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Articles 1 - 24 of 24
Full-Text Articles in Contracts
Anticipating Venezuela’S Debt Crisis: Hidden Holdouts And The Problem Of Pricing Collective Action Clauses, Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
Anticipating Venezuela’S Debt Crisis: Hidden Holdouts And The Problem Of Pricing Collective Action Clauses, Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
A creditor who asks for stronger enforcement rights upon its debtor’s default will rationally accept a lower interest rate reflecting the greater expected recovery the exercise of those rights provides. Over a dozen studies, however, have failed to document this basic relationship in the context of the collective action clause, a key provision in sovereign bonds. We conjecture that this failure is because enforcing the rights in question requires collective decision-making among anonymous creditors with different interests, impeding market predictions regarding future price effects. The pricing of rights that require collective enforcement thus turns on whether the market observes an …
Central Clearing Of Financial Contracts: Theory And Regulatory Implications, Steven L. Schwarcz
Central Clearing Of Financial Contracts: Theory And Regulatory Implications, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
To protect economic stability, post-crisis regulation requires financial institutions to clear and settle most of their derivatives contracts through central counterparties, such as clearinghouses associated with securities exchanges. This Article asks whether regulators should expand the central clearing requirement to non-derivative financial contracts, such as loan agreements. The Article begins by theorizing how and why central clearing can reduce systemic risk. It then examines the theory’s regulatory and economic efficiency implications, first for current requirements to centrally clear derivatives contracts and thereafter for deciding whether to extend those requirements to non-derivative contracts. The inquiry has real practical importance because the …
The Price Of Law: The Case Of The Eurozone's Collective Action Clauses, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati, Steven Ongena
The Price Of Law: The Case Of The Eurozone's Collective Action Clauses, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati, Steven Ongena
Faculty Scholarship
Do markets value contract protections? And does the quality of a legal system affect such valuations? To answer these questions we exploit a unique experiment whereby, after January 1, 2013, newly issued sovereign bonds of Eurozone countries under domestic law had to include Collective Action Clauses (CACs) specifying the minimum vote needed to modify payment terms. We find that CAC bonds trade at lower yields than otherwise similar no-CAC bonds; and that the quality of the legal system matters for this differential. Hence, markets appear to see CACs as providing protection against the legal risk embedded in domestic-law sovereign bonds.
Restructuring Sovereign Debt After Nml V. Argentina, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
Restructuring Sovereign Debt After Nml V. Argentina, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The decade and a half of litigation that followed Argentina’s sovereign bond default in 2001 ended with a great disturbance in the Force. A new creditor weapon had been uncloaked: The prospect of a court injunction requiring the sovereign borrower to pay those creditors that decline to participate in a debt restructuring ratably with any payments made to those creditors that do provide the country with debt relief.
For the first time holdouts succeeded in fashioning a weapon that could be used to injure their erstwhile fellow bondholders, not just the sovereign issuer. Is the availability of this new weapon …
Sovereign Debt And The “Contracts Matter” Hypothesis, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
Sovereign Debt And The “Contracts Matter” Hypothesis, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The academic literature on sovereign debt largely assumes that law has little role to play. Indeed, the primary question addressed by the literature is why sovereigns repay at all given the irrelevance of legal enforcement. But if law, and specifically contract law, does not matter, how to explain the fact that sovereign loans involve detailed contracts, expensive lawyers, and frequent litigation? This Essay makes the case that contract design matters even in a world where sovereign borrowers are hard (but not impossible) to sue. We identify a number of gaps in the research that warrant further investigation.
