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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Faculty Articles and Papers

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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

Antitrust Censorship Of Economic Protest, Hillary Greene Jan 2010

Antitrust Censorship Of Economic Protest, Hillary Greene

Faculty Articles and Papers

Antitrust law accepts the competitive marketplace, its operation, and its outcomes as an ideal. Society itself need not and does not. Although antitrust is not in the business of evaluating, for example, the “fairness” of prices, society can, and frequently does, properly concern itself with these issues. When dissatisfaction results, it may manifest itself in an expressive boycott: a form of social campaign wherein purchasers express their dissatisfaction by collectively refusing to buy. Antitrust should neither participate in nor censor such normative discourse. In this Article, I explain how antitrust law impedes this speech, argue why it should not, and …


Articulating Trade Offs: The Political Economy Of State Action Immunity, Hillary Greene Jan 2006

Articulating Trade Offs: The Political Economy Of State Action Immunity, Hillary Greene

Faculty Articles and Papers

Antitrust uses economic analysis to assess various trade-offs involving efficiency. Even assuming that a competition matter implicates purely economic matters it can be exceedingly difficult to determine and measure all the relevant factors, assign them proper weights, decide on the appropriate time frames, assess the pertinent interactions, and conduct the trade-off calculations. Not surprisingly, different members of the antitrust community often take vastly differing positions regarding the economic consequences of a particular antitrust doctrine as well as the significance of those consequences. When potentially anti-competitive conduct occurs in the context of state regulation, the challenge to achieving a sensible accommodation …


The Economics Of The Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward An Exclusionary Theory, Peter Siegelman, Ian Ayres Jan 1989

The Economics Of The Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward An Exclusionary Theory, Peter Siegelman, Ian Ayres

Faculty Articles and Papers

On March 22, 1988, the Attorneys General of eight states filed antitrust actions in state and federal courts' alleging that major insurance and reinsurance companies colluded to boycott specific types of insurance coverage in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The suits suggest that this collusion was responsible for the unprecedented increase in premiums and concomitant erosion of coverage that has come to be known as "the insurance crisis."' The lawsuits have provoked fierce denials by insurance industry participants, including assertions that the suits, which came in an election year, were politically motivated.' The litigation is certain to …