various different approaches to structuring such regulatory competition, including those embodied in two recent reform proposals, the Optional Federal Charter (OFC) and the Single License Proposal (SLP). Ultimately, the Article argues that regulatory competition of any sort would undermine the core goals of insurance regulation, harming consumers, insurers, and third parties.