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Antitrust

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Full-Text Articles in Communications Law

Data Advantage And Merger Review: Can Entrenchment Theory Reform Antitrust Enforcement?, Shin-Ru Cheng May 2025

Data Advantage And Merger Review: Can Entrenchment Theory Reform Antitrust Enforcement?, Shin-Ru Cheng

Seattle University Law Review

A merger involving giant digital companies is likely to dampen competition, as it allows those companies to combine and control data access, enabling them to entrench their dominant positions in relevant markets and extend those positions into related markets. While competition law in many jurisdictions aims to prohibit mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly, arguably the review of digital mergers is failing because antitrust agencies lack an effective approach to identify data-generated anticompetitive harms. This Article demonstrates that entrenchment theory, recently reintroduced in the 2023 U.S. Merger Guidelines, would help reform the process of antitrust enforcement. …


Defining Deference: Impacts Of Abandoning Chevron On Emerging Technology Governance And Administrative Law, R. Aubrey Davis Iii May 2025

Defining Deference: Impacts Of Abandoning Chevron On Emerging Technology Governance And Administrative Law, R. Aubrey Davis Iii

Seattle University Law Review

Emerging technologies, particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI), often lead to unforeseen legal outcomes. Notable abuses in areas such as facial recognition, employment bias, and housing discrimination are well known. However, legislative responses to these issues either have been largely reactive or there has been no legislative response at all. In lieu of legislation, agencies have sought to fill the gap. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently proposed a rule mandating voter notification for all AI-generated political phone calls citing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991 as authority. However, the TCPA was originally passed to curtail telemarketing, not …


Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng Oct 2021

Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng

University of Cincinnati Law Review

In recent years, states have launched several antitrust investigations targeting digital platforms. A major difficulty in these investigations is demonstrating the extent of a digital platform’s market power. Market power is defined as the control of the output or the price without the loss of business to competitors. As will be explored in this Article, market power is a critical component in an antitrust analysis. On several occasions, courts have adopted the switching costs approach in their analysis of market power. According to this approach, market power may be inferred when the costs of switching from one supplier to another …


The Separation Of Platforms And Commerce, Lina M. Khan Jan 2019

The Separation Of Platforms And Commerce, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

A handful of digital platforms mediate a growing share of online commerce and communications. By structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity. One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have inte­grated across business lines such that they both operate a platform and market their own goods and services on it. This structure places domi­nant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that de­pend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation.

This Article argues …


Law School News: 'Marketplace Of Ideas' Imperiled (04-05-2018), David A. Logan Apr 2018

Law School News: 'Marketplace Of Ideas' Imperiled (04-05-2018), David A. Logan

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.


Closing Fireside Chat With The Assistant Attorney General For The U.S. Department Of Justice Antitrust Division, William Baer, Philip J. Weiser Jan 2016

Closing Fireside Chat With The Assistant Attorney General For The U.S. Department Of Justice Antitrust Division, William Baer, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

This Closing Fireside Chat was the final session of the 16th annual Silicon Flatirons Center conference, The Digital Broadband Migration: The Evolving Industry Structure of the Digital Broadband Landscape, held on Feb. 1, 2016 in the Wittemyer Courtroom of the University of Colorado Law School.

"At the time this conference was held, William J. Baer was Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in the United States Department of Justice. On April 17, 2016, President Obama asked Mr. Baer to become Acting Associate Attorney General of the United States. Video of this interview with Assistant Attorney General Baer is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C351xEX0h4g …


Apple And Amazon’S Antitrust Antics: Two Wrongs Don’T Make A Right, But Maybe They Should, Kerry Gutknecht Jan 2014

Apple And Amazon’S Antitrust Antics: Two Wrongs Don’T Make A Right, But Maybe They Should, Kerry Gutknecht

CommLaw Conspectus: Journal of Communications Law and Technology Policy (1993-2015)

No abstract provided.


Acum V. Emi, Daphne Barak-Erez, Zvi Zylbertal, Elyakim Rubinstein Sep 2013

Acum V. Emi, Daphne Barak-Erez, Zvi Zylbertal, Elyakim Rubinstein

Translated Opinions

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.]

