Law Commons^™

State Sovereign Immunity And The New Purposivism, Anthony J. Bellia, Bradford R. Clark

Journal Articles

Since the Constitution was first proposed, courts and commentators have debated the extent to which it alienated the States’ preexisting sovereign immunity from suit by individuals. During the ratification period, these debates focused on the language of the citizen-state diversity provisions of Article III. After the Supreme Court read these provisions to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia, Congress and the States adopted the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit this construction. The Court subsequently ruled that States enjoy sovereign immunity independent of the Eleventh Amendment, which neither conferred nor diminished it. In the late twentieth-century, Congress began enacting statutes …

Does The Discourse On 303 Creative Portend A Standing Realignment?, Richard M. Re

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Perhaps the most surprising feature of the last Supreme Court Term was the extraordinary public discourse on 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. According to many commentators, the Court decided what was really a “fake” or “made-up” case brought by someone who asserted standing merely because “she worries.” As a doctrinal matter, these criticisms are unfounded. But what makes this episode interesting is that the criticisms came from the legal Left, which has long been associated with expansive principles of standing. Doubts about standing in 303 Creative may therefore portend a broader standing realignment, in which liberal Justices become jurisdictionally hawkish. …

Abortion—A Question Of Human Rights, Geoffrey J. Bennett, Christina M. Lyon

Journal Articles

Unlike the American Supreme Court which has been prepared to acknowledge, confront, and attempt to resolve the many problems associated with abortion, the European Commission of Human Rights in two cases that have only recently been reported has disappointingly side-stepped many of the difficult issues involved, and raised more questions than it answers. Furthermore, the reasoning in these decisions, which are concerned with the interpretation of several of the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, is at times vague and curiously ill-argued. The two decisions are first a German case, Bruggeman and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany …

Emergency-Docket Experiments, Edward L. Pickup, Hannah L. Templin

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

This short Essay is the first to analyze the Court’s recent emer-gency-docket experiments and discuss their effectiveness. We conclude that the Court’s interventions have real benefits: giving emergency cases greater procedure improves transparency, boosts public confidence in the Court, and gives guidance to litigants and lower courts.

But experiments are often iterative—it is unusual to hit the right result the first time. So too with the Court’s emergency-docket tinkering. In tweaking its stay factors, the Justices have failed to give suffi-cient guidance to litigants about how those factors will apply in the future. Plus, in transferring Ramirez from the emergency …

Federal Judicial Power And Federal Equity Without Federal Equity Powers, John Harrison

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article discusses the ways in which the federal courts do and do not have equity powers. Article III courts have the judicial power, which enables them to apply the law, primary and remedial. Applicable remedial law often includes the law of equitable remedies, so the federal courts have the power and obligation to give remedies pursuant to equitable principles. The law of equitable remedies, written and unwritten, is external to the courts, not created by them, the same way written law is external to the courts. Because the unwritten law of equitable remedies is found largely in judicial practice, …

A Responsive Remedy For Unconstitutional Removal Restrictions, William C. Eisenhauer

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court has inconsistently approached the remedies in unlawful removal restriction cases. This inconsistency fails to redress plaintiffs injured by unlawful executive power, blurs the separation of powers, and discourages other constitutional actors from considering their actions’ implications.3 This Note proposes a straight-forward solution to those problems.

It begins in Part I by laying out the mechanics of appointment and removal, with special attention to the constitutional and precedential intricacies of the removal power. Part II introduces the remedial problem by describing the Supreme Court’s two most recent removal cases and identifying the problematic inconsistencies. Part III dis-cusses in …

Calling Balls And Strikes? Chief Justice Roberts In October Term 2019, Meghan Dalton

