Law Commons^™

How To Interpret Statutes - Or Not: Plain Meaning And Other Phantoms, Steven Wisotsky

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

No abstract provided.

Administrative Law In The Roberts Court: The First Four Years, Robin K. Craig

Robin K. Craig

Given Justice David Souter’s retirement in the summer of 2009, the four U.S. Supreme Court terms that began in October 2005 and ended in June 2009 constitute a first distinct phase of the Roberts Court. During those first four terms, moreover, the Court decided a number of cases relevant to the practice and structure of administrative law.

This Article provides a comprehensive survey and summary of the Supreme Court’s administrative-law-related decisions issued during this first phase of the Roberts Court. It organizes those decisions into three categories. Part I of this Article discusses the Supreme Court decisions that affect access …

Ip And Antitrust: Errands Into The Wilderness, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

IP AND ANTITRUST: ERRANDS INTO THE WILDERNESS

ABSTRACT

Antitrust and intellectual property law both seek to promote economic welfare by facilitating competition and investment in innovation. At various times both antitrust and IP law have wandered off this course and have become more driven by special interests. Today, antitrust and IP are on very different roads to reform. Antitrust began an Errand into the Wilderness in the late 1970s with a series of Supreme Court decisions that linked the plaintiff’s harm and right to obtain a remedy to the competition-furthering goals of antitrust policy. Today, patent law has begun its …

How Many Plaintiffs Are Enough? Venue In Title Vii Class Actions, Piper Hoffman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article critiques the recent rash of federal district court opinions holding that all named plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must satisfy the venue requirements in the court where they filed the action. Neither the text nor the history of Title VII requires this prevailing interpretation; to the contrary, requiring every named plaintiff to satisfy venue requirements in the same court undermines the legislative purpose behind both Title VII and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by creating a new obstacle to employees seeking to enforce …

The Food Stays In The Kitchen: Everything I Needed To Know About Statutory Interpretation I Learned By The Time I Was Nine, Hillel Y. Levin

Scholarly Works

What happens when kids and their parents interpret laws like lawyers and judges? Where and why does interpretation go off the rails?

Based on a true story, this piece starts with a proclamation by Mother, the Supreme Lawmaker, that "no food may be eaten outside the kitchen." What follows is a series of rulings by Judges - father, babysitter, grandma (a liberal jurist, of course), etc. - who, using traditional tools of interpretation, eventually declare it to mean that all food may be eaten outside of the kitchen. Ultimately, the supreme lawmaker reacts and clarifies.

The piece is meant to …

Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry Into Legal Interpretation, Anup Malani

Anup Malani

Most scholarship on statutory interpretation discusses what courts should do with ambiguous statutes. This paper investigates the crucial and analytically prior question of what ambiguity in law is. Does a claim that a text is ambiguous mean the reader is uncertain about its meaning? Or is it a claim that readers, as a group, would disagree about what the text means (however certain each of them may be individually)? This distinction is of considerable theoretical interest. It also turns out to be highly consequential as a practical matter.

To demonstrate, we developed a survey instrument for exploring determinations of ambiguity …

Ambiguities In Articles 5(2), 121 And 123 Of The Rome Statute, Roger S. Clark

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law

No abstract provided.

Interpreting Eminent Domain In Missouri: Elimination Of Blight Is Allright, Anita J. Patel

Missouri Law Review

This Note argues that the court in Allright improperly interpreted the statute's requirement of a specific finding of blight for each parcel but it properly applied the predominance requirement. It also examines the impact of the new eminent domain legislation in Missouri and argues that the legislation does not provide as much protection to private property owners as the legislature claims.

Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Review: A Case Of The Tail Wagging The Dog, Michael Halley

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A response to John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003 (2009). Professor John Manning's analysis of the Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions works as a platform to further the cause of textualism. His argument fails to persuade, however, because the textualism he says the Court should embrace in federalism cases is antithetical to the atextual nature of the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislation. Manning prefaces his work by telling readers that his analysis is not an end in itself. His aim, rather, is to "use the methodology" the …

Looking For Fair Use In The Dmca's Safety Dance, Ira Nathenson

Ira Steven Nathenson

Like a ballet, the notice-and-take-down provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") provide complex procedures to obtain take-downs of online infringement. Copyright owners send notices of infringement to service providers, who in turn remove claimed infringement in exchange for a statutory safe harbor from copyright liability. But like a dance meant for two, the DMCA is less effective in protecting the "third wheel," the users of internet services. Even Senator John McCain - who in 1998 voted for the DMCA - wrote in exasperation to YouTube after some of his presidential campaign videos were removed due to take-downs. McCain …

Chevron'S Two Steps, Kenneth A. Bamberger, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations of regulatory statutes set forth in the landmark Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council decision prescribes two analytic inquiries, and for good reason. The familiar two-step analysis is best understood as a framework for allocating interpretive authority in the administrative state; it separates questions of statutory implementation assigned to independent judicial judgment (Step One) from questions regarding which the courts role is limited to oversight of agency decisionmaking (Step Two).