Differing Perceptions? Market Practice And The Evolution Of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
Differing Perceptions? Market Practice And The Evolution Of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The 20th century witnessed a transformative, “tectonic” shift in international law, from “absolute” to “restrictive” theories of sovereign immunity. As conventionally understood, however, this dramatic transformation represented only a shift in the default rule. Under absolute immunity, national courts could not hear lawsuits and enforce judgments against a foreign sovereign without its consent. Under restrictive immunity, foreign sovereigns were presumptively not immune when they engaged in commercial acts. We demonstrate that market practices undermine this conventional understanding. Using an extensive, two-century data set of contracts between foreign governments and private creditors, we show that contracting parties have long treated absolute …
Contractual Arbitrage, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott
Contractual Arbitrage, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
Contracts are inevitably incomplete. And standard-form or boilerplate commercial contracts are especially likely to be incomplete because they are approximations; they are not tailored to the needs of particular deals. Not only do these contracts contain gaps but, in an attempt to reduce incompleteness, they often contain clauses with vague or ambiguous terms. Terms with indeterminate meaning present opportunities for strategic behavior well after a contract has been concluded. This linguistic uncertainty in standard form commercial contracts creates an opportunity for “contractual arbitrage”: parties may argue, ex post, that the uncertainties in expression mean something that the contracting parties, ex …
The Puzzle Of Pdvsa Bond Prices, Paolo Colla, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
The Puzzle Of Pdvsa Bond Prices, Paolo Colla, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
Market reports in the summer of 2016 suggest that Venezuela is on the brink of default on upwards of $65 billion in debt. That debt comprises of bonds issued directly by the sovereign and those issued by the state-owned oil company PDVSA. Based on the bond contracts and other legal factors, it is not clear which of these two categories of bonds would fare better in the event of a restructuring. However, market observers are convinced — and we agree — that legal and contractual differences would likely impact the payouts on the bonds if Venezuela defaults. Using a comparison …
How To Restructure Venezuelan Debt (¿Cómo Restructurar La Deuda Venezolana?), Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
How To Restructure Venezuelan Debt (¿Cómo Restructurar La Deuda Venezolana?), Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Faculty Scholarship
English Abstract: There is a growing consensus that Venezuela will not be able to persist for much longer with its policy of full external debt service. The social costs are just too great. This implies a debt restructuring of some kind. Venezuela, principally through its state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), has extensive commercial contacts with the United States. Not since Mexico in the 1980s has an emerging market country with this level of commercial contacts attempted to restructure its New York law-governed sovereign debt. Holdout creditors in a restructuring of Venezuelan sovereign debt will therefore present a …
Pricing Contract Terms In A Crisis: Venezuelan Bonds In 2016, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati, Steven Ongena
Pricing Contract Terms In A Crisis: Venezuelan Bonds In 2016, Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati, Steven Ongena
Faculty Scholarship
As of this writing in June 2016, the markets are predicting Venezuela to be on the brink of default. On June 1, 2016, the 6 month CDS contract traded at about 7000bps which translates into a likelihood of default of over 90%. Our interest in the Venezuelan crisis is that its outstanding sovereign bonds have a unique set of contractual features that, in combination with its near-default status, have created a natural experiment. This experiment has the potential to shed light on one of the long standing questions that sits at the intersection of the fields of law and finance, …
The Pricing Of Non-Price Terms In Sovereign Bonds: The Case Of The Greek Guarantees, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
The Pricing Of Non-Price Terms In Sovereign Bonds: The Case Of The Greek Guarantees, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
In March 2012, Greece conducted one of the biggest and most brutal sovereign debt restructurings ever, asking holders of Greek government bonds to take net present value haircuts of near 80 percent. Greece forced acquiescence to its terms from a large number of its bonds by using a variety of legal strong-arm tactics. With the vast majority of Greek bonds, the tactics worked. There were, however, thirty-six bonds guaranteed by the Greek state, which, because of the weakness of the underlying companies, were effectively obligations of the Greek state. Yet, on these thirty six bonds, even though Greece desperately needed …
When Governments Write Contracts: Policy And Expertise In Sovereign Debt Markets, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern
When Governments Write Contracts: Policy And Expertise In Sovereign Debt Markets, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern
Faculty Scholarship
At least three times in the past two decades, national governments and institutions at the regional and international levels have tried to reform sovereign bond contracts to facilitate debt restructuring. Increasingly, these efforts have focused on promoting majority modifications clauses, a species of collective action clause (CAC) that facilitates a binding debt restructuring. Rather than legislate or regulate, governments have convened expert commissions, produced model CACs, and aggressively marketed these clauses to debtors and creditors. When events prove the existing CAC template inadequate or irrelevant, the process begins anew. This paper considers this mode of government intervention, which has a …
The Relevance Of Law To Sovereign Debt, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
The Relevance Of Law To Sovereign Debt, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The literature on sovereign debt treats law as of marginal significance, largely because the doctrine of sovereign immunity leaves creditors few potent legal remedies against sovereign borrowers. Although sovereign debts can indeed by hard to enforce, the goal of this Essay is to demonstrate that law plays a central, and constantly evolving, role in structuring sovereign debt markets. To list just a few examples, legal rules and institutions (i) decide when a borrower is sovereign, (ii) define the consequences of sovereignty by drawing (or refusing to draw) artificial boundaries between the sovereign and other legal entities, (iii) play some role …
Human Equity? Regulating The New Income Share Agreements, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane Ring
Human Equity? Regulating The New Income Share Agreements, Shu-Yi Oei, Diane Ring
Faculty Scholarship
A controversial new financing phenomenon has recently emerged. New "income share agreements" (''ISAs'') enable an individual to raise funds by pledging a percentage of her future earnings to investors for a certain number of years. These contracts, which have been offered by entities such as Fantex, Upstart, Pave, and Lumni, raise important questions for the legal system: Are they a form of modern-day indentured servitude or an innovative breakthrough in human financing? How should they be treated under the law?
