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Articles 1 - 30 of 52
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Flag Can Travel But The Constitution Must Ask Permission: How The First Circuit And The District For Puerto Rico Commit To Equal Protection Without Abandoning The Insular Cases Doctrine, Alejandro J. Anselmi González
The Flag Can Travel But The Constitution Must Ask Permission: How The First Circuit And The District For Puerto Rico Commit To Equal Protection Without Abandoning The Insular Cases Doctrine, Alejandro J. Anselmi González
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
For American citizens, one of the most important safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States is the equal protection of the law. The United States prides itself on the doctrine and jurisprudence of equal protection because of the social progression achieved since the end of the Civil War. The Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution eliminated the institution of slavery and were supposed to guarantee equal civil and legal status to all citizens. The Constitution, however, has not been consistently interpreted in this way since the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898. The nation emerged from this conflict …
Justifying The Supreme Court’S Standards Of Review, R. Randall Kelso
Justifying The Supreme Court’S Standards Of Review, R. Randall Kelso
St. Mary's Law Journal
Abstract forthcoming.
Winston Churchill On The American Constitution, Gerard N. Magliocca
Winston Churchill On The American Constitution, Gerard N. Magliocca
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
Though best known for leading Britain during World War II, Winston Churchill was a keen observer of constitutional law. Most of his insights concerned the unwritten conventions of the British Constitution, but Churchill also commented extensively on the American Constitution. Intellectual curiosity and a desire to forge a closer alliance between Great Britain and the United States were at the root of Churchill’s interest in the institutions of what he called “The Great Republic.” As with all things Churchill, his observations on our Constitution were sometimes inspiring, sometimes illuminating, and sometimes noxious.
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis …
City Of Los Angeles V. Lyons: How Supreme Court Jurisprudence Of The Past Puts A Chokehold On Constitutional Rights In The Present, Peter C. Douglas
City Of Los Angeles V. Lyons: How Supreme Court Jurisprudence Of The Past Puts A Chokehold On Constitutional Rights In The Present, Peter C. Douglas
Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
The United States today has refocused its attention on its continuing struggles with civil rights and police violence—struggles that have always been present but which come to the forefront of the collective consciousness at inflection points like the current one. George Floyd—and uncounted others—die at the hands of the police, and there is, justifiably, outrage and a search for answers. Although the reasons why Black and Brown people are disproportionally subject to unconstitutional police violence are manifold, one reason lies in the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. While many scholars have criticized the Burger …
Two Diametrically Opposed Jurists: The Jurisprudence Of Chief Justices Roger B. Taney And Salmon P. Chase, Alexandra M. Michalak
Two Diametrically Opposed Jurists: The Jurisprudence Of Chief Justices Roger B. Taney And Salmon P. Chase, Alexandra M. Michalak
The Cardinal Edge
No abstract provided.
Immunity As An Integral Aspect Of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis Of The Supreme Court Case Michigan V. Bay Mills Indian Community, Meghanlata Gupta
Immunity As An Integral Aspect Of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis Of The Supreme Court Case Michigan V. Bay Mills Indian Community, Meghanlata Gupta
The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal
While Native nations in the United States have tribal sovereignty—that is, the inherent freedom and authority to govern themselves without outside control—non-Native actors have often challenged this institution within legal and political spaces. The United States court system, starting with the Marshall Court, has often attempted to define aspects of Indigenous sovereignty and federal-tribal relationships. The 2014 US Supreme Court case Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community is no exception, raising questions of sovereign immunity in the context of Indian gaming, tribal-state relationships, and land trusts. This paper first provides a general context for the case, identifying relevant historical events …
The Return Of A Judicial Artifact? How The Supreme Court Could Examine The Question Of The Nondelegation Doctrine’S Place In Future Cases, Dalton Davis
Helms School of Government Undergraduate Law Review
No abstract provided.