The boundary between a reviewing court's decision and oversight roles rests squarely on the question of statutory ambiguity. For while courts, …

Not-So-Informed Consent: Using The Doctor-Patient Relationship To Promote State-Supported Outcomes, Amanda Mcmurray Roe

Case Western Reserve Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Hidden Legacy Of Holy Trinity Church: The Unique National Institution Canon, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

This Article explores an underappreciated legacy of the Supreme Court's (in)famous decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States. Although Holy Trinity has been much discussed in the academic literature and in judicial opinions, the discussion thus far has focused almost exclusively on the first half of the Court's opinion—which declares that the "spirit" of a statute should trump its "letter"—and relies on legislative history to help divine that spirit. Scholars and jurists have paid little, if any, attention to the opinion's lengthy second half. In that second half, the Court tells a detailed narrative about the country's …

Which Is To Be Master, The Judiciary Or The Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation Of Powers, Linda Jellum

Articles

Statutory interpretation is at the cutting edge of legal scholarship and, now, legislative activity. As legislatures have increasingly begun to perceive judges as activist meddlers, some legislatures have found a creative solution to the perceived control problem: statutory directives. Statutory directives, simply put, tell judges how to interpret statutes. Rather than wait for an interpretation with which they disagree, legislatures use statutory directives to control judicial interpretation. Legislatures are constitutionally empowered to draft statutes. In doing so, legislatures expect to control the meaning of the words they choose. Moreover, they prefer to do so early in the process, not after …

Understanding The Paradoxical Case Of The Voting Rights Act, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This is an article about the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its curious handling by the U.S. Supreme Court. When the Court examines the constitutionality of the Act, for example, it blindly defers to the work of Congress, unwilling to subject the statute to any meaningful scrutiny. In contrast, this posture of deference for questions of constitutional law differs greatly from the Court’s posture when interpreting the language of the statute. This is an area where the Court defers to no one, even when the text of the statute or the clear intent of Congress demands a different outcome. …

May Legislative History Be Considered At Chevron Step One: The Third Circuit Dances The Chevron Two-Step In United States V. Geiser, Melina Forte

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court As Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg's Eclectic Approach To Statutory Interpretation Symposium: The Jurisprudence Of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg: A Discussion Of Fifteen Years On The U.S. Supreme Court, James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court is in the midst of an extended debate regarding the proper approach to construing federal statutes. A number of Justices have engaged in heated dialogue addressing the pros and cons of textualism or intentionalism, as well as the virtues and limitations of Chevron deference. Although Justice Ginsburg has not participated in these judicial exchanges, she has adopted her own approach to the challenge of interpreting federal statutes. This Article explores Ginsburg’s approach by focusing on four opinions that construe federal criminal laws and three that interpret labor relations and anti-discrimination laws. The Article’s central thesis is that …

The Warp And Woof Of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches In Tax Law And Workplace Law, James J. Brudney, Corey Distlear

Faculty Scholarship

Debates about statutory interpretation-and especially about the role of the canons of construction and legislative history-are generally framed in one-size-fits-all terms. Yet federal judges including most Supreme Court Justices-have not approached statutory interpretation from a methodologically uniform perspective. This Article presents the first in-depth examination of interpretive approaches taken in two distinct subject areas over an extended period of time. Professors Brudney and Ditslear compare how the Supreme Court has relied on legislative history and the canons of construction when construing tax statutes and workplace statutes from 1969 to 2008. The authors conclude that the Justices tend to rely on …

Process-Based Preemption, Bradford R. Clark

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

The question of preemption arises because the Constitution establishes a federal system with two governments (one federal and one state) that have overlapping power to regulate the same matters involving the same parties in the same territory. To succeed, such a system requires a means of deciding when federal law displaces state law. The Founders chose the Supremacy Clause (reinforced by Article III) to perform this function. Although seemingly one-sided, the Clause actually incorporates several important political and procedural safeguards designed to preserve the proper balance between the governance prerogatives of the federal government and the states. It does this …

Shadow Precedents And The Separation Of Powers: Statutory Interpretation Of Congressional Overrides, Deborah Widiss

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In both judicial decisions and critical commentary on statutory interpretation, the possibility of congressional override is generally considered a significant balance to the countermajoritarian reality that courts, through statutory interpretation, make policy. This Article demonstrates that the "check" on judicial power provided by overrides is not as robust as is typically assumed. One might assume that overridden precedents are functionally erased or reversed. But because Congress technically cannot overrule a prior decision, courts must determine whether the enactment of an override fully supersedes the prior judicial interpretation. Overrides thus raise unique, and previously largely ignored, questions of statutory interpretation. Using …

Tax Shelters And Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, Shannon Weeks Mccormack

Articles

Few are unaware that the Tax Code and Regulations provide a detailed, complex (and lengthy) set of rules. It is hardly surprising (or new) that taxpayers attempt to avoid these rules to lower their taxes. Courts and lawmakers have long grappled to identify abusive transactions and strip taxpayers of the associated tax savings. The transactions have, however, changed dramatically over the last decade making the task much more challenging. The rapid proliferation of aggressive and diverse tax shelters has created what many refer to as a tax shelter war. In general, tax shelters refer to transactions carefully designed to fit …