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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Contracts
A Process For Politics, Anna Gelpern
A Process For Politics, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
I argue that consistent and public process observance has a distinctly valuable function in sovereign debt restructuring, with no precise equivalent in national insolvency regimes. National regimes reflect the distribution bargains of their enactment, presumptively legitimate and binding. Debtors and creditors allocate insolvency losses in their shadow, with liquidation as a backstop and politics just outside the frame. All else equal, the restructuring process has a harder job with sovereign debt. There is no liquidation backstop and no default distribution scenario. Each crisis resolution episode must allocate losses from scratch among the country’s citizens, foreign and domestic creditors, and other …
Cacs And Doorknobs, Anna Gelpern, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Cacs And Doorknobs, Anna Gelpern, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In response to debt crises, policy makers often feature Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds among the pillars of international financial architecture. However, the content of official pronouncements about CACs suggests that CACs are more like doorknobs: a process tool with limited impact on the incidence or ultimate outcome of a debt restructuring. We ask whether CACs are welfare improving and, if so, whether they are pillars or doorknobs. The history of CACs in corporate debt suggests that CACs can be good, bad or unimportant depending on their vulnerability to abuse and the available alternatives, including bankruptcy and debt …
The Importance Of Being Standard, Anna Gelpern
The Importance Of Being Standard, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Contract standardisation in the sovereign debt market saves time and money in preparing documents and endows widely-used terms with a shared public meaning, which in turn saves investors the costs of acquiring information, facilitates secondary market trading and reduces the scope for mistakes in the judicial interpretation of contract terms. Sovereign debt issuers and investors claim to value standardisation and list it as an important contractual objective. Issuers generally insist that their bond contracts are standard and reflect market practice. Variations from past practice and market norm must be explained in disclosure documents and through market outreach. Standardisation is not …
The Puzzle Of Pdvsa Bond Prices, Anna Gelpern, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati
The Puzzle Of Pdvsa Bond Prices, Anna Gelpern, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Market reports in the summer of 2016 suggest that Venezuela is on the brink of default on upwards of $65 billion in debt. That debt comprises of bonds issued directly by the sovereign and those issued by the state-owned oil company PDVSA. Based on the bond contracts and other legal factors, it is not clear which of these two categories of bonds would fare better in the event of a restructuring. However, market observers are convinced — and we agree — that legal and contractual differences would likely impact the payouts on the bonds if Venezuela defaults. Using a comparison …
Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern
Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The sovereign debt restructuring regime looks like it is coming apart. Changing patterns of capital flows, old creditors’ weakening commitment to past practices, and other stakeholders’ inability to take over, or coalesce behind a viable alternative, have challenged the regime from the moment it took shape in the mid-1990s. By 2016, its survival cannot be taken for granted. Crises in Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine since 2010 exposed the regime’s perennial failures and new shortcomings. Until an alternative emerges, there may be messier, more protracted restructurings, more demands on public resources, and more pressure on national courts to intervene in disputes …
Count The Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses In Sovereign Bonds, Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller, Brad Setser
Count The Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses In Sovereign Bonds, Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller, Brad Setser
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
On August 29, 2014, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) published new recommended terms for sovereign bond contracts governed by English law. One of the new terms would allow a super majority of creditors to approve a debtor’s restructuring proposal in one vote across multiple bond series. The vote could bind all bond holders, even if a series voted unanimously against restructuring, so long as enough holders in the other series voted for it. An apparently technical change, awkwardly named “single-limb aggregated collective action clauses (CACs)” promised to eliminate free-riders for the first time in the history of sovereign bond …
Common Capital: A Thought Experiment In Cross-Border Resolution, Anna Gelpern
Common Capital: A Thought Experiment In Cross-Border Resolution, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Cross-border bank resolution efforts focus on burden-sharing between bank owners, private creditors and the public. There is little talk of burden-sharing among governments, despite the rich history of governments trying to stick one another with the cost of financial conglomerate failures. There is an unspoken fear that acknowledging the need to allocate losses among governments would undermine post-crisis pledges of No More Bailouts. This symposium essay argues for making government stakes in private financial firms more transparent, and for using the contingent public share as a key to loss allocation among governments in cross-border banking crises.