Notre Dame Law Review

Part I of this Note will outline the scope of the assignment power, focusing on the strategic considerations a Chief Justice can make in assigning opinions. Part II will analyze Roberts’s voting and assignment patterns in October Term 2019, specifically applying the earlier discussions to his assignment choices in three key cases decided this term. Part III will focus on Chief Justice Roberts’s jurisprudential values and explore how these concerns might have informed his decision making in October Term 2019. Finally, this Note concludes by asking to what extent Roberts’s recent assignment choices are consistent with his signature promise to …

Dissenting From The Bench, Christine Venter

Journal Articles

This paper examines the oral dissents of Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg from the year 2000 to the times of their respective deaths. It explores the concept and purpose of oral dissent and details the kinds of cases in which each justice was more likely to orally dissent. The paper analyzes the kinds of rhetoric that each justice used to refer to their subject matter, and argues that Scalia's rhetoric evinces a view of the law as "autonomous", operating independently of the facts of the case. In contrast, Ginsburg's view espouses a view of the law as responsive …

Untangling Entanglement, Stephanie H. Barclay

Journal Articles

The Court has increasingly signaled its interest in taking a more historical approach to the Establishment Clause. And in its recent American Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the three-prong Lemon test is essentially dead letter. Such a result would make sense for the first two prongs of the Lemon test about secular purpose and the effects. Many scholars have observed that these aspects of the prong are judicial creations far afield of the Establishment Clause history. But what of the entanglement prong of the test? If we rejected all applications of this prong of the analysis, would …

Proximate Vs. Geographic Limits On Patent Damages, Stephen Yelderman

Journal Articles

The exclusive rights of a U.S. patent are limited in two important ways. First, a patent has a technical scope—only the products and methods set out in the patent’s claims may constitute infringement. Second, a patent has a geographic scope—making, using, or selling the products or methods described in the patent’s claims will only constitute infringement if that activity takes place in the United States. These boundaries are foundational features of the patent system: there can be no liability for U.S. patent infringement without an act that falls within both the technical and geographic scope of the patent.

Why Federal Courts Apply The Law Of Nations Even Though It Is Not The Supreme Law Of The Land, Anthony J. Bellia, Bradford R. Clark

Journal Articles

We are grateful to the judges and scholars who participated in this Symposium examining our book, The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution. One of our goals in writing this book was to reinvigorate and advance the debate over the role of customary international law in U.S. courts. The papers in this Symposium advance this debate by deepening understandings of how the Constitution interacts with customary international law. Our goal in this Article is to address two questions raised by this Symposium that go to the heart of the status of the law of nations under the Constitution. …

Precedent And Constitutional Structure, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

The Constitution does not talk about precedent, at least not explicitly, but several of its features suggest a place for deference to prior decisions. It isolates the judicial function and insulates federal courts from official and electoral control, promoting a vision of impersonality and continuity. It charges courts with applying a charter that is vague and ambiguous in important respects. And it was enacted at a time when prominent thinkers were already discussing the use of precedent to channel judicial discretion. Taken in combination, these features make deference to precedent a sound inference from the Constitution’s structure, text, and historical …

Religious Freedom And Recycled Tires: The Meaning And Implications Of Trinity Lutheran, Richard W. Garnett, Jackson C. Blais

Journal Articles

The Supreme Court's decision in Trinity Lutheran clearly affirmed a First Amendment rule against anti-religious discrimination. At the same time, it raised or left open a number of important and interesting questions about education reform, the relevance of anti-Catholic bias to states' so-called Blaine Amendments, and the sharpening tension between religious freedom and the application of antidiscrimination laws.

King V. Burwell: The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity To Cure What Ails Chevron, Vanessa L. Johnson, Marisa Finley, J. James Rohack

Journal of Legislation

The article outlines the construct of the ACA’s premium assistance tax credits, explores the legal controversies surrounding these subsidies, uses the tax subsidies cases to demonstrate the flaws in the Chevron framework, and argues that the Supreme Court should have framed its King v. Burwell analysis in a way that would have cured, rather than ignored, the ails of Chevron.

