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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Financial System Engineering, Manuel A. Utset
Financial System Engineering, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes And Time-Inconsistent Preference, Manuel A. Utset
Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes And Time-Inconsistent Preference, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Complex Financial Institutions And Systemic Risk, Manuel A. Utset
Complex Financial Institutions And Systemic Risk, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Managerial Entrenchment And Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory And Evidence From A Recessionary Market, Jay B. Kesten
Managerial Entrenchment And Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory And Evidence From A Recessionary Market, Jay B. Kesten
Scholarly Publications
Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and valuation of takeover premiums. The mainstream view, both of academics and market participants, is that entrenchment reduces accountability to shareholders and amplifies agency costs, thus decreasing shareholder wealth. Two influential studies (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) and Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003)) present empirical evidence consistent with this conclusion, finding statistically significant negative correlations between entrenchment and …
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory Of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, Manuel A. Utset
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory Of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.
Microfinance And The Mechanics Of Solidarity Lending: Improving Access To Credit Throught Innovations In Contract Structure, Jameel Jaffer
Microfinance And The Mechanics Of Solidarity Lending: Improving Access To Credit Throught Innovations In Contract Structure, Jameel Jaffer
Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy
No abstract provided.
The Discipline Of Institutions And The Disciplining Of Banks, Manuel A. Utset
The Discipline Of Institutions And The Disciplining Of Banks, Manuel A. Utset
Scholarly Publications
No abstract provided.