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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Contracts
Competitive Harm From Vertical Mergers, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Competitive Harm From Vertical Mergers, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The antitrust enforcement Agencies' 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines introduce a nontechnical application of bargaining theory into the assessment of competitive effects from vertical acquisitions. The economics of such bargaining is complex and can produce skepticism among judges, who might regard its mathematics as overly technical, its game theory as excessively theoretical or speculative, or its assumptions as unrealistic.
However, we have been there before. The introduction of concentration indexes, particularly the HHI, in the Merger Guidelines was initially met with skepticism but gradually they were accepted as judges became more comfortable with them. The same thing very largely happened again …
Public Good Economics And Standard Essential Patents, Christopher S. Yoo
Public Good Economics And Standard Essential Patents, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
Standard essential patents have emerged as a major focus in both the public policy and academic arenas. The primary concern is that once a patented technology has been incorporated into a standard, the standard can effectively insulate it from competition from substitute technologies. To guard against the appropriation of quasi-rents that are the product of the standard setting process rather than the innovation itself, standard setting organizations (SSOs) require patentholders to disclose their relevant intellectual property before the standard has been adopted and to commit to license those rights on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND).
To date …
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article offers experimental evidence that parties are more willing to exploit efficient-breach opportunities when the contract in question includes a liquidated-damages clause. Economists claim that the theory of efficient breach allows us to predict when parties will choose to breach a contract if the legal remedy for breach is expectation damages. However, the economic assumption of rational wealth-maximizing actors fails to capture important, shared, nonmonetary values and incentives that shape behavior in predictable ways. When interpersonal obligations are informal or underspecified, people act in accordance with shared community norms, like the moral norm of keeping promises. However, when sanctions …
A Reliance Damages Approach To Corporate Lockups, David A. Skeel Jr.
A Reliance Damages Approach To Corporate Lockups, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Financial Distress As A Non-Cooperative Game: A Proposal For Overcoming Obstacles To Private Workouts, Claire Oakes Finkelstein
Financial Distress As A Non-Cooperative Game: A Proposal For Overcoming Obstacles To Private Workouts, Claire Oakes Finkelstein
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Economic Structure Of The Post-Contractual Corporation, William W. Bratton
The Economic Structure Of The Post-Contractual Corporation, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The New Economic Theory Of The Firm: Critical Perspectives From History, William W. Bratton
The New Economic Theory Of The Firm: Critical Perspectives From History, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton
The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of issuer-bondholder conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal frameworks: neoclassical contract interpretation; contract avoidance; and corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary …
The Interpretation Of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, William W. Bratton
The Interpretation Of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.