Discretionary Dockets, Randy J. Kozel, Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

The Supreme Court’s workload and its method for selecting cases have drawn increasing critical scrutiny. Similarly, and separately, recent commentary has focused on the disparate approaches the Court has taken to resolving cases on its (historically small) docket. In this Essay we draw these two lines of inquiry together to argue that the Court’s case selection should align with its approach to constitutional adjudication. In doing so, we discuss four modes of constitutional decisionmaking and then examine the interplay between those modes, the Court’s management of its docket, and its sense of institutional role. The Court, we argue, has neither …

Gerry Bradley Was Quoted In The Wall Street Journal Law Blog The Gay Marriage Case: How The Supreme Court Could Rule, Gerard V. Bradley

NDLS in the News

Gerry Bradley was quoted in the Wall Street Journal Law Blog The Gay Marriage Case: How the Supreme Court Could Rule on June 23, 2015.

Chaidez V. United States - You Can't Go Home Again, Aram A. Gavoor, Justin M. Orlosky

Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy

This article examines a 2013 Supreme Court decision, Chaidez v. United States, in which the Court declined to apply retroactively another recent decision, Padilla v. Kentucky. To many observers, Chaidez appears to be a discrete departure from previous Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence. On a personal level, noncitizens who pled guilty to a crime without being apprised of the plea’s removal risks are now unable to seek redress under Padilla and return to their homes in the United States. This article examines relevant Sixth Amendment and retroactivity jurisprudence and proposes an explanation for the Court’s apparent aboutface.

Supreme Court Cases 2013–14 Term, Barbara Fick

Books

This is section 6 from a symposium called "Recent Developments in Employment Law" hosted by the Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, December 16, 2014.

The Court-Packing Plan As Symptom, Casualty, And Cause Of Gridlock, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

This essay, prepared for the Notre Dame Law Review's Symposium, “The American Congress: Legal Implications of Gridlock,” considers three ways in which President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing bill was related to the phenomenon of gridlock in the 1930s. First, as FDR's public remarks on the subject demonstrate, he believed that the early New Deal was a victim of partisan gridlock between the Democrat-controlled political branches and the Republican-controlled judiciary. Moreover, he did not believe that the impasse could be overcome through an amendment to the Constitution, for he regarded Article V's supermajority requirements as virtually encoding gridlock into the …

Court-Packing And Compromise, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing bill would have permitted him to appoint six additional justices to the Supreme Court, thereby expanding its membership to fifteen immediately. Throughout the ultimately unsuccessful campaign to enact the measure, Roosevelt was presented with numerous opportunities to compromise for a measure authorizing the appointment of fewer additional justices. The President rejected each of these proposals, and his refusal to compromise often has been attributed to stubbornness, overconfidence, or hubris. Yet an examination of the papers of Attorney General Homer S. Cummings reveals why FDR and his advisors believed that he required no fewer than …

A Hands-Off Approach To Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

At the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, the program organized by the Section on Law and Religion presented for consideration the claim that “the United States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and belief.” The Court, it was proposed, is — more and more — taking a “hands-off approach to religious doctrine.”

This proposal was, and remains, timely and important, as is illustrated by — to mention just a few, diverse examples — the ongoing property-ownership dispute between several “breakaway” Episcopal …

Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

At the Federalist Society's 2008 National Student Symposium, a panel of scholars was asked to consider the question, does pervasive judicial review threaten to destroy local identity by homogenizing community norms? The answer to this question is yes, pervasive judicial review certainly does threaten local identity, because such review can homogenize[e] community norms, either by dragging them into conformity with national, constitutional standards or (more controversially) by subordinating them to the reviewers' own commitments. It is important to recall, however, that while it is true that an important feature of our federalism is local variation in laws and values, it …

William H. Rehnquist: A Life Lived Greatly, And Well, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

