Consumer Protection Law Commons^™

The Revival Of Section 5: A Return To The Ftc’S Roots In A Time Of Democratic Crisis, Shaoul Sussman

Center for Law and the Economy

On November 10, 2022, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or the “Commission”) issued a policy statement on the scope of unfair methods of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). This policy statement marked a significant shift, reviving a broad interpretation of the agency’s authority to police anticompetitive conduct. The antitrust defense bar reacted with alarm, arguing that the principles are overly ambiguous and lack guidance. This Essay contends that reaction is misplaced. The statement draws on a rich body of U.S. Supreme Court and circuit court precedent that the antitrust bar seems to have largely …

Antitrust And Tech Giants: Learning From United States V. Google Llc, Marcus D’Agostino

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Note addresses the evolution of antitrust regulation and enforcement in the United States, with a focus on the recent case of United States v. Google LLC. That case is used to frame the broader problem of insufficient remedies being implemented against large technology firms. The mild remedies granted to the government in Google reinforce the findings of the 2020 Congressional Report on Digital Competition. The Report recommended changes to the antitrust laws that would revive structural separation as a remedy. This Note argues that the body of evidence presented compels structural separation to be used more frequently as the …

Data Advantage And Merger Review: Can Entrenchment Theory Reform Antitrust Enforcement?, Shin-Ru Cheng

Seattle University Law Review

A merger involving giant digital companies is likely to dampen competition, as it allows those companies to combine and control data access, enabling them to entrench their dominant positions in relevant markets and extend those positions into related markets. While competition law in many jurisdictions aims to prohibit mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly, arguably the review of digital mergers is failing because antitrust agencies lack an effective approach to identify data-generated anticompetitive harms. This Article demonstrates that entrenchment theory, recently reintroduced in the 2023 U.S. Merger Guidelines, would help reform the process of antitrust enforcement. …

Defining Deference: Impacts Of Abandoning Chevron On Emerging Technology Governance And Administrative Law, R. Aubrey Davis Iii

Seattle University Law Review

Emerging technologies, particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI), often lead to unforeseen legal outcomes. Notable abuses in areas such as facial recognition, employment bias, and housing discrimination are well known. However, legislative responses to these issues either have been largely reactive or there has been no legislative response at all. In lieu of legislation, agencies have sought to fill the gap. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently proposed a rule mandating voter notification for all AI-generated political phone calls citing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991 as authority. However, the TCPA was originally passed to curtail telemarketing, not …

"Price Discrimination" Discrimination, Talia B. Gillis

Faculty Scholarship

Credit price personalization, where lenders set prices based on individual borrower and loan characteristics, is a common practice across many loan types, with conventional accounts of its harms focusing on the ways in which risk-based pricing, or setting prices based on borrowers’ credit risk, can lead to disparities for protected groups like racial minorities and women. This Article examines an often-overlooked yet potentially harmful form of price personalization — charging borrowers different rates based on their willingness-to-pay, known as price discrimination — and argues that this practice can exploit vulnerable borrowers, including protected groups like racial minorities and women, by …

Redefining The Relevant Market: Abandonment Or Return To Brown Shoe, Daniel A. Hanley

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Defining a relevant market is arguably the most important requirement in antitrust litigation. Between the 1890s and the 1940s, defining a relevant market was a simple and generalized process, typically undertaken by courts as a cursory matter. However, in the 1960s, defining relevant markets became a centerpiece of antitrust litigation. The modern method originates from the Supreme Court’s landmark 1962 decision in Brown Shoe v. United States. The method commonly known as the Brown Shoe test requires judges to construct relevant markets by carefully analyzing accessible and understandable qualitative data, such as internal corporate documents and consumer surveys. Since the …

A Structural Approach To The Application Of Section One Of The Sherman Act To Oligopolistic Interdependence, Annmarie Levins

Maine Law Review

A central tenet of American economic thought is that markets in which many producers compete for business are preferable to those in which one or a few sellers dominate. The conventional wisdom underlying this preference is that competitive markets produce more of the goods consumers want at lower prices than do noncompetitive markets. Oligopolies are markets in which there are few sellers. Oligopolistic markets are characterized frequently by higher prices and lower outputs than competitive markets. Many sectors of the American economy are oligopolistic. For example, the American automobile industry is dominated by "the big three," General Motors, Ford, and …

The False Choice Between Digital Regulation And Innovation, Anu Bradford

Northwestern University Law Review

This Article challenges the common view that more stringent regulation of the digital economy inevitably compromises innovation and undermines technological progress. This view, vigorously advocated by the tech industry, has shaped the public discourse in the United States, where the country’s thriving tech economy is often associated with a staunch commitment to free markets. U.S. lawmakers have also traditionally embraced this perspective, which explains their hesitancy to regulate the tech industry to date. The European Union has chosen another path, regulating the digital economy with stringent data privacy, antitrust, content moderation, and other digital regulations designed to shape the evolution …

Vertical Restraints In An Amazon World, Martin Edwards

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Vertical restraints are a peculiarity, even among the dizzying array of contracts subject to antitrust scrutiny. While current law treats vertical restraints permissively, antitrust reformers have added this permissive treatment of vertical restraints to their list of proposed reforms. The reformers have softly proposed that courts apply a presumption of illegality standard for vertical restraints— greater scrutiny than the current standard, the rule of reason. This Article argues that doing so is inadvisable.

