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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Law
Partial Takings, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
Partial Takings, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
All Faculty Scholarship
Partial takings allow the government to expropriate the parts of an asset it needs, leaving the owner the remainder. Both vital and common, partial takings present unique challenges to the standard rules of eminent domain. Partial takings may result in the creation of suboptimal, and even unusable, parcels. Additionally, partial takings create assessment problems that do not arise when parcels are taken as a whole. Finally, partial takings engender opportunities for inefficient strategic behavior on the part of the government after the partial taking has been carried out. Current jurisprudence fails to resolve these problems and can even exacerbate them. …
Keepings, Donald J. Kochan
Keepings, Donald J. Kochan
Donald J. Kochan
Inclusionary Eminent Domain, Gerald S. Dickinson
Inclusionary Eminent Domain, Gerald S. Dickinson
Gerald S. Dickinson
This article proposes a paradigm shift in takings law, namely “inclusionary eminent domain.” This new normative concept – paradoxical in nature – rethinks eminent domain as an inclusionary land assembly framework that is equipped with multiple tools to help guide municipalities, private developers and communities construct or preserve affordable housing developments. Analogous to inclusionary zoning, inclusionary eminent domain helps us think about how to fix the “exclusionary eminent domain” phenomenon of displacing low-income families by assembling and negotiating the use of land – prior to, during or after condemnation proceedings – to accommodate affordable housing where condemnation threatens to decrease …
The Neglected Political Economy Of Eminent Domain, Nicole Stelle Garnett
The Neglected Political Economy Of Eminent Domain, Nicole Stelle Garnett
Nicole Stelle Garnett
This Article challenges a foundational assumption about eminent domain - namely, that owners are systematically undercompensated because they receive only fair market value for their property. The Article shows that, in fact, scholars have overstated the undercompensation problem because they have focused on the compensation required by the Constitution, rather than on the actual mechanics of eminent domain. The Article examines three ways that Takers (i.e., non-judicial actors in the eminent domain process) minimize undercompensation. First, Takers may avoid taking high-subjective-value properties. Second, Takers frequently must pay more compensation in the form of relocation assistance. Third, Takers and property owners …
The Hidden Function Of Takings Compensation, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
The Hidden Function Of Takings Compensation, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
All Faculty Scholarship
To date, scholars have justified the constitutional mandate to pay compensation for takings of property on the intuitively appealing grounds that fairness demands recompensing aggrieved owners; on the basis of a belief that government that fails to pay will suffer from “fiscal illusion” and take excessively; or due to the need to neutralize politically powerful property owners who would otherwise foil socially beneficial projects. This Essay offers a new explanation of the role of takings compensation in ensuring good government. Inspired by public choice theory, we argue that takings compensation is intended to reduce the incentives for corruption by limiting …
Ripe Standing Vines And The Jurisprudential Tasting Of Matured Legal Wines – And Law & Bananas: Property And Public Choice In The Permitting Process, Donald J. Kochan
Ripe Standing Vines And The Jurisprudential Tasting Of Matured Legal Wines – And Law & Bananas: Property And Public Choice In The Permitting Process, Donald J. Kochan
Donald J. Kochan
From produce to wine, we only consume things when they are ready. The courts are no different. That concept of “readiness” is how courts address cases and controversies as well. Justiciability doctrines, particularly ripeness, have a particularly important role in takings challenges to permitting decisions. The courts largely hold that a single permit denial does not give them enough information to evaluate whether the denial is in violation of law. As a result of this jurisprudential reality, regulators with discretion have an incentive to use their power to extract rents from those that need their permission. Non-justiciability of permit denials …
A Positive Theory Of Eminent Domain, Eric Kades
A Positive Theory Of Eminent Domain, Eric Kades
Eric A. Kades
The "Public Use" Requirement In Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based On Secret Purchases And Private Influence, Daniel B. Kelly
The "Public Use" Requirement In Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based On Secret Purchases And Private Influence, Daniel B. Kelly
ExpressO
This article provides a rationale for understanding and interpreting the “public use” requirement within eminent domain law. The rationale is based on two factors. First, while the government often needs the power of eminent domain to avoid the problem of strategic holdout, private parties are usually able to purchase property through secret buying agents. The availability of these buying agents makes the use of eminent domain for private parties unnecessary (and indeed, undesirable). The government, however, is ordinarily unable to make secret purchases because its plans are subject to democratic deliberation and known in advance. Second, while the use of …
Economic Regulation In The United States: The Constitutional Framework, Mark C. Christie