A Government Of Laws That Is A Government Of Men And Women, Mark Tushnet
A Government Of Laws That Is A Government Of Men And Women, Mark Tushnet
Arkansas Law Review
I take Mark Killenbeck’s “provocative” article as an occasion for some informal comments about what Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii tell us about the saying, “a government of laws, not a government of men and women.” My basic thought is that the “not” in the saying has to be replaced “but also.” And, in some sense we have always had to have known that the saying was wrong as stated. Whatever the laws are, they don’t make themselves. Nor do they administer themselves, nor interpret themselves. Men and women appear at the stages of enactment, application, and adjudication. So, for …
A Proper Burial, Robert L. Tsai
A Proper Burial, Robert L. Tsai
Arkansas Law Review
In his article, Professor Mark Killenbeck defends both Korematsu v. United States and Trump v. Hawaii on their own terms, albeit on narrow grounds. He goes on to conclude that comparisons of the two decisions don’t hold up. Killenbeck has authored a thoughtful and contrarian paper, but I’m not sold. In my view, Korematsu simply isn’t worth saving; in fact, a more complete repudiation of the internment decisions is overdue. Trump v. Hawaii, too, must also be revisited at the earliest opportunity and its more alarming features that abet presidential discrimination against non-citizens rejected. Moreover, I believe that comparisons between …
Tainted Precedent, Darrell A.H. Miller
Tainted Precedent, Darrell A.H. Miller
Arkansas Law Review
We have a common law system of constitutional adjudication, at least in the sense that constitutional practice in the United States relies on prior rulings rather than reasoning from first principles in each case. If there’s controlling precedent on point, it’s binding. Neither “inferior courts” in the federal system, nor state courts adjudicating federal law, are permitted to start anew with the “original public meaning” of the First Amendment or pronounce a fresh Dworkinian “moral reading” of the Fourth. Even the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court of the United States, for reasons of reputation, stability, and rule …
There Was Nothing "Neutral" About Executive Order 9066, Eric L. Muller
There Was Nothing "Neutral" About Executive Order 9066, Eric L. Muller
Arkansas Law Review
There is no more appropriate place to discuss the Japanese American cases of World War II than in the pages of the Arkansas Law Review. This is not only because Arkansas was the only state outside the Western Defense Command to host not one but two of the War Relocation Authority’s (WRA) concentration camps for Japanese Americans. It is because one of the most important lawyers to oversee the development and administration of all the WRA camps was the dean under whose leadership this law review was founded: Robert A. Leflar. Leflar’s is not a name that constitutional lawyers are …
Korematsu, Hawaii, And Pedagogy, Sanford Levinson
Korematsu, Hawaii, And Pedagogy, Sanford Levinson
Arkansas Law Review
I begin with some reflections on my own career in teaching—or, perhaps, attempting to teach—American constitutional law to generations of students from 1975 to the present. Or, more accurately, until about three years ago, when I taught introductory constitutional law for the last time. I am quite happy to no longer be teaching that course, whatever joys it did provide me in the past, for a very simple reason: I became more and more frustrated by the demands of coverage, i.e., the duty to take up a variety of topics—including attendant cases and collateral materials—and the unfortunate certainty that what …
Korematsu As The Tribute That Vice Pays To Virtue, Jack M. Balkin
Korematsu As The Tribute That Vice Pays To Virtue, Jack M. Balkin
Arkansas Law Review
Mark Killenbeck wants to (partially) rehabilitate the reputation of one of the Supreme Court’s most despised legal decisions, Korematsu v. United States. He argues that “[w]e should accept and teach Korematsu as an exemplar of what thelaw regarding invidious discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin should be.” In both Korematsu (and Hirabayashi v. United States) the Court asserted that classifications based on race were subject to strict scrutiny. But “[t]he majority,” Killenbeck explains, “refused to heed their own mandate. In Hirabayashi they held that the government policy was ‘reasonable.’ In Korematsu, . . . they failed …
Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, Mark R. Killenbeck
Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, Mark R. Killenbeck
Arkansas Law Review
How to best describe and treat Korematsu v. United States? A self-inflicted wound? It is certainly an exemplar of a case that in key respects tracks Justice Stephen Breyer’s caution about decisions that have “harm[ed] not just the Court, but the Nation.” Part of an “Anticanon,” resting on “little more than naked racism and associated hokum” and “embod[ying] a set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute”? Perhaps. Or is it simply an opinion and result that “has long stood out as a stain that is almost universally recognized as a shameful mistake”?
Symposium: Giving Korematsu V. United States A Sober Second Thought, Nick Bell, Emily Levy, Julian Sharp
Symposium: Giving Korematsu V. United States A Sober Second Thought, Nick Bell, Emily Levy, Julian Sharp
Arkansas Law Review
We are elated to present Professor Mark Killenbeck’s thought provoking article, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered. Killenbeck dives into the Korematsu opinion and its history with great care to determine whether it truly “has no place in law under the Constitution” as Chief Justice John Roberts declared in Trump v. Hawaii.1 While Korematsu’s result provides an understandable “impulse to condemn” it, Killenbeck shows us that focusing solely on the case’s result “stands apart from and in stark contrast to its most important place in the constitutional order: articulation of precepts and terminology that provide the foundations for strict scrutiny.”
