Law and Economics Commons^™

The Alarming Legality Of Security Manipulation Through Shareholder Proposals, Artem M. Joukov, Samantha M. Caspar

Seattle University Law Review

Shareholder proposals attract attention from scholars in finance and economics because they present an opportunity to study both quasidemocratic decision-making at the corporate level and the impact of this decision-making on firm outcomes. These studies capture the effect of various proposals but rarely address whether regulations should allow many of them in the first place due to the possibility of stock price manipulation. Recent changes to shareholder proposal rules, adopted in September 2020, sought to address the potential for exploitation that some proposals create (but ultimately failed to do so). This Article shows the potential for apparently legal stock price …

Consumer Welfare & The Rule Of Law: The Case Against The New Populist Antitrust Movement, Elyse Dorsey, Geoffrey A. Manne, Jan M. Rybnicek, Kristian Stout, Joshua D. Wright

Pepperdine Law Review

Populist antitrust notions suddenly are fashionable again. At their core is the view that antitrust law is responsible for a myriad of purported socio-political problems plaguing society today, including but not limited to rising income inequality, declining wages, and increasing economic and political concentration. Seizing on Americans’ fears about changes to the modern US economy, proponents of populist antitrust policies assert the need to fundamentally reshape how we apply our nation’s competition laws in order to implement a variety of prescriptions necessary to remedy these perceived social ills. The proposals are varied and expansive but have the unifying theme of …

The Economics And Antitrust Of Bundling, Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This article explains the economics and antitrust of bundling. I first show that popular arguments such as demand complementarities, economies of scope, and price discrimination are not sufficient. I then detail potentially anticompetitive factors such as leverage and opacity. I then use simple examples to show how variation in consumer valuations explains bundling and is not anticompetitive. Finally, I explore other business judgment rule explanations for bundling.

Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White

Michigan Law Review

Plus factors are economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms, that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action. Possible plus factors are typically enumerated without any attempt to distinguish them in terms of a meaningful economic categorization or in terms of their probative strength for inferring collusion. In this Article, we provide a taxonomy for plus factors as well as a methodology for ranking plus factors in terms of their strength for inferring explicit collusion, the strongest of which are referred to as "super plus factors."

Cbs-Viacom And The Effects Of Media Mergers: An Economic Perspective, David Waterman

Federal Communications Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Scholarship Of The Absurd: Bob Bork Meets The Bald Soprano, Alex Kozinski

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Antitrust Economics on Trial: A Dialogue on the New Laissez-Faire by Walter Adams and James W. Brock

A Micro-Microeconomic Approach To Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, Harry S. Gerla

Michigan Law Review

If we are to gain an accurate perspective on the impact of antitrust laws and policies on the behavior of firms in the real world, we must adopt a micro-microeconomic approach which focuses not on how rational, profit-maximizing firms will theoretically behave, but upon how late twentieth-century American managers and executives actually behave. This article attempts to begin that task.

Part I of this article examines the justifications for focusing on individual managers rather than profit-maximizing firms as the key actors in antitrust law. Part II looks at contemporary management mores and practices and develops some generalized "rules of the …

An Economic Analysis Of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, John Cirace

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law, Competition, And The Macroeconomy, Peter C. Carstensen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article examines the links between antitrust law-one possible tool for dealing with economic ills-and macroeconomic structure. It analyzes the current policy and economic assumptions underlying the importance of antitrust enforcement in reaching a healthy, competitive economy and concludes that such enforcement does contribute to the increased effectiveness of macroeconomic tools.

Part I explores the current macroeconomic theories and their policy implications. Part II discusses the related concepts of market power and competition and concludes that dissipation of market power is preferable, but that the regulation of market power may yield significant social and economic benefits in the short run, …

Decision Theory And Antitrust: Quantitative Evaluation For Efficient Enforcement, Ira Horowitz

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, Thomas E. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective by Richard A. Posner

The Patent-Antitrust Balance: Proposals For Change, N.R. Powers

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law - The Per Se Rule - Naked Horizontal Territorial Restraints Held To Be Illegal Per Se, A. Roy Decaro

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust - Standing - State Does Not Have Standing To Sue As Parens Patriae Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act For Damages To The General Economy Attributed To Violations Of The Antitrust Laws, James M. Papada Iii

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

The New Antitrust: A Structural Approach, Charles E. Mueller

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Abc's Of Clayton 7: Amendment Of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court And Current Complexities, Various Editors

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.