Administrative Law Commons^™

What Is To Be Done About The Radical Far-Right?, Bernard E. Harcourt

Faculty Scholarship

The far Right in America has become radical. In the process, it has outmaneuvered the progressives. In the first months of his second mandate, President Trump has mounted a revolution (or counterrevolution) against the liberal democratic state. Steve Bannon said he was Leninist and wanted to “smash the state.” President Trump has done just that. In this essay, I explore the far Right’s embrace of Lenin. I return to the Hegelian roots of Lenin’s politics to explain what he meant by “smashing the state machine.” I then argue that the Left should reclaim Lenin’s dialectics and his call, in the …

Jurisdictional Waters, Jamison E. Colburn

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Administrative Law Of Mccarthyism, Nicholas Handler

Faculty Scholarship

This Article recovers the largely overlooked legal and administrative history of the federal loyalty-security program, and argues that it played a formative role in the development of modern civil service protections and administrative law. During the McCarthy era, the United States Civil Service Commission (CSC), under pressure from Congress, implemented a sweeping loyalty program aimed at rooting out purportedly disloyal federal employees. Though often remembered as a moment of political overreach and civil liberties violations, this Article shows that the loyalty program simultaneously catalyzed a surprising expansion in procedural rights for government workers—both through internal reforms initiated by the CSC …

Communicative Administration: The Administrative State Beyond Legal Administration, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

On many dimensions, the administrative state is at the nadir of its power. The Supreme Court has tightened administrative law controls on agency power, and the Trump Administration has stormed the bureaucracy in an unprecedented blitz designed to kneecap agency capacity and independence. For better or worse, many agencies and their civil servants are being sidelined as meaningful actors in the administration of government. Yet this familiar account doesn’t tell the entire story. At the same time that agencies are being stripped of the power to implement law—what this Article calls “legal administration”— they are steadily accumulating extensive and largely …

Some Realism About Constitutional Remedies, Thomas P. Schmidt, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has wavered between two approaches to questions of executive power, which are often labeled institutional formalism and realism. Formalism treats an institution like the presidency as a “black box” to which the Constitution assigns certain powers. In Trump v. Hawaii,  for example, the Supreme Court upheld President Trump’s infamous travel ban by focusing not on the “particular President” and his past call for a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” but rather on “the authority of the Presidency itself.” That is the language of institutional formalism.

Realism, on the other hand, peers into the “black …

Climate Lies And Unjust Profits, Vanessa Casado-Pérez, Yotam Kaplan, Yael Lifshitz, Niv Meyerson

Faculty Scholarship

The climate crisis has reached a perilous tipping point. Our entrenched reliance on fossil fuels remains unchecked, as fossil fuel corporations wield their power to block meaningful reform and entrench their profits. The political horizon offers little relief—an incoming administration is poised to dismantle vital environmental protections, stripping away the few safeguards that stand between us and climate catastrophe.

In this grim landscape, communities across the nation are turning to the courts with renewed urgency, seeking justice and reform through climate litigation. Yet past efforts have fallen short, stymied by two formidable barriers. First, by centering on greenhouse gas emissions …

The Unitary Executive And The Federal Reserve, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court may soon embrace an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that would significantly expand the power of the president over federal administrators and invalidate key provisions in dozens of federal statutes. A critical question is whether this interpretation — known as the unitary executive theory (UET) — would also render unconstitutional central bank independence (CBI), an arrangement where a country’s monetary policy is formulated by a semiautonomous body of experts insulated from partisan political pressure. Several justices have suggested that it would not, and a growing scholarly literature has proposed ways for the Court to distinguish the …

Metrics Not Thresholds: How To Regulate Ai And Other Expert Methods For Use In Criminal Investigations And Proceedings, Rebecca Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

Should regulators set performance thresholds for AI tools used in the criminal legal system? This Article draws on U.S. evidence law for guidance. Its answer is ... don’t. Instead of gatekeeping with ex ante performance thresholds, regulators should require or incentivize metrics of reliability that can be clearly communicated to end-user decisionmakers.