Producers and their consumers both want the same thing: the best overall product experience for the money. The critical economic functions of vertical restraints are to enable …

The Liv Golf V. Pga Tour Antitrust Case As A Case Study In Federal Civil Procedure, Michael J. Dube

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This Article uses LIV Golf Inc. v. PGA Tour, Inc., a sophisticated and headline-grabbing antitrust matter, as a means of instantiating federal civil procedure concepts. The first Part of this Article addresses the unsuccessful motion for a temporary restraining order that in many ways shaped how the litigation proceeded. The second Part examines the dance that is discovery through a focus on a drawn-out dispute regarding a single interrogatory. The final Part drills down on a more novel discovery dispute that began the path towards settlement, namely whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and related common-law doctrine …

Antitrust Standing For Umbrella Purchasers, Ahmed Alfaris

University of San Francisco Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust, Amazon, And Algorithmic Auditing, Jens Frankenreiter, Abhisek Dash, Abhijnan Chakraborty, Saptarshi Ghosh, Animesh Mukherjee, Stefan Bechtold, Krishna P. Gummadi

Scholarship@WashULaw

In digital markets, antitrust law and special regulations aim to ensure that markets remain competitive despite the dominating role that digital platforms play today in everyone's life. Unlike traditional markets, market participant behavior is easily observable in these markets. We present a series of empirical investigations into the extent to which Amazon engages in practices that are typically described as self-preferencing. We discuss how the computer science tools used in this paper can be used in a regulatory environment that is based on algorithmic auditing and requires regulating digital markets at scale.

Coercive Rideshare Practices: At The Intersection Of Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law In The Gig Economy, Christopher L. Peterson, Marshall Steinbaum

Utah Law Faculty Scholarship

This Essay considers antitrust and consumer protection liability for coercive practices vis-à-vis drivers that are prevalent in the rideshare industry. Resale price maintenance, nonlinear pay practices, withholding data, and conditioning data access on maintaining a minimum acceptance rate all curtail platform competition, sustaining a high-price, tacitly collusive equilibrium among the few incumbents. Moreover, concealing relevant trip data from drivers is both deceptive and unfair when the platforms are in full possession of the relevant facts. In the absence of these coercive practices, customers too would be better off due to platform competition, which would lower average prices by sharpening competition …

Cookies, Pop-Ups And Commercials: How Tech Companies' Privacy Promises Are Preserving Their Data Dominance, Cailley Lapara

Capstones

As antitrust sentiment focused on Big Tech from regulators and consumers grows, companies like Google and Apple and more have announced plans to move away from the behavioral ad business model that brought the companies to the size they are today. This trend is marketed to customers as a way to address their growing concerns over privacy and data collection. It also comes as the companies face sweeping antitrust litigation and legislation that would break up the firms. But the companies' claims of moving towards privacy are sketchy at best, and appear to serve as a way for the companies …

Table Of Contents

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

Dynamic Pricing Algorithms, Consumer Harm, And Regulatory Response, Alexander Mackay, Samuel Weinstein

Articles

Pricing algorithms are rapidly transforming markets, from ride-sharing, to air travel, to online retail. Regulators and scholars have watched this development with a wary eye. Their focus so far has been on the potential for pricing algorithms to facilitate explicit and tacit collusion. This Article argues that the policy challenges pricing algorithms pose are far broader than collusive conduct. It demonstrates that algorithmic pricing can lead to higher prices for consumers in competitive markets and even in the absence of collusion. This consumer harm can be initiated by a single firm employing a superior pricing algorithm. Higher prices arise from …

Returning To The Statutory Text: Why The Language Of Section 13(B) Requires Courts To Narrowly Construe The Ftc’S Ability To Obtain Injunctive Relief, Christopher Halm

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces over 70 laws in the areas of antitrust and consumer protection, and one valuable tool to support their enforcement is Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“Section 13(b)”). Section 13(b), among other features, grants the FTC authority to seek an injunction in district court against any defendant that is “about to violate” one or more of those laws. For the past three decades, courts have adopted a permissive judicial interpretation of that language, authorizing injunctions against defendants when the allegedly impending violations were only “likely to recur” based on past misconduct. This …

Addictive Technology And Its Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, James Niels Rosenquist, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Samuel N. Weinstein

Articles

The advent of mobile devices and digital media platforms in the past decade represents the biggest shock to cognition in human history. Robust medical evidence is emerging that digital media platforms are addictive and, when used in excess, harmful to users’ mental health. Other types of addictive products, like tobacco and prescription drugs, are heavily regulated to protect consumers. Currently, there is no regulatory structure protecting digital media users from these harms. Antitrust enforcement and regulation that lowers entry barriers could help consumers of social media by increasing competition. Economic theory tells us that more choice in digital media will …

Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng

University of Cincinnati Law Review

In recent years, states have launched several antitrust investigations targeting digital platforms. A major difficulty in these investigations is demonstrating the extent of a digital platform’s market power. Market power is defined as the control of the output or the price without the loss of business to competitors. As will be explored in this Article, market power is a critical component in an antitrust analysis. On several occasions, courts have adopted the switching costs approach in their analysis of market power. According to this approach, market power may be inferred when the costs of switching from one supplier to another …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents.