Chief Justice Rehnquist leaves behind a formidable and important legacy in constitutional law. His work on the Court was animated and guided by the view that We the People, through our Constitution, have authorized our federal courts, legislators, and administrators to do many things - but not everything. Because the Nation's powers are few and defined, Congress may not pursue every good idea or smart policy, nor should courts invalidate every foolish or immoral one. However, for those of us who knew, worked with, learned from, and cared about William Rehnquist, it is his unassuming manner, the care he took …

The Rehnquist Court And The Groundwork For Greater First Amendment Scrutiny Of Intellectual Property, Mark P. Mckenna

Journal Articles

This contribution to the Washington University School of Law conference on the Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment addresses the Rehnquist Court's view of the role of the First Amendment in intellectual property cases. It argues that, while the Rehnquist Court was not eager to find a conflict between intellectual property laws and the First Amendment, there is reason to believe that it set the stage for greater First Amendment scrutiny of intellectual property protections. At the very least, the Court left that road open to future courts, which might be inclined to view intellectual property more skeptically.

The Lame Ducks Of Marbury, John C. Nagle

Journal Articles

The election of 1800 was one of the most contested - and important - in American history. After it became clear that neither President John Adams nor a Federalist majority in Congress had been reelected, they acted during the lame-duck period to preserve their influences far into the future. They did so by appointing John Marshall as Chief Justice, ratifying the Treaty with France, creating numerous new federal judicial positions, and filling many of those positions with friends, family, and Federalists (including William Marbury). Not surprisingly, Jefferson and his supporters protested these actions as contrary to the will of the …

The Supreme Court's Impact On Marriage, 1967-90, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

In the twenty years following Loving, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases dealing with the family. Although the Court reasoned that it was protecting marriage and extending such protection to other forms of families, the perverse effect of these decisions was to weaken the most traditional family type of all, the nuclear family. Adults, and particularly pregnant women and unwed fathers, triumphed in this move towards autonomy and rights. The vanquished included those who depended upon the family for love and sustenance: minor children, elderly adults, and longtime homemakers.

This paper discusses these cases from a family law …

Review Essay: Liberalism And The Supreme Court, Donald P. Kommers

Journal Articles

In Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Rogers M. Smith of Yale University takes stock of the American liberal tradition and its impact on the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. It argues that the tradition's political vision lacks philosophical coherence and that our constitutional law, by reflecting this incoherence, has failed to provide the legal community with a public philosophy suited to the needs of American society in the late twentieth century.His goal is to demonstrate the superiority of "rational liberty," both as a philosophical theory and practical guide to constitutional policymaking, over three major competing versions of liberal constitutionalism. To wit: …

Imagining The Past And Remembering The Future: The Supreme Court's History Of The Establishment Clause, Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

Our Framers through the Establishment Clause sought to prevent the government from preferring one religious sect to another. However, the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education abandoned that meaning of nonestablishment and created a general prohibition on all nondiscriminatory aid to religion, a decision later reinforced in Lemon v. Kurtzman. This Article discusses the Founder’s worldview and looks at other Establishment Clause cases to illustrate that the historical evidence is inconsistent with Everson. Rather, the founders intended to assure that religion would be aided only on a nondiscriminatory, or sect-neutral, basis and does not stand for …

The Supreme Court And The Constitution: The Continuing Debate On Judicial Review, Donald P. Kommers

Journal Articles

The three books reviewed in this essay are recent contributions to the growing literature of constitutional theory (Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Ha- ven: Yale University Press, 1982); Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); and John Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). They explore important questions about the role of the Supreme Court and the meaning of the Constitution.

Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, And Limitations, Nell Jessup Newton

Journal Articles

Judicial deference to federal legislation affecting Indians is a theme that has persisted throughout the two-hundred-year history of American Indian law. The Supreme Court has sustained nearly every piece of federal legislation it has considered directly regulating Indian tribes, whether challenged as being beyond federal power or within that power but violating individual rights.' This judicial deference often has been justified by invoking federal plenary power to regulate Indian affairs and the political question doctrine's requirement of deference to the political branches. Indeed, not until 1977 did the Court explicitly repudiate use of the political question doctrine to bar equal …