Poor Esg: Regressive Effects Of Climate Stewardship, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani, Alex Raskolnikov

Faculty Scholarship

The rise of inequality and global warming are the two ultimate challenges of our time. After decades of congressional failure to address climate change, the private sector has stepped in and adopted a set of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies as a market-based solution to a public policy failure. ESG advocates hope that corporate executives would save our planet. Where Congress failed, ESG will succeed.

This Article argues that if ESG-driven climate stewardship ever achieves the scale necessary to have a real impact on global warming, it will hurt the poor. Legislative interventions to combat climate change are nearly …

Ultra Vires Review In Administrative Law For Dummies, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Richard W. Murphy, Ultra Vires Review of Federal Agency Action Made Simple(r), 2025 Utah L. Rev. 1201 (2025).

Non-statutory review, ultra vires review, and Leedom v. Kyne, the leading case on non-statutory review, all have one thing in common—when I come across them, my eyes glaze over, and I pretend it never happened, hoping they will all go away. It’s like an allergic reaction. I’ve avoided talking about them, writing about them, and covering them in my Administrative Law course like the plague. Leave it to Richard (“Chip”) Murphy, famous for his entertaining and informative annual reviews of …

Trust, Transparency, And The Fragile Promise Of Data Governance In The Era Of Modernization, Fallon Julia Cochlin, Regen Weber-Fares, Jami Crespo, William M. Sage, Cason Daniel Schmit

Faculty Scholarship

Public health data modernization in the United States has accelerated since COVID-19 exposed systemic weaknesses in fragmented data infrastructure and governance. Technical solutions have advanced, but legal and relational barriers still complicate data sharing across jurisdictions. Traditionally, interjurisdictional data sharing has relied on individually negotiated Data Use Agreements (DUAs), a process that is both resource-heavy and often opaque. To address this, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have proposed a Core DUA to standardize terms and reduce administrative burden. However, its success depends on trust — a fragile foundation increasingly strained by politicization, perceived lack of transparency, and controversial …

Agenda Control And Precedent, Thomas P. Schmidt

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court now has vast control over its agenda: It has the power to pick and choose not only what cases it will hear through writs of certiorari, but also what specific legal questions within those cases it will consider. As a result, the Court never revisits a precedent unless it has made a prior, discretionary choice to put the viability of a precedent on its agenda. For that reason, the Court’s powers of agenda control play a significant and underappreciated role in maintaining the continuity of the legal order. Indeed, it is no surprise that the formal …

Performing Legality: When And Why Chinese Government Leaders Show Up In Court, Rachel E. Stern, Jieun Kim, Benjamin L. Liebman

Faculty Scholarship

Since 2015, Chinese government leaders have been required by law to appear in court when citizens sue their unit or to designate an employee to take their place. We frame this policy as a demand on leaders to “perform legality,” sacrificing their time to demonstrate how seriously the government takes legal proceedings. Drawing on an original dataset of 127,529 administrative lawsuits decided between 2015 and 2018, we investigate how often government leaders appear in Chinese courtrooms, and for which kinds of cases. Overall, leaders attended 24.72% of hearings. Contrary to the State Council’s instructions to prioritize attendance in lawsuits that …

The Law Of For Cause Removal, Jane Manners, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

For the first time in American history, the Supreme Court is poised to decide what it means for the president to remove a principal officer “for cause.” The case — which arises from the attempted removal of Lisa Cook, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — has major implications for central bank independence in the United States and, more broadly, for the U.S. administrative state. But given how long it has been since such offices were formally contested, courts and commentators have forgotten many aspects of the legal tradition governing “for cause” removal. In …

Selective Service And The Separation Of Powers, Jeremy K. Kessler

Faculty Scholarship

The legal history of the U.S. military draft is a case study in creative statutory interpretation. Throughout the twentieth century, this interpretive creativity tended both to expand draft registrants’ substantive and procedural rights, and to recalibrate the roles played by Congress, the courts, and various executive branch factions in the governance of tens of millions of young men. Today’s Military Selective Service Act (“MSSA”) reads much like the law that governed the land when the country last went to war with conscripts during the 1950s and 1960s. But between U.S. entry into the Korean War and its withdrawal from Vietnam, …

Trump V. Cook And The American Rule Of For-Cause Removal, Jane Manners, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

Halfway through oral argument in Trump v. Cook, Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked Solicitor General John Sauer when a statute authorizing an officer’s removal should be read to require process. “Why shouldn’t we do the same thing that the Shurtleff court did,” Barrett asked, “and say that, well, as we said in Shurtleff, when a statute specifies the grounds for removal, there must be notice and a hearing given?”

