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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Contracts
How To Repair Unconscionable Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar
How To Repair Unconscionable Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
Several doctrines of contract law allow courts to strike down excessively one-sided terms. A large literature explored which terms should be viewed as excessive, but a related question is often ignored—what provision should replace the vacated excessive term? This paper begins by suggesting that there are three competing criteria for a replacement provision: (1) the most reasonable term; (2) a punitive term, strongly unfavorable to the overreaching party; and (3) the maximally tolerable term. The paper explores in depth the third criterion—the maximally tolerable term—under which the excessive term is reduced merely to the highest level that the law considers …
Bribes V. Bombs: A Study In Coasean Warfare, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman
Bribes V. Bombs: A Study In Coasean Warfare, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman
All Faculty Scholarship
The use of bribes to co-opt an enemy’s forces can be a more effective way to wage war than the conventional use of force: Relative to bombs, bribes can save lives and resources, and preserve civic institutions. This essay evaluates the efficacy and normative desirability of selectively substituting bribes for bombs as a means of warfare. We show how inter-country disparities in wealth, differences in military strength, the organization of the bribing and recipient forces, uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict, and communications technology can contribute to the efficacy of bribes. We discuss methods for enforcing bargains struck between …
Distributive Injustice And Private Law, Aditi Bagchi
Distributive Injustice And Private Law, Aditi Bagchi
All Faculty Scholarship
Imperfect rights are not held against any single person, and when violated, they do not ground a claim for any particular quantum of redress. The right to an adequate income may be an imperfect right. Because imperfect rights have been asserted only as claims against the state, and because they do not lend themselves to constitutional adjudication, they have had little traction. In my paper, I will emphasize that any claim on the state is derivative from the right held as against other citizens. Even those who believe that individuals have perfect social rights against the state should concede an …
Comment: On Contractual Defaults And Experimental Law And Economics, Avishalom Tor
Comment: On Contractual Defaults And Experimental Law And Economics, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
It is possible that contract default rules, whose relevance is contingent upon parties' agreement to contract, differ from other default states. Parties therefore might not perceive contingent contractual defaults as relevant reference points. Ironically, however, Sloof, Oosterbeek and Sonnemans' (SOS) "default contract" applied inevitably whenever proposed and whenever Respondents rejected a non-default proposal, bearing greater resemblance to a legal right than to a contractual default. Thus, the contingency of typical contractual defaults cannot account for the No Bias Finding. Other aspects of the SOS experimental design, on the other hand, may explain the No Bias Finding.
Lawyers Asleep At The Wheel? The Gm-Fisher Body Contract, Victor P. Goldberg
Lawyers Asleep At The Wheel? The Gm-Fisher Body Contract, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
In the analysis of vertical integration by contract versus ownership one event has dominated the discussion – General Motors' merger with Fisher Body in 1926. The debates have all been premised on the assumption that the ten-year contract between the parties signed in 1919 was a legally enforceable agreement. However, it was not. Because Fisher's promise was illusory the contract lacked consideration. This note suggests that GM's counsel must have known this. It raises a significant question in transactional engineering: what is the function of an agreement that is not legally enforceable.
Transactional Economics: Victor Goldberg's Framing Contract Law, Mark P. Gergen, Victor P. Goldberg, Stewart Macaulay, Keith A. Rowley
Transactional Economics: Victor Goldberg's Framing Contract Law, Mark P. Gergen, Victor P. Goldberg, Stewart Macaulay, Keith A. Rowley
Faculty Scholarship
Professor Mark Gergen: Thank you. It is an honor to speak to this group and to be on a panel with Stewart Macaulay, Keith Rowley, and Victor Goldberg. I have an enormous amount of respect for the three. Keith had the misfortune of being a student of mine in Federal Income Tax.
Framing Contract Law offers a wealth of information about familiar cases. Victor argues that in construing contracts, courts should be attentive to how people engineer contracts to minimize transaction costs. He shows that courts often err in this regard, imposing unnecessary costs. To make his case, Victor delves …