Law Commons^™

Rehnquist's Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism And The Stealth Advance Of Martial Law, Diane H. Mazur

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article argues that judicial deference to the military, at least as the principle is understood in contemporary decisions of the Court, is surprisingly recent and not at all constitutionally established. In fact, this deference departs from constitutional text and from a line of Supreme Court precedent concerning civilian-military relations extending back before the Civil War. Broad judicial deference to military discretion is only a creation of the post-Vietnam, all-volunteer military and, more specifically, only a creation of one single Justice of the Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist.

In Greer v. Spock, First Amendment values were displaced narrowly in the …

Unmasking The Presumption In Favor Of Preemption, Mary J. Davis

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

It is inescapable: there is a presumption in favor of preemption. Historically, the Supreme Court has said differently-that, rather, there is a presumption against preemption. There is no such presumption any longer, if, indeed, there ever really was one. Preemption doctrine has been exceedingly puzzling in the last decade, but when one recognizes that the Court's doctrine not only favors preemption, but presumes it, preemption doctrine is not a puzzle at all.

This Article argues that the Supreme Court's recent preemption decisions compel the conclusion that the Court's preemption analysis has, in effect, created a presumption in favor of preemption, …

Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead And The Shrinking Domain Of Statutory Ambiguity, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In skewering the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp., Justice Scalia's rhetoric is exceptional. He derides the decision as "one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action. Its consequences will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad." Although Justice Scalia objects to Mead's new and uncertain limits on the applicability of the Chevron doctrine, this Article will focus instead on how Mead employs a method of interpretation imputing a clear intent to Congress, and authorizes courts to discern statutory meaning without strong deference to …