In response, Sauer distinguished between statutes authorizing removal for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office (INM) — which he conceded require process — and statutes using the more …

Uncertain Enforcement And Standing To Sue, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

Plaintiffs with strong claims that a law is unconstitutional may yet fail to establish standing when the law is rarely enforced. Other statutes, like Texas’s unusual abortion law, may render challenges difficult by delegating enforcement to private parties who are difficult to identify in advance. Both problems arise from the assumption that the law shapes behavior only through sanctions imposed in enforcement proceedings. This view is mistaken, both jurisprudentially and empirically. Worse, it requires courts to ask two unanswerable questions: How likely is enforcement? And how likely does Article III require it to be? It also asks standing doctrine to …

U.S. Administrative Law: A Casebook (6th Ed.), Jud Mathews

Faculty Scholarship

The number of administrative law texts is vast. The approach of this one, now in its fifth edition, is simple. It is: (1) to focus on the richest and most canonical cases; (2) to provide more extensive extracts of them than most casebooks; and (3) to keep the notes to a bare minimum. Updated through October 2025, the book contains a number of significant decisions from recent Supreme Court terms, as well as foundational classics that many contemporary casebooks cut, and much in between.

Keeping Evidence Real, Anya Bernstein, Julia Simon-Kerr

Faculty Scholarship

Commentators largely agree that the Federal Rules of Evidence have problems. Expert testimony standards admit junk science. Impeachment rules chill defendant testimony. The hearsay regime defies consistent application and obstructs self-representation. The list goes on: Many rules fail to assist, or affirmatively thwart, jurors trying to make good decisions. Such shortcomings disproportionately harm those with the least power in the system, raising profound questions about whether the evidence code serves its statutory mandate—to promote truth and justice in court proceedings. In the face of widely recognized problems, the government body charged with managing the evidence code—the Advisory Committee on Evidence …

Sidelining The Public, Anya Bernstein, Glen Staszewski, Wendy E. Wagner

Faculty Scholarship

This Article challenges the widely held view that Congress is the American government’s institution closest to the people, while administrative agencies are unaccountable and unresponsive. Providing a systematic, side-by-side institutional analysis, we compare the actual practices and capacities of these two institutions to engage affected publics in policymaking. We find that despite the democratic bona fides of an elected legislature, agencies possess superior capacities, more evolved practices, stricter rules, and stronger incentives for meaningful public engagement. Yet these capacities have been eroded—particularly over the last 50 years—by intensifying legal, political, and managerial obstacles. The Supreme Court and political actors have …

Slaughter, The Symmetry Rule, And What The Decision Of 1789 Actually Decided, Jane Manners, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

During oral argument in Slaughter last month, Solicitor General John Sauer argued that there were three textual sources for an illimitable presidential removal power: the Vesting Clause, the Take Care Clause, and the Appointments Clause. Why the Appointments Clause? Because, he explained, “the power to remove flows to the power to appoint.” According to Sauer, a run of nineteenth century cases, including Ex Parte Hennen, supports this proposition.

Sauer’s contention is not new: Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. U.S. also claimed that in the First Congress, “the express recognition of the power of appointment in [Article II] enforced this …

The Unitary Theorists' Appointments Clause Problems, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The unitary executive theorists’ recent retreat to the Appointments Clause as a basis for unconditional presidential removal power is contradicted by the text and by overwhelming originalist evidence.

It is a surprising argument for a power of presidential removal, because the text of the Appointments Clause plainly requires both the President and Senate to appoint. The noncommon sense reading, that the president alone appoints, and thus the president can remove, was not in any of the Trump Administration’s briefs, but it was in a single amicus brief, and it was picked up in oral argument and the mainstream media.

