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Vertical Restraints, Dealers With Power, And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Vertical Restraints, Dealers With Power, And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The Supreme Court’s Leegin decision has now brought the rule of reason to all purely vertical intrabrand distribution restraints. But the rule of reason does not mean per se legality and occasions for anticompetitive vertically imposed restraints may still arise. Of all those that have been suggested the most plausible are vertical restraints imposed at the behest of a powerful dealer or group (cartel) of dealers.
Although a vertical distribution restraint resembles a dealer cartel in that both limit intraband competition, a manufacturer restraining the distribution of its product shuns the excess dealer profits a dealer cartel would seek. Accordingly, …
Harvard, Chicago And Transaction Cost Economics In Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harvard, Chicago And Transaction Cost Economics In Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Since Oliver Williamson published Markets and Hierarchies in 1975 transaction cost economics (TCE) has claimed an important place in antitrust, avoiding the extreme positions of the two once reigning schools of antitrust policy. At one extreme was the “structural” school, which saw market structure as the principal determinant of poor economic performance. At the other extreme was the Chicago School, which also saw the economic landscape in terms of competition and monopoly, but found monopoly only infrequently and denied that a monopolist could “leverage” its power into related markets. Since the 1970s both the structural and Chicago positions have moved …