Abortion Rights In The Supreme Court: A Tale Of Three Wedges, Jennifer S. Hendricks
Abortion Rights In The Supreme Court: A Tale Of Three Wedges, Jennifer S. Hendricks
ConLawNOW
In May 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case designed to overrule Roe v. Wade. The assumption is that six justices are inclined to repudiate Roe, and that some of those six would like to go further, declaring a constitutional right to life that would prevent the abortion issue from going “back to the states” at all. The question for the next year is not whether Roe will be overruled—it already was, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey—but how far the Court will go. This essay describes the arc of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence in …
Doe V. Nestle, S.A.: Chocolate And The Prohibition On Child Slavery, Megan M. Coppa
Doe V. Nestle, S.A.: Chocolate And The Prohibition On Child Slavery, Megan M. Coppa
Pace International Law Review
West Africa is presently home to approximately 1.5 million acres of cocoa farmland, which subsequently produces 70% of the world’s current chocolate supply. Côte d’Ivoire, also known as the Ivory Coast, is one of the largest cocoa producing countries within West Africa.
The increase of farmland and the need to control the deteriorating conditions have always created a demand for farm workers. Regrettably, more than 1.5 million cocoa farm workers in West Africa are currently children. These child workers are exposed to hazardous dust, flames, smoke, and chemicals, are required to utilize dangerous tools that they are not properly trained …
Determining The Constitutionality Of Public Aid To Parochial Schools After Espinoza, Anna Bryner
Determining The Constitutionality Of Public Aid To Parochial Schools After Espinoza, Anna Bryner
Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies
No abstract provided.
“Lawyers’ Work”: Does The Court Have A Legitimacy Crisis?, Lackland Bloom
“Lawyers’ Work”: Does The Court Have A Legitimacy Crisis?, Lackland Bloom
St. Mary's Law Journal
Talk of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is pervasive. It can’t be avoided by anyone paying attention. The question this article addresses is does the Supreme Court have a legitimacy crisis. The title “Lawyers’ Work” is taken from Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in which he declared that as long as the Court decides cases by engaging in “Lawyers’ Work” the public will leave it alone. This article concludes that Justice Scalia was partially though not entirely correct.
The article begins by considering the concept of judicial legitimacy as developed and studied by political scientists. Next it …
From The Frontlines Of The Modern Movement To End Forced Arbitration And Restore Jury Rights, F. Paul Bland, Myriam Gilles, Tanuja Gupta
From The Frontlines Of The Modern Movement To End Forced Arbitration And Restore Jury Rights, F. Paul Bland, Myriam Gilles, Tanuja Gupta
Chicago-Kent Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Essentially-At-Home Requirement For General Jurisdiction: Some Embarrassing Cases, David Crump
The Essentially-At-Home Requirement For General Jurisdiction: Some Embarrassing Cases, David Crump
Catholic University Law Review
In Daimler AG v. Baumann, the Supreme Court held that general jurisdiction does not exist unless the defendant is “essentially at home” in the forum. It offered two examples of places fitting this description but gave little further guidance or justification. A metaphor, such as essentially at home, is a bad way to express a legal standards, because the essence of a metaphor is that it substitutes one reality for another, creating a deliberate confusion. The Court also equated general jurisdiction with what it called all-purpose jurisdiction, which is wrong because it is easy to pose cases in which general …
The Faux Pas Of Automatic Stay Under The Indian Arbitration Act, 1996 - The Hcc Dictum, Two-Cherry Doctrine, And Beyond, Sai Ramani Garimella, Gautam Mohanty
The Faux Pas Of Automatic Stay Under The Indian Arbitration Act, 1996 - The Hcc Dictum, Two-Cherry Doctrine, And Beyond, Sai Ramani Garimella, Gautam Mohanty
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
In the matter of Hindustan Construction. Co. v. Union of India, the Honorable Supreme Court of India (“SCI”) was presented with an opportunity to adjudicate upon a petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 87 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”) as inserted by Section 13 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act of 2019 (“2019 Act"). The legislative insertion stated that amendments made to the 1996 Act by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 2015 (“2015 Act”) would not apply to court proceedings arising out of, or in relation to, arbitral proceedings initiated before the …
Why Don't We All Just Wear Robes?, Ruthann Robson
Why Don't We All Just Wear Robes?, Ruthann Robson
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development
(Excerpt)
Lawyers and law professors select our professional outfits each day, often experiencing a mix of consternation and gratification. The dread springs from our failures: to know what constitutes the “right look;” to be able to achieve that “right look;” to anticipate what the day will bring; to have prepared by doing the laundry or other tasks. The joy resides in self-expression; we fashion ourselves as works of art, even within the constraints of professional attire.