In 2004 the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority determined that the activity of ACUM (a corporation that operates to manage its members’ copyrights in musical works in Israel) constitutes a monopoly on managing copyright over musical works. In 2011 the Antitrust Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) approved the activity of ACUM as a cartel, subject to a series of requirements (“the permanent requirements”), which would be …


Tying And Consumer Harm, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2012

Tying And Consumer Harm, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Brantley raises important issues of law, economics, and policy about tying arrangements. Under current legal principles, Brantley was on solid ground in distinguishing between anticompetitive ties and those that might harm consumer interests without impairing competition. As a matter of economics, the court was also right to reject the claim that the cable programmers forced consumers to pay for programs the customers didn’t want. The hardest question is a policy one - whether antitrust law should ever condemn the exploitation of market power in ways that extract surplus from consumers but do not create or enlarge market power. I shall …


Antitrust Review Of The At&T/Tmobile Transaction, Allen P. Grunes, Maurice E. Stucke Dec 2011

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/Tmobile Transaction, Allen P. Grunes, Maurice E. Stucke

Federal Communications Law Journal

In August 2011, the United States brought a landmark antitrust lawsuit to prevent the merger of two of the nation's four largest mobile wireless telecommunications services providers, AT&T Inc. and T-Mobile USA, Inc. But why are so many elected officials asking the Obama administration to intercede in the Department of Justice's lawsuit to force a settlement? Why are they approving a merger that would likely lead to higher prices, fewer jobs, less innovation, and higher taxes for their constituents? Does it have anything to do with the money they are receiving from AT&T and T-Mobile? This Article examines the recent …


Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers Dec 2011

Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers

Michigan Law Review

Until recently, regulation and antitrust law operated in tandem to safeguard competition in regulated industries. In three recent decisions-Trinko, Credit Suisse, and Linkline-the Supreme Court limited the operation of the antitrust laws when regulation "performs the antitrust function." This Note argues that cable programming regulations-which are in some respects factually similar to the telecommunications regulations at issue in Trinko and Linkline-do not perform the antitrust function because they cannot deter anticompetitive conduct. As a result, Trinko and its siblings should not foreclose antitrust claims for damages that arise out of certain cable programming disputes.


Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen Grunes Jan 2011

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, we review AT&T Inc.’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc., under federal merger law, under the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next we find that under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible theories. Finally, we turn …


Comcast/Nbcu: The Fcc Provides A Roadmap For Vertical Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker Jan 2011

Comcast/Nbcu: The Fcc Provides A Roadmap For Vertical Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The FCC’s analysis of the Comcast-NBCU transaction fills a gap in the contemporary treatment of vertical mergers by providing a roadmap for courts and litigants addressing the possibility of anticompetitive exclusion. The FCC identified the factors any judicial or administrative tribunal would likely consider today in analyzing whether a vertical merger would lead to anticompetitive input or customer foreclosure, and a range of economic methods potentially relevant to applying that template to the facts of a transaction. Notwithstanding the difference between administrative adjudication under a public interest standard and judicial decision-making under the Clayton Act, the legal framework and economic …


Plurality Of Political Opinion And The Concentration Of Media In The United States, William B. Fisch Jan 2010

Plurality Of Political Opinion And The Concentration Of Media In The United States, William B. Fisch

Faculty Publications

This paper reviews regulatory efforts of the U.S. federal govern- ment to promote viewpoint diversity in broadcast media (radio, television, cable, and satellite) in the face of increasing concentration of ownership of such media, and the impact on such efforts of the free- doms of speech and press embodied in the First Amendment to the federal constitution. With respect to this issue, the regulatory work has been done overwhelmingly by the Federal Communications Commis- sion, operating under an act of Congress which has been amended from time to time to push the FCC in particular directions. The anti- trust laws …


