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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Contracts
Privity's Shadow: Exculpatory Terms In Extended Forms Of Private Ordering, Mark P. Gergen
Privity's Shadow: Exculpatory Terms In Extended Forms Of Private Ordering, Mark P. Gergen
Florida State University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Moral Hazard Of Contract Drafting, Eric A. Zacks
The Moral Hazard Of Contract Drafting, Eric A. Zacks
Florida State University Law Review
This Article identifies and examines the principal-agent problem as it arises in the context of contract preparation. The economic agency relationship, as it may be understood to exist for contract drafting, provides a superior framework for understanding and reforming the inability of the non-drafting party (the principal) to control the drafting party (the agent). As an economic agent, the drafting party faces a moral hazard when preparing the contract because of the differing interests of the parties as well as the information and control asymmetries that exists. For example, the use of standard form contracts in consumer transactions is an …
Marital Contracting In A Post-Windsor World, Martha M. Ertman
Marital Contracting In A Post-Windsor World, Martha M. Ertman
Florida State University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Law And Economic Exploitation In An Anti-Classification Age, Hila Keren
Law And Economic Exploitation In An Anti-Classification Age, Hila Keren
Florida State University Law Review
Does our legal system permit the economic exploitation of extreme vulnerability? Focusing on predatory housing loans—a thriving business at the dawn of the twenty-first century—this Article argues that the answer in most cases is yes. Under an individualistic neoliberal paradigm, borrowers are held liable for their contracts, even if they were targeted with predatory practices. Further, borrowers’ attempts to resort to antidiscrimination law, and frame their exploitation as “reverse redlining,” have offered no real answer. An important yet undertheorized explanation for this problem is the impact of the Supreme Court’s anti-classification jurisprudence on lower courts. In an anti-classification age, even …