This Article comprehensively addresses the public policy and legal issues raised by ISAs and articulates an analytical approach to evaluating …
Santa Anna And His Black Eagle: The Origins Of Pari Passu?, Benjamin Chabot, Mitu Gulati
Santa Anna And His Black Eagle: The Origins Of Pari Passu?, Benjamin Chabot, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most debated issues in international finance is the meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds. The clause is ubiquitous; it is in almost every single foreign-law sovereign bond out there. Yet, almost no one seems to agree on its meaning. One way to cut the Gordian knot is to track down the origins of the clause. Modern lawyers may have simply copied the clause from the documents of their predecessors without understanding its meaning. But surely the people who first drafted the clause knew what it meant. Four enterprising students at Duke Law School may …
A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
For two decades, collective action clauses (CACs) have been part of the official-sector response to sovereign debt crisis, justified by claims that these clauses can help prevent bailouts and shift the burden of restructuring onto the private sector. Reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s focused on CACs. So do efforts in the Eurozone today. CACs have even been suggested as the cure for the US municipal bond market. But bonds without CACs are still issued in major markets, so reformers feel obliged to explain why they know better. Over time, a narrative has emerged to justify pro-CAC reforms. It …
In-House Counsel’S Role In The Structuring Of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Steven L. Schwarcz, Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully
In-House Counsel’S Role In The Structuring Of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Steven L. Schwarcz, Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully
Faculty Scholarship
The authors introduce the financial crisis and the role played by mortgage-backed securities. Then describe the controversy at issue: whether, in order to own and enforce the mortgage loans backing those securities, a special-purpose vehicle “purchasing” mortgage loans must take physical delivery of the notes and security instruments in the precise manner specified by the sale agreement. Focusing on this controversy, the authors analyze (i) the extent, if any, that the controversy has merit; (ii) whether in-house counsel should have anticipated the controversy; and (iii) what, if anything, in-house counsel could have done to avert or, after it arose, to …
Cds Zombies, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
Cds Zombies, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the contract interpretation strategies adopted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for its credit derivatives contracts in the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The authors argue that the economic function of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) after Greece is limited and uncertain, partly thanks to ISDA’s insistence on textualist interpretation. Contract theory explanations for textualist preferences emphasise either transactional efficiency or relational factors, which do not fit ISDA or the derivatives market. The authors pose an alternative explanation: the embrace of textualism in this case may be a means for ISDA to reconcile the competing political …
The Dynamics Of Contract Evolution, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner
The Dynamics Of Contract Evolution, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
Contract scholarship has given little attention to the production process for contracts. The usual assumption is that the parties will construct the contract ex nihilo, choosing all the terms so that they will maximize the surplus from the contract. In fact, parties draft most contracts by slightly modifying the terms of contracts that they have used in the past, or that other parties have used in related transactions. A small literature on boilerplate recognizes this phenomenon, but little empirical work examines the process. This Article provides an empirical analysis by drawing on a data set of sovereign bonds. The authors …
The Evolution Of Contractual Terms In Sovereign Bonds, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Eric A. Posner
The Evolution Of Contractual Terms In Sovereign Bonds, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
In reaction to defaults on sovereign debt contracts, issuers and creditors have strengthened the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; debtors may engage in excessively risky activities using …
Drafting A Model Collective Action Clause For Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Drafting A Model Collective Action Clause For Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit
Faculty Scholarship
In the wake of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the European financial authorities announced last November that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after mid-2013 must contain an identical collective action clause (CAC) in order, if necessary, to facilitate a restructuring of those
instruments.
CACs in sovereign bonds have been the subject of considerable attention over the last ten years. They were introduced into sovereign bonds governed by U.S. law only in early 2003. Yet a surprising number of versions of the clause can be found in modern sovereign bonds.
The history of the research and development of this contractual provision …
Political Risk And Sovereign Debt Contracts, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner
Political Risk And Sovereign Debt Contracts, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
Default on sovereign debt is a form of political risk. Issuers and creditors have responded to this risk both by strengthening the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and by creating terms that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce …
Innovation After The Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since 2003, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern
Innovation After The Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since 2003, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern
Faculty Scholarship
For over a decade, contracts literature has focused on standardization. Scholars asked how terms become standard, and why they change so rarely. This line of inquiry painted a world where a standard term persists until it is dislodged by another standard term, perhaps after a brief window of ferment before the second term takes hold. It also overshadowed the early insights of boilerplate theories, which described contracts as a mix of standard and customized terms, and asked why the mix might be suboptimal. This article brings the focus back to the mix. It examines the development of selected provisions in …
Sovereign Bonds And The Collective Will, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
Sovereign Bonds And The Collective Will, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.