Eurocom Dbs V. Bezeq, Esther Hayut, Eliezer Rivlin, Elyakim Rubinstein Aug 2009

Eurocom Dbs V. Bezeq, Esther Hayut, Eliezer Rivlin, Elyakim Rubinstein

Translated Opinions

Facts: Bezeq, the Israel Telecommunications Corporation Ltd., held 49.78% of the shares of “Yes” D.B.S. Satellite Services (1998) Ltd. Another 32.6% of the Yes shares are held by Eurocom D.B.S Ltd. Yes is one of only two providers in the multi-channel television broadcast infrastructure market and in the multi-channel television broadcasting market. The other multi-channel television provider in the market is “Hot”. Bezeq is a public company licensed to provide internal fixed line services, including fixed line telephony and Internet infrastructure. Bezeq also provides the public with a wide variety of communications services through its subsidiary and affiliated companies, …


Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust scholars are having fun again. Not so long ago, they were the poor, redheaded stepchildren of the legal academy, either pining for the older days of rigorous antitrust enforcement or trying to kill off what was left of the enterprise. Other law professors felt sorry for them, ignored them, or both. But now antitrust is making a comeback of sorts. In one heady week in May of 2009, a front-page story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney-the Obama Administration's new Antitrust Division head at the Department of Justice-to jettison the entire report on …


Essential Facilities And Trinko: Should Antitrust And Regulation Be Combined?, Timothy J. Brennan Dec 2008

Essential Facilities And Trinko: Should Antitrust And Regulation Be Combined?, Timothy J. Brennan

Federal Communications Law Journal

"The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective."' Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18-19, 2008.

The Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Trinko represented a radical change from prior doctrine ensuring that antitrust laws applied in regulated industries. The change resulted from a failure to appreciate that regulation and antitrust can be complements. Regulation can boost the value of antitrust by creating incentives to refuse to deal in order to reap monopoly profit otherwise proscribed by regulation. Ironically, the essential facilities doctrine rejected by the Trinko court and the Trinko decision …


Reexamining The Legacy Of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review By The Doj And The Fcc, Philip J. Weiser Jan 2008

Reexamining The Legacy Of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review By The Doj And The Fcc, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

Most debates over the structure of merger review in the telecommunications industry focus on the criticism that the role of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is entirely redundant in light of the review conducted by the antitrust agencies. The FCC's lack of a consistently applied standard only reinforces such criticisms. There are, however, cases where the FCC's review of a merger - and imposition of conditions that complement the existing regulatory regime - enable the antitrust agencies to clear mergers that would otherwise pose potential objections.

The central challenge for competition policy merger review is to structure the analysis of …


Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems And Solutions To The Network Neutrality Debate , Robert M. Frieden Feb 2007

Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems And Solutions To The Network Neutrality Debate , Robert M. Frieden

ExpressO

What Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) can and cannot do to diversify services lies at the core of the debate over network neutrality. In prior generations ISPs had little incentive or technological capability to deviate from plain vanilla best efforts routing for content providers and from standard “all you can eat” subscription terms for consumer access to the World Wide Web. The next generation Internet has the technological capability and ISPs have the commercial motivation to offer “better than best efforts” routing and premium services for both content providers and consumers seeking higher quality of service and more reliable traffic delivery. …


Hit And Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, And Refusal To Deal In The Supreme Court Decision In Trinko, Nicholas Economides Oct 2006

Hit And Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, And Refusal To Deal In The Supreme Court Decision In Trinko, Nicholas Economides

ExpressO

Under the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange carriers, including Verizon, were obligated to lease parts of their local telecommunications network to any firm at “cost plus a reasonable profit” prices which could combine them at will, add retailing services and sell local telecommunication service as a rival to the incumbent. AT&T, an entrant in local telecommunications, leased parts of Verizon’s network. Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued Verizon alleging various anti-competitive actions of Verizon against AT&T, including that Verizon raised the costs of AT&T, its downstream retail rival. The Supreme Court held …


A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp Oct 2006

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.


Network Neutrality Or Bias?--Handicapping The Odds For A Tiered And Branded Internet, Robert M. Frieden Sep 2006

Network Neutrality Or Bias?--Handicapping The Odds For A Tiered And Branded Internet, Robert M. Frieden

ExpressO

Recent double digit billion dollar mergers of telecommunications firms consolidate both market share and market leadership by incumbent operators such as Verizon. These companies seek to exploit technological and market convergence by offering a triple play package of wired and wireless telephone service, video and Internet access. As well they need to develop new profit centers to compensate for declining revenues and market shares in traditional services such as wireline telephony.

