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Full-Text Articles in Law
Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen, Seth Davis
Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen, Seth Davis
Vanderbilt Law Review
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court deferred to an agency's controversial interpretation of a key provision of a regulatory statute. Lower courts now apply "Chevron deference" as a matter of course, upholding agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous provisions within the statutes they administer. Recently, however, the Court refused in King v. Burwell to defer to an agency's answer to a statutory question, citing the "deep economic and political significance" of the question itself. The Court in King offered barebones guidance regarding the scope of and rationales for embracing this so-called "major questions exception" …
Reading Remedially: What Does "King V. Burwell" Teach Us About Modern Statutory Interpretation, And Can It Help Solve The Problems Of Cercla § 113(H)?, Benjamin Raker
Vanderbilt Law Review
In the latter half of the twentieth century, Congress drafted a law to solve a problem. As decades passed, that problem became increasingly complex. In the new millennium, Congress became increasingly polarized, and increasingly unproductive. In the face of that inaction, the executive branch decided to rely on a provision of that earlier law to address a modern facet of that earlier problem. Or litigants decided to ask a court to rely on a provision of that earlier law to address a modern facet of that earlier problem. The Congress that drafted the law might not have understood this modern …
The Inference From Authority To Interpretive Method In Constitutional And Statutory Domains, Kevin M. Stack
The Inference From Authority To Interpretive Method In Constitutional And Statutory Domains, Kevin M. Stack
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Should courts interpret the Constitution as they interpret statutes? This question has been answered in a wide variety of ways. On the one hand, many scholars and jurists understand constitutional and statutory interpretation as largely overlapping, continuous, or converging. For some, this overlap follows directly from the Constitution's status as a form of legislated law. In this way of thinking, because the Constitution, like a statute, was bargained over and formally adopted, it should be interpreted in accordance with general principles applicable to legislated law. Proponents of this view argue that if constitutional interpretation appears distinctive in practice, that is …