Economic Regulation In The United States: The Constitutional Framework, Mark C. Christie
University of Richmond Law Review
The United States of America is well-known (and occasionally well-liked or loathed) as the world's largest free-market capitalist nation. Indeed, many assume that since the United States for more than two centuries has had an economic system based on liberal principles, Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of capitalism must have been embedded in the United States Constitution from the beginning of the American republic. Yet government at all levels in the United States has historically exercised significant regulation of economic and commercial activity-regulation inconsistent with laissez-faire capitalism. The purpose of this article is to consider several questions: (1) what are the …
The Neglected Political Economy Of Eminent Domain, Nicole Stelle Garnett
The Neglected Political Economy Of Eminent Domain, Nicole Stelle Garnett
Journal Articles
This Article challenges a foundational assumption about eminent domain - namely, that owners are systematically undercompensated because they receive only fair market value for their property. The Article shows that, in fact, scholars have overstated the undercompensation problem because they have focused on the compensation required by the Constitution, rather than on the actual mechanics of eminent domain. The Article examines three ways that Takers (i.e., non-judicial actors in the eminent domain process) minimize undercompensation. First, Takers may avoid taking high-subjective-value properties. Second, Takers frequently must pay more compensation in the form of relocation assistance. Third, Takers and property owners …
Bargaining For Takings Compensation, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
Bargaining For Takings Compensation, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
All Faculty Scholarship
Efficiency and fairness require paying full compensation to property owners when their property is taken by eminent domain. Yet, to date, the evidentiary challenge of proving subjective value has proved insurmountable, and current law requires condemnees to settle for fair market value. This Article proposes a self-assessment mechanism that can make full compensation at subjective value practical. Under our proposal, property owners must be given the opportunity to state the value of the property designated for condemnation. Once property owners name their price, the government can take the property only at that price. However, if the government chooses not to …
Selling Mayberry: Communities And Individuals In Law And Economics, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman
Selling Mayberry: Communities And Individuals In Law And Economics, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman
All Faculty Scholarship
The small village of Cheshire, Ohio was recently acquired in its entirety by the firm whose giant power plant, located at the edge of town, caused it serious pollution problems. Although the plant was worth substantially more than the town, this was not a simple Coasean bargain. This paper combines an ethnographic methodology with theoretical insights from law and economics to present an empirical and theoretic challenge to the standard account of nuisance disputes. We explore the transaction in detail and explain what prevented collective action and holdout problems that are usually thought to hinder bargaining with groups. Specifically, we …
"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan
"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan
Donald J. Kochan
This Article reexamines the doctrine of public use under the Takings Clause and its ability to impede takings for private use through an application of public choice theory. It argues that the judicial validation of interest-group capture of the condemnation power through a relaxed public use standard in Takings Clause review can be explained by interest group politics and public choice theory and by institutional tendencies inherent in the independent judiciary. Legislators can sell the eminent domain power to special interests for almost any use, promising durability in the deal given the low probability that the judiciary will invalidate it …
Takings From Freund To Fischel." Review Of Regulatory Taking: Law, Economics, And Politics, By W. A. Fischel, James E. Krier
Takings From Freund To Fischel." Review Of Regulatory Taking: Law, Economics, And Politics, By W. A. Fischel, James E. Krier
Reviews
The regulatory takings problem is easy to describe but difficult to resolve. The government enacts restrictions on land use that reduce the market value of the targeted parcels by a considerable amount. The restrictions are couched in terms of the police power, but actually they might amount to a taking that requires compensation, not because any of the land has been wrested away (it hasn't), but because much of the value has. Through the police power the government gets to govern for free, whereas with takings it's pay as you go. On what does the distinction-police power or taking-depend?
Economic Due Process And The Takings Clause, John A. Humbach
Economic Due Process And The Takings Clause, John A. Humbach
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
The discussion which follows will examine the new verbalizations repeatedly employed in Supreme Court takings decisions of the past decade and the Court's enlistment of the just compensation requirement as a basis for undertaking substantive review of legislation. As an introduction, the distinctive historical roles and roots of the substantive due process and just compensation requirements will be reviewed.
Book Review, Howard C. Klemme