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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Contracts
College Football Coaches’ Pay And Contracts: Are They Overpaid And Unfairly Treated?, Randall Thomas, Lawrence Van Horn
College Football Coaches’ Pay And Contracts: Are They Overpaid And Unfairly Treated?, Randall Thomas, Lawrence Van Horn
Indiana Law Journal
College football coaches’ employment contracts and compensation garner public attention and scrutiny in much the same way as those of corporate CEOs. In both cases, the public perception is that they must be overpaid and pampered. Economic theory claims that for coaches and CEOs to be overpaid, they must be receiving compensation in excess of the value they create for their organizations. However, both receive pay-for-performance compensation, which structurally aligns their compensation with value creation. This means we need to examine the underlying structure of the contract that gives rise to the observed compensation to determine whether they are appropriately …
Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment, Adi Ayal, Uri Benoliel
Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment, Adi Ayal, Uri Benoliel
Indiana Law Journal
One of the most vital debates in franchise law focuses on whether state or federal law should adopt “good-cause statutes” (GCSs), which require franchisors to show good cause before terminating contractual relations with a franchisee. The traditional law-and-economics analysis suggests that GCSs are inefficient. This inefficiency argument is based upon one central hypothesis: GCSs increase franchisee free riding since they limit the franchisor’s ability to terminate the franchise contract easily. The free-riding hypothesis has been significantly influential in the development of franchise law, as is evident in state and federal statutory regimes. To date, the majority of states and the …