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Full-Text Articles in Contracts

A Philosophy Of Contract Law For Artificial Intelligence: Shared Intentionality, John Linarelli Jan 2022

A Philosophy Of Contract Law For Artificial Intelligence: Shared Intentionality, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

This is a chapter for the forthcoming book, Contracting and Contract Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Martin Ebers, Cristina Poncibò, and Mimi Zou, to be published by Hart Publishing. The aim of this chapter is to offer a general theory of contract law to account for the inclusion of artificial intelligence in contract practices. Artificial intelligence brings out that what makes contract law a distinctive form of legal obligation is shared intentionality. I refer to this insight as the shared intentionality thesis. Shared intentionality is the psychological capacity of one agent to share and pursue a …


Advanced Artificial Intelligence And Contract, John Linarelli Jan 2019

Advanced Artificial Intelligence And Contract, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

The aim of this article is to inquire whether contract law can operate in a state of affairs in which artificial general intelligence (AGI) exists and has the cognitive abilities to interact with humans to exchange promises or otherwise engage in the sorts of exchanges typically governed by contract law. AGI is a long way off but its emergence may be sudden and come in the lifetimes of some people alive today. How might contract law adapt to a situation in which at least one of the contract parties could, from the standpoint of capacity to engage in promising and …


Concept And Contract In The Future Of International Law, John Linarelli Jan 2015

Concept And Contract In The Future Of International Law, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

This is an article written for a symposium on Joel Trachtman’s book, The Future of International Law. I first deal with the contractarian features of Trachtman’s approach to understanding international law. Using the tools of new institutional economics and constitutional economics, Trachtman seeks to describe the features of an international legal system. This is positive political theory or at least relates substantially to the methods of positive political theory. I explore a different approach, one connecting to normative political theory. In its ambitious sense, my approach would see international law as a form of moral argument, but in its modest …


Global Procurement Law In Times Of Crisis: New Buy American Policies And Options In The Wto Legal System, John Linarelli Jan 2011

Global Procurement Law In Times Of Crisis: New Buy American Policies And Options In The Wto Legal System, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

This is a draft chapter, Sue Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson (eds.), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2011). What should governments do to protect their citizens in a global economic crisis? National economies are interdependent and economic risk is systemic on a global scale, but economic policy remains pervasively national in scope. Fiscal policy has not been the subject of much in the way of collective action at the global level, and if it has, states accomplish it in ad hoc political (as opposed to legal) arrangements in response to particular crises. States …


Organizations Matter: They Are Institutions, After All, John Linarelli Jan 2010

Organizations Matter: They Are Institutions, After All, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

Judge Posner (2010) offers a substantial agenda for organization economics. He advises us on how organization economics can shed substantial light on some of the most pressing social problems of the day. I comment on two of the areas he selects for discussion and offer some comments on the relationship of organization economics to new institutional economics. Judge Posner surely is right to argue that organization economics can help us understand the failures of corporate governance in regulating executive pay. Moreover, with additional and more institutionally nuanced theorizing, organizational economics should further our understanding of the work of judiciaries in …