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Full-Text Articles in Contracts
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
William J. Magnuson
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
Redefining Roles And Duties Of The Transactional Lawyer: A Narrative Approach, Lori D. Johnson
Redefining Roles And Duties Of The Transactional Lawyer: A Narrative Approach, Lori D. Johnson
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
This Article posits that narrative theory can assist the transactional lawyer in walking this tightrope effectively and ethically.
Specifically, this Article proceeds to show that the use of narrative techniques, specifically those proposed by Walter Fisher, can assist transactional lawyers: (1) in understanding their clients’ goals more fully; (2) in more effectively advancing their clients’ goals through persuasion; and (3) in creating complete, holistic documents to govern the proposed deal. As such, the appropriate use of narrative techniques and understanding of narrative theory can enhance the skills of transactional lawyers, and improve client outcomes.
This Article proceeds in three …
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
The Evolution Of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, J. Brad Bernthal
The Evolution Of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, J. Brad Bernthal
Publications
There has been an explosion in new types of startup finance instruments. Whereas twenty years ago preferred stock dominated the field, startup companies and investors now use at least eight different instruments—six of which have only become widely used in the last decade. Legal scholars have yet to reflect upon the proliferation of instrument types in the aggregate. Notably missing is a way to organize instruments into a common framework that highlights their similarities and differences.
This Article makes four contributions. First, it catalogues the variety of startup investment forms. I describe novel instruments, such as revenue-based financing, which remain …