The Price Of Prime—Consumer Privacy In The Age Of Amazon, Ariana Aboulafia, Greg Fritzius, Tessa Mears, Macy Nix

Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice

No abstract provided.

Can David Really Beat Goliath? A Look Into The Anti-Competitive Restrictions Of Apple Inc. And Google, Llc, Emily Feeley

The University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–April 2020, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since 1994. This revised listing includes 66 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through April 2020. It includes challenges and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency concerns. This listing can be treated as an Appendix to Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016).

Intellectual Property For Breakfast: Market Power And Informative Symbols In The Marketplace, P. Sean Morris

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article continues to examine an important question: are trademarks a source of market power, or, put differently, when are trademarks an antitrust problem? This fundamental question is a cause of division among antitrust and intellectual property law scholars. However, by raising the question and presenting some scenarios that can provide answers, my hope is that contemporary antitrust and intellectual property scholars can explore some of its implications. As part of my own quest to address this question, I explore the proposition that creative deception and the wealth-generating capacity of trademarks are unorthodox elements that actually contribute to allegations of …

Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, And Distribution, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Policymakers and scholars have in distributional conversations traditionally ignored consumer laws, defined as the set of consumer protection, antitrust, and entry barrier laws that govern consumer transactions. Consumer law is overlooked partly because tax law is cast as the most efficient way to redistribute. Another obstacle is that consumer law research speaks to microeconomic and siloed contexts—deceptive fees by Wells Fargo or a proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable. Even removing millions of dollars of deceptive credit card fees across the nation seems trivial compared to the trillion-dollar growth in income inequality that has sparked concern in recent …

Procompetitive Justifications In Antitrust Law, John M. Newman

Indiana Law Journal

The Rule of Reason, which has come to dominate modern antitrust law, allows defendants the opportunity to justify their conduct by demonstrating procompetitive effects. Seizing the opportunity, defendants have begun offering increasingly numerous and creative explanations for their behavior.

But which of these myriad justifications are valid? To leading jurists and scholars, this has remained an “open question,” even an “absolute mystery.” Examination of the relevant case law reveals multiple competing approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions. The ongoing lack of clarity in this area is inexcusable: procompetitive-justification analysis is vital to a properly functioning antitrust enterprise.

This Article provides answers …

Platforms, American Express, And The Problem Of Complexity In Antitrust, Chris Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Everything about Ohio v. American Express was wrong and the adoption of “two-sided platform” reasoning into American antitrust law might be one of its worst, most regrettable wrong turns in decades. That is not because the original theoretical model of two-sided interaction has anything wrong with it at all. It is rather that nothing could be gained by incorporating it that could be worth the result in the American Express case itself, or the difficulty that has likely been invited into antitrust litigation. The consequences are hard to predict, but they may be severely limiting to our already moribund antitrust …

The Direct Purchaser Requirement In Clayton Act Private Litigation: The Case Of Apple Inc. V. Pepper , Konstantin G. Vertsman

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

More than fifty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. established the direct purchaser rule, the Supreme Court was provided with an opportunity in Apple Inc. v. Pepper to reevaluate and update the proximate cause standing requirement for litigation under § 4 of the Clayton Act. In the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision, the majority opinion established a rule that consumers who purchase directly from a monopolist satisfy the direct purchaser standing requirement notwithstanding the internal business structure of the monopolist. This interpretation of the direct purchaser rule, along with the recent reformulation …

Revising The Vertical Merger Guidelines (Ftc Hearings), Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This slide deck was the author’s presentation at the FTC Hearings on Vertical Mergers (November 1, 2018). The deck sets out a summary of the author’s economic analysis and proposed revisions to the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines.

Update On Antitrust And Pay-For-Delay: Evaluating “No Authorized Generic” And “Exclusive License” Provisions In Hatch-Waxman Settlements, Saami Zain

San Diego Law Review

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, the United States Supreme Court held that a patent litigation settlement where a branded drug company pays a generic drug company to end the litigation and delay launching its generic may violate the antitrust laws. Although the decision ended years of controversy over whether such settlements were subject to antitrust scrutiny, many issues remain unresolved concerning the lawfulness of these settlements. In particular, courts have struggled in assessing the legality of patent settlements between branded and generic drug manufacturers involving non-cash compensation or benefits. This article discusses one type of non-cash compensation that is …