It could have been different. We could have sacrificed the satisfaction of self-expression for the complacency of conformity; we could wear robes. Judges—at least …
Preventing A Permanent Underclass: Why In-State Tuition For Daca Students Just Makes Sense, Christian Bowcutt, Eliza Allen
Preventing A Permanent Underclass: Why In-State Tuition For Daca Students Just Makes Sense, Christian Bowcutt, Eliza Allen
Brigham Young University Prelaw Review
In the landmark 1982 Supreme Court Case "Plyler v. Doe", the right to a free education was guaranteed to undocumented students. One of the reasons for this was to "prevent a permanent underclass". Today, we have a similar opportunity to lift our fellow peers by passing legislation to guarantee in-state tuition to DACA recipients. DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) is a program that grants temporary citizenship to qualifying children and youth who are brought to the United States with their parent(s) or guardian(s). Currently, the majority of states have not guaranteed this right to DACA students. With tuition rates …
The Militia: A Definition And Litmus Test, Marcus Armstrong
The Militia: A Definition And Litmus Test, Marcus Armstrong
St. Mary's Law Journal
The United States Supreme Court, in its decision in Perpich v. Department of Defense, ruled that members of the National Guard are “troops” as that word is used in the Constitution. In doing so, the Court negated a long-standing, but obsolete, definition of the militia. However, this move away from an obsolete definition of the militia posed considerable difficulties that the Court was unable to rectify in its Perpich decision. In this Article, the author hopes to help rectify these difficulties by proposing four necessary characteristics that define the militia: first, the militia is a military force; second, the …
Super-Dissenters, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos
Super-Dissenters, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos
Hofstra Law Review
An overview of adjudication by the Supreme Court reveals three phenomena. In the 1976 term, unanimous decisions switch from being decidedly liberal to even, and in 1990, they switch to greater frequency. Also, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court displays greater complexity of coalition formation. The departures of Justice Douglas in the first case, and of Justices Brennan and Marshall in the last two, have explanatory power. A look back at pre-WWII data indicates both changes are in the direction of returning to older patterns.
Towards A New Role Of The Supreme Court As A Degree Of Litigation "The Supreme Court As Second Or Third Degree Of Litigation" "A Comparative Study" - Part (I), Prof. Mostafa El-Metwally Quandil
Towards A New Role Of The Supreme Court As A Degree Of Litigation "The Supreme Court As Second Or Third Degree Of Litigation" "A Comparative Study" - Part (I), Prof. Mostafa El-Metwally Quandil
UAEU Law Journal
In principle, the Supreme Court must refer the reversed decision to the trial court for a new decision, because the role of the Supreme Court is to make a final determination on questions of law and not to hear a case. That being said, there is a recent tendency according to which the Supreme Court acts as a second or third degree court, competent to decide reviewed cases without referring to the trial court.
Towards A New Role Of The Supreme Court As A Degree Of Litigation "The Supreme Court As Second Or Third Degree Of Litigation" "A Comparative Study"- Part (Ii), Prof. Mostafa El-Metwally Quandil
Towards A New Role Of The Supreme Court As A Degree Of Litigation "The Supreme Court As Second Or Third Degree Of Litigation" "A Comparative Study"- Part (Ii), Prof. Mostafa El-Metwally Quandil
UAEU Law Journal
In principle, the Court of Cassation refers the appealed judgment in which to transmit the merits of the case to the trial court (First Instance Court) to rule again, because its main role is to assess the legal provisions and not the subject of the disputes presented before it. However, this has been partially changed to the extent that it may be said that the Court of Cassation considered - in some cases and in some legislation – as second or third level of litigation; where - in this case - and then set aside the appealed judgment dismissal on …
Appeal Against The Judgment Of Bankruptcy In Light Of The New Judicial Systems In The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia, Ahmed Makhlouf Jr
Appeal Against The Judgment Of Bankruptcy In Light Of The New Judicial Systems In The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia, Ahmed Makhlouf Jr
UAEU Law Journal
This paper presents the challenge to the ruling of Bankruptcy This paper presents the challenges against the judgment of Bankruptcy in light of the new judicial systems in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has changed significantly the UK litigation system. Where was the creation of specialized courts, including commercial courts, the adoption of the principle of litigation on the two instances, and the establishment of the Supreme Court to monitor the proper application of the provisions of Shariaa and regulations (laws). Therefore, bankruptcy suits have become passed by two phases of litigation. The first instance in front of first-class …
The Conservative Court And Torture Attenuation, Ari B. Rubin
The Conservative Court And Torture Attenuation, Ari B. Rubin
American University National Security Law Brief
No abstract provided.