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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

University of Michigan Law School

Journal

Regulation

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

Rhetoric And Skepticism In Antitrust Argument, Herbert Hovenkamp Aug 1986

Rhetoric And Skepticism In Antitrust Argument, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

In his essay on Workable Antitrust Policy Judge Easterbrook professes an extraordinary skepticism about economic models in general, and particularly about the ability of courts to use economic models to distinguish the competitive from the anticompetitive. But a profession of skepticism is itself a very powerful rhetorical device; it creates a perception of tough-mindedness, of refusal to yield real-world observations to analytic models or other abstractions, of extreme reluctance to accept any proposition that has not been clearly proven. Further, it is always very easy to be a skeptic, because every position ever taken except perhaps for a few tautologies …


Workable Antitrust Policy, Frank H. Easterbrook Aug 1986

Workable Antitrust Policy, Frank H. Easterbrook

Michigan Law Review

One of the schools of thought in the economics of antitrust was called "workable competition." The adherents to this school believed that markets were prone to cartelization and that concentration was death on competition, but that occasionally competition might prove "workable." These scholars were suspicious of almost every industrial practice they saw. One of the manifestations of their work came to be known as the "structure-conduct-performance paradigm." The thesis was that you could tell whether competition was feasible from the structure of the market. If the top four firms had fifty percent or so of the sales, we should abandon …


Consumer Beware Chicago, Eleanor M. Fox Aug 1986

Consumer Beware Chicago, Eleanor M. Fox

Michigan Law Review

Professor Hovenkamp's article, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, reveals an important truth. Chicago School economics does not provide a superior roadmap to efficiency. I would take the critique one step further and assert: The main gap between Chicago and its critics is not even the design of the roadmap to efficiency. The main gap is social and political philosophy.


Antitrust And The Consumer Interest, Kenneth S. Carlston, James M. Treece Mar 1966

Antitrust And The Consumer Interest, Kenneth S. Carlston, James M. Treece

Michigan Law Review

Public control of business in the United States has proceeded, in most sectors of the economy, on the assumption that free, open competition in the market should be the primary regulator. It is felt that consumer welfare will be maximized by such an organization of the economy. Courts, governmental agencies, and, to a certain extent, private agencies have performed the role of ensuring that free markets are not displaced by other, less desirable alternatives.


Regulation Of Business - Robinson-Patman Act - A Further Look At Functional Discounts, Richard R. Dailey S.Ed. Mar 1956

Regulation Of Business - Robinson-Patman Act - A Further Look At Functional Discounts, Richard R. Dailey S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Probably no sphere of governmental regulation of business in the United States has caused more concern or created more confusion than the attempted regulation of pricing practices. This problem has arisen, in part, because of the peculiar tendencies of certain segments of the American economy toward expansion and vertical integration and, also in part, because of the adoption of ambiguous and prejudicial legislation designed as a cure-all for allegedly harmful pricing practices. In addition, the attitude of the courts and the Federal Trade Commission in this field has been far from consistent over the years, with the result that neither …