This …

General Rulemaking Grants And The Federal Trade Commission, Tamar Katz, Alex Lloyd George, Lev Menand, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

The legal campaign against the administrative state has a new front: general rulemaking provisions. General rulemaking provisions authorize agencies, in an open-ended way, to write rules to carry out Congress’s directives. Administrative agencies have relied on such provisions for decades. But over the last several years, some litigators, scholars, and judges have advanced limiting theories that would, if applied widely, greatly reduce the ability of agencies to execute federal statutes. The leading edge of this campaign is an effort to negate the rulemaking authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The reasoning employed by the FTC’s opponents, already adopted by …

Fact Checking Oral Argument In Slaughter, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court heard argument on Monday in Trump v. Slaughter, a case in which the President seeks to override the power of Congress to limit, through legislation, presidential removal of federal administrators. The argument revealed some confusion about the law and history of federal offices and multiple precedents important to resolving the question. This post examines mistakes and misreadings with respect to: the design of the Federal Reserve System; the meaning of a fixed term; and the Court’s decisions in Marbury v. Madison, Ex Parte Hennen, and Parsons v. United States.

Slaughter, Parsons, And The Original Meaning Of A Term Of Years, Jane Manners, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

This term the Supreme Court is hearing argument in two major cases regarding the law of federal offices. One — Trump v. Slaughter — may strip Congress of the power to place any restrictions on the President’s ability to remove administrators at will. Another — Trump v. Cook — will address how such restrictions work, assuming that the President has to follow them.

Quasi-Judicial: A History And Tradition, Beau J. Baumann, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

In challenging the historical assumptions underlying the unitary executive theory, scholars have made several seemingly unrelated discoveries. First, "judicial" power was conceived in English law as a subset of "executive" authority. Second, Congress at or near the Founding insulated certain court-like comissions from presidential control. Finally, the "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" powers that were central to the holding of Humphrey's Executor flowed from a forgotten nineteenth-century legal tradition was guiding Congress's construction of the modern state. This Essay connects these findings into a single claim: generations of American stretching back past the Founding have instinctively insulated administrators granted quasi-judicial functions from …

Presidential Removal As Article I, Not Article Ii, Gary Lawson, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

As a matter of original public meaning, Article I’s Necessary and Proper clause is the starting point for both Congress’s power to create offices and the limits on that power.

We believe that many legal scholars have demonstrated that, as a matter of original public meaning, the term “executive power” did not imply a presidential removal power, and Article II did not imply an indefeasible (unconditional) presidential removal power. By contrast, Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause is a basis for limiting congressional power that is more historically grounded in original public meaning and in early practice. Tenure protections and …

Presidents, Opinions, And Independent Officers, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Opinions in Writing Clause is a persistent textual problem for the claim that Article II implies an indefeasible removal power: If the Framers believed they had given the president an unconditional removal power, why would they also specify a lesser power merely to ask for opinions? New historical research confirms this textual problem was also contextual: early state constitutions, the Ratification debates, and the First Congress indicate that the Opinions Clause’s original public meaning signaled independence of department heads, or at least the possibility of congressional requirements like good cause.

Legal scholars have already shown that the texts of …

Removal: A Response To Professor Nelson, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

In an essay published earlier this fall, Professor Caleb Nelson argues that, as a matter of originalism, the President does not have a constitutional power to remove executive officers. Professor Nelson is a renowned scholar, whose arguments could well influence the Supreme Court in two upcoming removal cases: Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook. It’s therefore important to evaluate whether his historical claim about removal is correct.

Amicus In Trump V. Cook: The Fed, Offices As Property, And The Meaning Of “Cause”, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Federal Reserve Act states that “each member shall hold office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by the President.” 12 U.S.C. § 242. Based on the historical record, when Congress creates an office with a fixed term of years and protects against removal without “cause,” Congress has both granted “a constitutionally protected property interest” under the Fifth Amendment (that cannot be taken away without “due process”) and extended a statutory entitlement to receive fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond before any removal may …