While incumbent telecommunications operators have pursued new market opportunities, these ventures have not abandoned core management philosophies, operating assumptions and business strategies. Longstanding strategies for recovering investments, using a …


Unwarranted Fears Mask The Benefits Of Network Diversity: An Argument Against Mandating Network Neutrality, Elvis Stumbergs Sep 2006

Unwarranted Fears Mask The Benefits Of Network Diversity: An Argument Against Mandating Network Neutrality, Elvis Stumbergs

ExpressO

The rapid development of the Internet has necessitated an update to Federal telecommunications laws. Recent Congressional efforts to enact such an update, however, have spawned a fiery debate over a somewhat nebulous concept: network neutrality. The debate concerns the way that Internet access providers handle the data traffic being sent over their networks. These providers would like the option to offer some of their customers, web site hosting companies and similar entities, additional services that would essentially result in these customers’ content loading faster, more reliably, or more securely than others not receiving such priority treatment. Yet, this proposed “diversity” …


Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp Jun 2006

Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

This brief comment suggests where the anti-eminent domain movement might be heading next.


Regulation Of Joint Ventures Under Article 81 Of Eu Treaty, Rahul Goel Mar 2006

Regulation Of Joint Ventures Under Article 81 Of Eu Treaty, Rahul Goel

ExpressO

The paper discusses Article 81 of EU treaty, which focuses on the analysis of the competitive behavior of a joint venture participant in co-operative non-full-function joint venture with focus on telecommunications sector. The Article 81 analyses the joint ventures that fail to satisfy the threshold of the European Commission’s Merger Regulation (ECMR) due to the factors that either they are not fully-functional in nature or lack a community dimension.


Why Have A Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms In Communications, Tim Wu Jan 2006

Why Have A Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms In Communications, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

This paper describes a vision of what telecommunications laws’ central goals should be in coming decades, and what kind of legal instruments will serve those goals. The telecommunications law, I suggest, has been preoccupied with three projects: allocating rights, managing discrimination, and achieving various social goals, like indecency regulation. This paper argues that in the future the main point of the telecommunications law should be as an anti-discrimination regime, and that the main challenge for regulators will be getting the anti-discrimination rules right.

The view advanced here, while much popularized over the last decade, has deeper roots reaching back to …


Digital Wars -- Legal Battles And Economic Bottlenecks In The Digital Information Industries, Curt A. Hessler Oct 2005

Digital Wars -- Legal Battles And Economic Bottlenecks In The Digital Information Industries, Curt A. Hessler

ExpressO

The Digital Age has spawned major legal battles over the fundamental principles of intellectual property law and antitrust law. These diverse struggles can best be analyzed using the basic norm of "value added" from neo-classical normative economics. This analysis suggests that current intellectual property doctirnes provide excessive protection and current antitrust doctrines remain awkward in dealing with the cross-market leveraging of monopoly power in the presence of "natural monopolies" created by network effects.


Digital Wars -- Legal Battles And Economic Bottlenecks In The Digital Information Industries, Curt A. Hessler Sep 2005

Digital Wars -- Legal Battles And Economic Bottlenecks In The Digital Information Industries, Curt A. Hessler

ExpressO

The Digital Revolution has created the apparent anomaly that information, though very cheap to create and near costless to share, is managed by industries that are increasingly concentrated and roiled by endless legal warfare. This paper surveys the major legal battles by subjecting all of them to the familiar norm of "maximizing economic value added", as defined by neo-classical "welfare economics". The various legal wars are traced to defects and confusions in current legal approaches to intellectual property (the "property wars") and to antitrust doctrines (the "monopoly wars").


Introduction To Symposium On Integrating New Economic Learning With Antitrust Doctrine, Jonathan Baker Jan 2004

Introduction To Symposium On Integrating New Economic Learning With Antitrust Doctrine, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.


Introduction: A Regulatory Regime For The Internet Age, Philip J. Weiser Jan 2004

Introduction: A Regulatory Regime For The Internet Age, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

No abstract provided.