Law and Economics Commons^™

Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol

Michigan Law Review

Review of The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust: An Examination of US and EU Competition Policy by Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kudrle.

Complementary Products And Processes - The Law Of Tying, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This book of CASES AND MATERIALS ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY is intended for educational use. The book is free for all to use subject to an open source license agreement. It differs from IP/antitrust casebooks in that it considers numerous sources of competition policy in addition to antitrust, including those that emanate from the intellectual property laws themselves, and also related issues such as the relationship between market structure and innovation, the competitive consequences of regulatory rules governing technology competition such as net neutrality and interconnection, misuse, the first sale doctrine, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Chapters …

Is There A Role For Common Carriage In An Internet-Based World?, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

During the course of the network neutrality debate, advocates have proposed extending common carriage regulation to broadband Internet access services. Others have endorsed extending common carriage to a wide range of other Internet-based services, including search engines, cloud computing, Apple devices, online maps, and social networks. All too often, however, those who focus exclusively on the Internet era pay too little attention to the lessons of the legacy of regulated industries, which has long struggled to develop a coherent rationale for determining which industries should be subject to common carriage. Of the four rationales for determining the scope of common …

Antitrust And Nonexcluding Ties, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Notwithstanding hundreds of court decisions, tying arrangements remain enigmatic. Conclusions that go to either extreme, per se legality or per se illegality, invariably make simplifying assumptions that frequently do not obtain. For example, by ignoring double marginalization or tying product price cuts it becomes very easy to prove that a wide range of ties are anticompetitive. At the other extreme, by ignoring foreclosure possibilities one can readily conclude that ties are invariably benign.

Ties have historically been thought to produce two kinds of competitive harm: “leverage,” or extraction; and foreclosure, or exclusion. The two theories are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, …

Tying And The Rule Of Reason: Understanding Leverage, Foreclosure, And Price Discrimination, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Many tying arrangements are used by firms that do not have substantial market power in either of the two markets linked together by the tie. Their function must be something other than the enlargement or perpetuation of power. A few ties do involve fairly explicit exercises of market power, but they need not be used for a different purpose than the ties imposed by more competitive firms. This paper considers firms’ use of ties to exploit whatever power they already have over the tying product. The "leverage" theory sees ties as exploiting customers as a group via higher prices, whether …

Tying Arrangements And Antitrust Harm, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A tying arrangement is a seller’s requirement that a customer may purchase its “tying” product only by taking its “tied” product. In a variable proportion tie the purchaser can vary the amount of the tied product. For example, a customer might purchase a single printer, but either a contract or technological design requires the purchase of varying numbers of printer cartridges from the same manufacturer.

Such arrangements are widely considered to be price discrimination devices, but their economic effects have been controversial. Tying has been attacked on the theory that price discrimination of this sort reduces consumer welfare. We show …

Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese

Michigan Law Review

Antitrust law has largely succumbed to the hegemony of balancing. Courts applying the rule of reason are told to balance a restraint's procompetitive effects against its anticompetitive impact. Mergers once deemed anticompetitive solely because they facilitated the exercise of market power are now evaluated by weighing the anticompetitive effects of such increased power against any efficiencies created by the transaction. Finally, some activities once deemed per se illegal are now subject to a balancing approach, either by explicit application of the rule of reason, or by recognition of certain affirmative defenses to otherwise per se violations. Unlike many other balancing …

Antitrust Policy In Distribution, Kendall B. Debevoise

Michigan Law Review

The American genius lies quite as much in distribution as in manufacturing. Other peoples have demonstrated equal or greater creative ability in many fields. And it is debatable whether their talents are any less at mass production given adequate economic demand. But they have nowhere shown the American genius for distribution. It is axiomatic that if you manufacture in Detroit and your potential customer lives in New York, you need mutual friends. We seem to have figured out better ways to provide better friends for this purpose than any other nation.

But manufacturing came first. Someone had to build a …

Regulation Of Business - Proof Of Seller's Costs In Robinson-Patman Act Buyer Proceedings, Arthur M. Wisehart S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The purposes of this comment are to analyze the holding of the Court in the Automatic Canteen case and to relate the language of the opinion to the more general problem of defining the extent of buyer responsibility under section 2(f). As a preliminary matter, however, it is necessary to examine the pertinent statutory provisions. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful for buyers in interstate commerce" ... knowingly to induce or receive a · discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." In other words, it prohibits buyers from knowingly inducing or receiving the benefit of …